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1.1 Motivation and Object of Research 
US President Donald Trump signed the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” to “make America 
competitive again”1 on December 22, 2017. Among others, a competitive disadvantage for US 
firms was perceived due to the relatively high statutory tax rate: with 35 %, the US tax rate for 
corporations belonged to the highest in a worldwide comparison. Furthermore, the applicable 
worldwide tax system in the US imposed taxes on foreign income upon repatriation, while most 
European countries follow the territorial tax system and exempt foreign profits from taxation. 
The combination of the high home country tax rate and the worldwide tax system raised the 
perception that US firms paid higher taxes compared to their worldwide competitors. Thus, 
policymakers reduced the US statutory tax rate to 21 % and replaced the worldwide tax system 
by a territorial tax system in the beginning of 2018. 
However, a previously raised debate on tax avoidance strategies highlights in particular 
low effective tax rates (ETRs) of US firms and does not suggest that (all) US firms face high 
tax expenditures – not even prior to the US tax reform. For example, Amazon.com, Inc. is 
accused of paying only 3.6 % taxes worldwide in 2011,2 while Google LLC and Apple Inc. are 
claimed to have very low foreign effective tax rates of 3.2 % and 2.5 %, respectively.3 
Moreover, in an interview regarding the tax planning strategies of Apple Inc., Margrethe 
Vestager (the European Union’s commissioner for competition) said that it “is irritating when 
American companies pay less in taxes than European ones”4. Her statement demonstrates that 
the perception of a competitive disadvantage of US firms is not shared by everyone.  
                                               
1  The Hill (11/12/2017), available at http://thehill.com/opinion/finance/364206-making-america-competitive-
again. 
2  Huffington Post (17/04/2012), available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/17/apple-corporate-
income-tax-rate_n_1429955.html. 
3  Bloomberg (11/12/2012), available at https://www.gadgetsnow.com/it-services/How-Google-saved-2-billion-
in-income-tax/articleshow/17567959.cms; Business Insider (05/11/2012), available at http://www.business 
insider.com/apple-tax-rate-2012-11?IR=T. 
4  Bloomberg (19/09/2016), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-19/eu-s-vestager-
signals-apple-just-the-start-of-u-s-tax-probes. 
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Those tax strategies of Apple Inc., Google LLC and Amazon.com, Inc. were also noticed 
by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). With its project 
against Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) the OECD endorsed a plan consisting of 15 
actions to hinder tax planning strategies that are inconsistent with the purpose and intent of tax 
legislation (Kadet, 2016). While so-called Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules are already 
implemented in many countries worldwide to circumvent profit shifting activities to low-tax 
countries, US CFC rules are often said to be ineffective and may be the reason for the very low 
tax expenditures of US firms.5 Similarly, European CFC rules are thought to become less 
restrictive after the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) “Cadbury Schweppes” 6 judgment in 
2006 limited the application to “wholly artificial arrangements”. Thus, among others aims, the 
OECD intends with its BEPS action plan to strengthen anti-tax avoidance measures such as 
CFC rules (OECD, 2015). 
In a globalized world, US and European firms compete with each other. Therefore, it is 
of particular interest whether one group faces a competitive (dis)advantage and why differences 
in tax expenditures exist. As anecdotal evidence regarding the competitiveness differs between 
the US and the European perspective, it is not clear whether in reality US or European firms 
are paying less tax. In addition, uncertainty exists whether initiatives such as the US tax reform 
or the OECD action plan are suitable to reduce those tax differentials. This thesis aims to 
enhance the understanding of tax differentials between US and European firms by considering 
the following challenges. 
First, the determination of an appropriate measure is crucial when comparing tax 
expenditures between US and European firms. While a myriad number of proxies for tax 
expenditures exists, differences that arise due to different measures are understood only 
                                               
5  Tax Justice Blog (20/07/2015), available at http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2015/07/like_a_campy_ 
horror_ movie_the.php#.V-gdyclrPo0. 
6  Judgment from September 12, 2006, C-196/04. 
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roughly. Thereby, it is important to understand the information content of the proxies used when 
comparing tax expenditures between US and European firms. ETRs are common measures for 
tax expenditures and are built by a ratio of tax expenditures and pre-tax income. Previous 
research spends effort in defining different ETRs (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008) 
and in interpreting the information content of each (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
However, previous research that analyzes ETRs between US and European firms comes to 
confounding results at a first glance: PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) finds higher tax expenses 
in terms of GAAP ETRs for US firms, while Avi-Yonah and Lahav (2012) suggest lower tax 
expenses in terms of CURRENT ETRs for US firms. With regard to those findings, it is not clear 
whether the differences arise due to the sample selection of different studies or whether they 
might be caused by different ETR measures.  
Second, the determinants of tax differentials are of particular interest when evaluating 
the potential consequences arising from the US tax reform. Prior literature suggests for example 
that businesses with high values of intangibles and research and development expenses are more 
engaged in profit shifting activities (Grubert, 2003; Harris, 1993). However, the home country 
tax legislation such as the statutory tax rate, CFC rules (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Thornock, 2017; Dunbar and Duxbury, 2015; Grubert, 2012) or the international tax system 
(Dyreng and Markle, 2016; Markle, 2016; Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers, 2012) also 
impact tax expenditures. Markle and Shackelford (2012) suggest further that the location of a 
firm’s headquarters affects its worldwide tax expenditures. However, it is largely unexplained 
whether the tax differential between US and European firms arises from differences in firm 
characteristics, profit shifting opportunities or the home country tax legislation.  
Third, the OECD puts efforts into strengthening CFC rules with its ongoing BEPS action 
plan. While US CFC rules in particular are criticized of being ineffective, less is known about 
the effectiveness of European CFC rules. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) suggest that German 
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CFC rules were effective, as they find lower passive assets in subsidiaries affected by German 
CFC rules. Further studies confirm the economic relevance of European CFC rules (Egger and 
Wamser, 2015; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012). However, the ECJ required with its “Cadbury 
Schweppes” judgment of 2006 amendments to European CFC rules. As the application of CFC 
rules within Europe seems to become less restrictive after the ECJ judgment (Bräutigam, 
Spengel, and Streif, 2017), Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) suggest an increase of passive 
investments in European low-tax subsidiaries of German multinational corporations (MNCs) 
afterwards. Beyond this finding, empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of European 
CFC rules after the ECJ judgment is still scarce. 
The three essays of this thesis aim to contribute to the presented research gaps. The first 
essay “Alternative Effective Tax Rate Measures – An Assessment of Differences between US 
and European Firms” is a single author paper and thus has been created entirely under my own 
responsibility. The paper evaluates the information content of five different ETR measures and 
demonstrates the differences thereof between US and European firms. The analyses improve 
the understanding of the impact of tax and accounting legislation on different ETR measures. 
The second essay “Do US Firms Pay Less Tax than their European Peers? On Firm 
Characteristics, Profit Shifting Opportunities, and Tax Legislation as Determinants of Tax 
Differentials” is co-authored by Michael Overesch, Chair of Business Taxation at the 
University of Cologne and Georg Wamser, Chair of Public Finance at the University of 
Tuebingen. Among others, my contribution to this essay was the data collection and the 
implementation of all empirical analyses. The essay builds on the first essay, as it uses different 
ETR measures to analyze the tax differentials between listed US and European firms and the 
determinants thereof. With a more detailed approach it further investigates whether tax 
differentials between US and European firms can be attributed to firm characteristcs, profit 
shifting opportunities and home country tax legislation. Analyzing the determinants of those 
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tax differentials improves the understanding of the consequences arising from the US tax reform 
in 2017. The paper was presented at the Doctoral Research Seminar in Cologne 2016, the 3rd 
WU – Vienna University of Economics and Business Doctoral Seminar in Vienna 2016, 
the 40th European Accounting Association Annual Congress in Valencia 2017, the 3rd Berlin-
Vallendar Tax Conference in Vallendar 2017, the 4th Annual MaTax Conference in 
Mannheim 2017, the Seminar at Erasmus University Rotterdam 2018, and the Faculty Seminar 
of the Norwegian Centre for Taxation in Bergen 2018. 
The thesis concludes with the essay “The Cadbury Schweppes Judgment and its 
Implications on Profit Shifting Activities within Europe”, which is a single-author paper. Thus, 
except for a few comments on earlier versions, the complete essay has been developed by 
myself. The essay analyzes the impact of amendments to European CFC rules on profit shifting 
activities of European-owned subsidiaries compared to US-owned subsidiaries. While the 
second essay of this thesis analyzes the impact of CFC rules on the overall tax expenditures 
(ETRs) of MNCs, the third essay considers the subsidiary level of MNCs and analyzes the 
impact of CFC rules on pre-tax earnings. Further, the relative importance of different profit 
shifting channels is elaborated. Evaluating the Cadbury Schweppes judgment in more detail 
demonstrates the impact of CFC rules on profit shifting activities within Europe and gives 
suggestions on whether the intended OECD action of strengthening CFC rules will be effective 
in preventing undesired tax avoidance strategies. The paper was presented at the Doctoral 
Research Seminar in Cologne 2018 and the 41th European Accounting Association Annual 
Congress in Milan 2018. 
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1.2 Alternative Effective Tax Rate Measures – An Assessment of Differences between 
US and European Firms  
1.2.1 Research Question and Design 
The first essay “Alternative Effective Tax Rate Measures – An Assessment of 
Differences between US and European Firms” evaluates the expressive power of different ETR 
measures as proxies for tax expenditures. ETRs are common measures when analyzing tax 
expenditures, either in empirical research or by media coverage. However, studies that use 
different ETR measures when comparing tax expenditures between US and European firms 
suggest controversial results at a first glance. While higher GAAP ETRs for US firms are found 
by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011), lower CURRENT ETRs of US firms are suggested by Avi-
Yonah and Lahav (2012). 
My study reviews the definitions of five ETR measures and points out the differences 
thereof. Thereby, I concentrate on the so-called GAAP ETR, CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, 
CASH ETR5, and FOREIGN ETR. To illustrate the differences between ETRs and the 
explaining impacts, I compare those measures between US and European firms and demonstrate 
differences that for example, arise over time or exist between different subsamples. Further, I 
conduct a case study and analyze the ETRs of three US firms (Apple Inc., Amazon.com, Inc., 
and Google LLC) and one European firm (the German-based SAP SE). Additional information 
gathered from the notes to income taxes of the consolidated statements supports the 
understanding of the impact of tax and accounting legislation on ETRs.  
My explorative analyses are based on US and European firms with consolidated 
financial data information in the Compustat and Compustat Global databases. Calculating the 
FOREIGN ETR of European firms requires also unconsolidated financial statement information 
and ownership structures reported by the Amadeus database. The main analyses focus on the 
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most recent years 2011 to 2015, while some additional analyses go back to the year 1996. The 
basic sample consists of 3,456 US firms and 2,826 European firms.  
1.2.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
My analyses suggest that higher GAAP ETRs of US firms compared to European firms 
are attributable to higher deferred tax expenses of US firms. Comparisons of ETRs that do not 
include domestic deferred tax expenses (i.e., CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, CASH ETR5, and 
FOREIGN ETR), suggest lower ETRs for US firms compared to European firms. The analyses 
demonstrate further that in particular the home country tax and accounting legislations should 
be considered before criticizing the low level of an ETR measure. E.g., lower CASH ETRs of 
US firms do not necessarily arise due to tax aggressive strategies, as specific accounting 
legislation on employee stock options under US GAAP can also result in low cash taxes paid. 
Knowing what each measure is (not) able to capture and noticing the impacts on different 
ETR measures improves the understanding of supposedly contradictory results of prior 
research. Thus, my paper contributes to research that compares ETR measures of different 
countries (Avi-Yonah and Lahav, 2012; Markle and Shackelford, 2012; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011; Swenson and Lee, 2008) and those that are discussing suitable 
proxies for tax expenditures (Blouin, 2014; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). The implications of 
my study should assist future research in choosing an appropriate ETR measure. My results 
further raises sensitivity for judgments based on one single ETR measure, as a low ETR does 
not necessarily arise due to aggressive tax strategies. 
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1.3 Do US Firms Pay Less Tax than their European Peers? On Firm Characteristics, 
Profit Shifting Opportunities, and Tax Legislation as Determinants of Tax 
Differentials 
1.3.1 Research Question and Design 
The second essay “Do US Firms Pay Less Tax than their European Peers? On Firm 
Characteristics, Profit Shifting Opportunities, and Tax Legislation as Determinants of Tax 
Differentials” builds on the first essay and examines the tax differentials between US MNCs 
and their European peers in more detail. With the tax reform “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” enacted 
in December 2017, the US responded to arguments that US MNCs are disadvantaged in a 
worldwide comparison. First, the relatively high statutory tax rate has been criticized and 
second, the applicable worldwide tax system was seen as a disadvantage for US MNCs (e.g., 
Swenson and Lee, 2008). While foreign profits were taxed when repatriated to the US, most 
European countries have implemented the territorial tax system and exempt foreign income 
from taxation. However, not everyone agrees with those arguments and very low ETRs of US 
MNCs are used to counteract. E.g., with regard to Apple Inc., which achieved an effective 
foreign tax rate well below 4 % in recent years, the European Union’s commissioner for 
competition has seen a competitive advantage for US firms compared to their European peers 
already prior to the US tax reform.7  
With this study we add to the current debate, whether US MNCs or their European peers 
pay less tax. Further, we are interested in the determinants of tax differentials and if those can 
be attributed to differences in firm characteristics or in the home country tax legislation between 
the US and Europe. We consider differences in home country statutory tax rates, tax planning 
                                               
7  Bloomberg (19/09/2016), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-19/eu-s-vestager-
signals-apple-just-the-start-of-u-s-tax-probes. For more examples, see The Financial Times (30/09/2013), 
available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6ff0ebc-29c4-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7de.html. 
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opportunities, CFC rules, and taxation systems of foreign income as potential explanations for 
tax differentials between US and European MNCs. 
In our analyses, we use GAAP ETR and FOREIGN ETR as measures for tax expenses. 
First, we employ a one-to-one propensity score matching with regard to observable firm 
characteristics and industry belongings to create pairs of very similar US and European MNCs. 
We then include pair fixed effects, given the prior matched pairs, in the regressions to analyze 
tax differentials between very similar US and European MNCs. We continue our analyses by 
including the home country statutory tax rates and proxies for profit shifting opportunities into 
the regressions to investigate whether these are determinants of tax differentials. Finally, we 
consider different tax reforms to investigate the influence of the home country tax legislation. 
We conduct a difference-in-differences set up to analyze how changes in the application of CFC 
rules and the international tax system affect tax expenses. Therefore, we consider the “Check 
the Box” (CTB) introduction and the Cadbury Schweppes judgment as tax reforms on US and 
European CFC rules in 2002 and 2006, respectively. The abolishment of a worldwide tax 
system in 2009 in the UK is used to investigate the impact of the international tax system.  
Our empirical analyses are based on large MNCs listed on the S&P500 or 
StoxxEurope600 stock market indices. Our final sample considers the period 1995 to 2015 and 
consists of 965 US firms and 1,015 European firms. We use consolidated financial data 
information from the Compustat and Compustat Global database. The sample is completed with 
unconsolidated financial data information and ownership structures reported by the Amadeus 
database. 
1.3.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
For the most recent years of 2012 to 2015, we find that US MNCs report a higher GAAP 
ETR compared to their European peers. However, a 3.3 percentage points lower GAAP ETR for 
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US MNCs is found if we condition on the home country tax rate. Irrespective of the home 
country tax rate US MNCs have significantly lower FOREIGN ETRs. 
Our analyses suggest that observable firm characteristics and the home country tax 
legislation explain most of the tax differential between US and European MNCs. First, the 
differences in ETRs between US and European MNCs can partially be attributed to enhanced 
profit shifting opportunities of US MNCs. Second, we demonstrate the impact of CFC rules. 
We show that ETRs of US MNCs fell after CFC rules became less effective with the CTB 
introduction in 2002. A similar effect is found for European MNCs after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment in 2006. While CFC rules affect the GAAP ETR and the FOREIGN ETR, 
the international tax system impacts the GAAP ETR only: the switch to a territorial tax system 
in UK has reduced the GAAP ETR while the FOREIGN ETR of UK-based MNCs is unchanged. 
Finally, a residual tax differential between US and European MNCs has to be attributed to 
unobservable effects associated with being a US firm. 
Those findings help to interpret the impacts of the US tax reform on the tax differential 
between US and European MNCs. First, a lower US statutory tax rate will compensate the 
disadvantage of US MNCs arising from a higher home country tax rate compared to European 
MNCs. However, the considered applicable tax rate of 21 % is quite low and thus, will result 
in a competitive advantage for US firms. Moreover, the switch to a territorial tax system will 
further increase the tax differential in terms of GAAP ETR between US and European firms. 
However, the changes in the international tax system will not affect the tax differential in terms 
of FOREIGN ETR between US and European firms.  
Previous studies compare tax expenditures of US and European MNCs (Avi-Yonah and 
Lahav, 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). We contribute to this strand of literature and 
provide a thorough comparison of tax expenses between US and European MNCs as our 
approach uses different measures of ETRs. Allowing for pairwise comparisons and 
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conditioning on firm-specific characteristics, our analyses support the findings of the 
unconditional comparisons in the first essay of this thesis. Moreover, we attribute the tax 
differential to firm characteristics and home country tax legislation and thus, contribute to prior 
literature that analyzes the determinants of effective tax expenses (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, 
and Thornock, 2017; Plesko, 2003; Rego, 2003), changes in CFC rules (Dunbar and 
Duxbury, 2015; Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2013; Altshuler and Grubert, 2006), and changes in 
the international tax system (Markle, 2016; Egger, Merlo, Ruf, and Wamser, 2015; Atwood, 
Drake, Myers, and Myers, 2012).  
1.4 The Cadbury Schweppes Judgment and its Implications on Profit Shifting 
Activities within Europe 
1.4.1 Research Question and Design 
The essay “The Cadbury Schweppes Judgment and its Implications on Profit Shifting 
Activities within Europe” analyzes the impact of changes in CFC rules on profit shifting 
activities in more detail. CFC rules are established in many countries worldwide to limit profit 
shifting activities. In 2006, European countries had to adjust their CFC rules after the ECJ 
decided with its Cadbury Schweppes judgment that those rules infringe the principle of freedom 
of establishment. Thus, nowadays CFC rules are applicable to only wholly artificial 
arrangements within Europe. 
As the threshold to prevent the application of CFC rules within Europe is quite low after 
the Cadbury Schweppes judgment (Bräutigam, Spengel, and Streif, 2017), CFC rules are 
thought to be less effective in preventing profit shifting activities. Thus, European MNCs might 
increase those activities within Europe to minimize their overall tax payments. Thereby, several 
strategies can be used to shift pre-tax earnings to subsidiaries located in low-tax countries. The 
main channels are thought to be transfer pricing distortion and debt shifting activities 
(Dharmapala, 2014). 
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Addressing those issues, my empirical analyses are tripartite: first, I analyze whether 
less effective CFC rules result in an increase of pre-tax earnings of subsidiaries located in 
European low-tax countries. As only subsidiaries with a European parent company are affected 
by the ECJ judgment, I compare pre-tax earnings from subsidiaries with a European parent 
company to (unaffected) US-owned subsidiaries by implementing a difference-in-differences 
setting. In the second step of my analyses, I investigate whether the increase in pre-tax earnings 
is caused by profit shifting activities. Related to the first and second step, I analyze third, which 
profit shifting channels are used to shift pre-tax earnings to low-tax countries. 
 The empirical analyses are based on a dataset of 5,449 subsidiaries located in European 
low-tax countries. The sample period is restricted to the years from 2003 to 2011. The 
unconsolidated financial statement information is extracted from the Amadeus database. 
Statutory tax rate information were collected from tax surveys provided by PwC, KPMG, and 
EY. Country-specific characteristics as GDP, GDPC, the unemployment rate, and the 
corruption index are retrieved from the World Development Indicator Database and the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
1.4.2 Results and Contribution to the Literature 
The results of my difference-in-differences estimates confirm that European CFC rules 
became less effective in preventing profit shifting activities after the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. Pre-tax earnings of affected subsidiaries increase by approximately 10 % after the 
judgment in 2006. The finding is supported by several robustness tests. A more pronounced 
treatments effect is found for MNCs with enhanced profit shifting incentives or opportunities. 
The findings suggest that the increase in pre-tax earnings after the ECJ judgment is related to 
profit shifting activities. On average, 90 % of the increase in pre-tax earnings is attributable to 
transfer pricing activities, while less than 10 % is caused by debt shifting activities. All in all 
my findings suggest that strengthening CFC rules, as currently being pursued by the OECD, 
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could limit profit shifting activities. Moreover, my results contribute to the comparisons 
between the US and European home country tax legislations as they suggest that currently not 
only US but also European CFC rules do not circumvent profit shifting activities entirely.  
Prior literature suggests that CFC rules are effective in preventing profit shifting 
activities (Egger and Wamser, 2015; Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2012; Altshuler and 
Hubbard, 2002). Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) analyze the impact of the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment on the allocation of passive assets and suggest that German firms started to use low-
tax countries within Europe more heavily after 2006. The second essay of this thesis shows that 
the overall tax expenses (ETRs) of European MNCs decrease after the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. In addition, little is known about the consequences of the ECJ judgment on profit 
shifting activities within Europe. My analyses provide new insights to the impact of the ECJ 
judgment on profit shifting activities and to the relative importance of transfer pricing and debt 
shifting activities. Thus, the study contributes further to previous literature analyzing profit 
shifting channels (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017; Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). 
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Abstract: 
This paper describes five different effective tax rate (ETR) measures and analyzes their 
differences between US and European firms. Comparisons of GAAP ETRs suggest higher tax 
expenditures for US firms than for European firms. However, with regard to other ETR 
measures (e.g., CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, CASH ETR5, and FOREIGN ETR) lower tax 
expenditures are found for US firms. The analyses demonstrate that the higher GAAP ETRs of 
US firms are attributable to higher deferred tax liabilities. A case study with four firms enables 
a more detailed analysis of additional information from the notes of the financial statements. 
The findings suggest that the GAAP ETRs and CURRENT ETRs of US MNCs depend on the 
classification choices concerning undistributed foreign earnings. Further, specific accounting 
legislation for employee stock options can explain low CASH ETRs.  
 
Keywords: Effective Tax Rate, Tax Avoidance, Tax Expenses, Taxes Paid, Accrual Accounting 
 
20 
 
Chapter 2 
Tables .................................................................................................................................. 21 
Figures ................................................................................................................................ 21 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................... 22 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Prior Literature ......................................................... 25 
2.2.1 Alternative Measures of Tax Expenditures ..................................................... 25 
2.2.2 Conceptual Framework of Foreign Earnings .................................................. 30 
2.2.3 Deviating Results of Prior Research ............................................................... 31 
2.3 Differences in ETRs between US and European Firms ........................................... 33 
2.3.1 Sample Selection ........................................................................................... 33 
2.3.2 Univariate Analyses ....................................................................................... 34 
2.3.3 Explorative Analyses ..................................................................................... 43 
2.4 Clarification of Results – A Case Study Example .................................................... 45 
2.4.1 Firm Selection and Procedure ........................................................................ 45 
2.4.2 Differences in the ETRs of Selected Firms ..................................................... 46 
2.4.3 Potential Influence of the US Tax Reform ...................................................... 51 
2.4.4 Suitability of ETRs to Define Tax Avoidance ................................................ 54 
2.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 57 
Appendix ............................................................................................................................. 59 
References ........................................................................................................................... 66 
 
  
 
21 
 
Tables 
Table 1. Deciles of ETRs ...................................................................................................... 56 
Table A1. Overview of Effective Tax Rates .......................................................................... 59 
Table A2. Variable Definitions ............................................................................................. 60 
Table A3. Sample Selection .................................................................................................. 61 
Table A4. Descriptive Statistics ............................................................................................ 61 
 
Figures 
Figure 1. Alternative ETRs ................................................................................................... 35 
Figure 2. GAAP ETRs of Different Countries ....................................................................... 38 
Figure 3. GAAP ETRs of Subsamples .................................................................................. 40 
Figure 4. Development of GAAP ETR over Time ................................................................. 42 
Figure 5. Distribution of GAAP ETR .................................................................................... 44 
Figure 6. Alternative ETRs of Selected Firms ....................................................................... 47 
Figure A1. ETR Comparison over different Countries .......................................................... 62 
Figure A2. ETR Comparison over Subsamples ..................................................................... 63 
Figure A3. ETR Comparison over Time ............................................................................... 64 
Figure A4. Distribution of ETRs ........................................................................................... 65 
  
 
22 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Apple Inc. (in the following “Apple”), Amazon.com, Inc. (in the following “Amazon”), 
Google LLC (in the following “Google”) and most of the other firms accused of being tax 
aggressive in a recent debate are headquartered in the US. Thus, it is astonishing that the Tax 
Foundation assumes higher effective tax rates (ETRs) for US firms than for non-US firms.8 For 
example, Amazon is criticized for paying less than 3.6 % of its income on taxes in 2011.9 
However, it is not mentioned in that context that Amazon’s average effective tax rate (GAAP 
ETR) is 31.6 % and therewith higher than the mean ETR of US firms in the same year. Further, 
Apple is claimed as being “America’s largest tax avoider”10 due to its foreign effective tax rate 
(FOREIGN ETR) of only 2.5 % in 2011. While that rate is based on foreign income and foreign 
tax expenses only, the overall ETR (GAAP ETR) of Apple is 24.2 % and therewith significantly 
higher. Those examples show that, first, various measures for tax expenditures exist, and 
second, differences arise between those measures. 
The examples demonstrate further that ETRs are common measures to analyze tax 
expenditures. While the different tax measures mentioned above might result in deviating 
findings at a first glance, it is important to understand the information content of each of these 
measures. The purpose of this paper is to describe and point out the differences in various ETR 
measures. Therefore, I focus on five different ETR measures and clarify the information content 
of each. The interpretation of the components and the explanations of the impact of tax and 
accounting legislations on ETRs should help future research in choosing a meaningful ETR and 
establishing an efficient research model. The study aims to raise sensitivity to interpretations 
                                               
8  Dittmer (2011) compares the results of four studies analyzing the ETRs of US firms and finds an ETR of non-
US firms that is on average 7.2 percentage points lower than the ETR of US firms. 
9  Huffington Post (17/04/2012), available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/17/apple-corporate-
income-tax-rate_n_1429955.html. 
10  New York Times (21/05/2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/technology/ceo-denies-that-
apple-is-avoiding-taxes.html. 
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made based on a single ETR measure, as those in the examples of Apple and Amazon 
demonstrated above. 
To illustrate the differences between various ETR measures, I calculate and compare 
each measure for US and European firms. While there is a disagreement over who pays more 
taxes, the result of my comparisons suggests that conflicting findings of prior analyses can be 
attributed to the use of different ETR measures. US firms face higher GAAP ETRs than 
European firms do, as the GAAP ETR includes deferred tax expenses and these are on average 
higher for US firms. However, comparisons of ETRs based on current tax expenses (CURRENT 
ETR) or cash taxes paid (CASH ETR or CASH ETR5) result in lower ETRs for US firms. 
Comparing an ETR measure that focuses on foreign tax expenses and foreign pre-tax income 
only, i.e., FOREIGN ETR, also suggests a lower ratio for US firms. Comparing not only ETR 
measures between US and European firms but also between various subsamples demonstrates 
that US multinationals face lower tax expenditures than do purely domestic firms, while the 
difference between European multinationals and domestic firms is not notable. 
Furthermore, I conduct a case study to give specific examples for the differences 
between several ETR measures. For this, I focus on three US firms and one European firm. 
Additional information on the income tax accounting from the notes to the financial statements 
confirms prior assumptions and thus helps to understand the impact on ETRs. Examples of the 
selected US firms support the importance of deferred tax expenses and demonstrate that ETRs 
are affected by classification choices on undistributed foreign earnings. For instance, a lower 
GAAP ETR and a similar CURRENT ETR result if a firm classifies its undistributed foreign 
earnings as permanently reinvested outside the US and thus does not recognize deferred tax 
liabilities. Analyzing the notes to the consolidated statements suggests further that the CASH 
ETRs of the selected US firms are particularly low due to specific accounting principles on 
employee stock options. In contrast, the notes to the income taxes of the selected European firm 
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demonstrate that its ETRs are not affected by classification choices and do not indicate a 
particular importance of employee stock options. 
My paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, earlier literature 
illustrates the compositions and implications of different ETR measures (e.g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman, 2010), book-tax differences (e.g., Lisowsky, Robinson, and Schmidt, 2013), and 
unrecognized tax benefits (e.g., Lee, Dobiyanski, and Minton, 2015) as proxies for tax 
avoidance. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) developed a long-run CASH ETR to measure 
tax avoidance over several years. Further, different measures of taxes are used as proxies to 
analyze the determinants of tax expenditures (Gupta, Laux, and Lynch, 2016; Armstrong, 
Blouin, and Larcker, 2012; Cheng, Huang, Li, and Stanfield, 2012; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and 
Shevlin, 2010; Collins and Shackelford, 2003; Rego, 2003; Plesko, 2003).  
Second, my analyses contribute to research that is struggling with defining tax 
aggressiveness. While ETRs are common proxies when analyzing tax avoidance, Blouin (2014) 
discusses the concepts of measuring tax aggressiveness and concludes that ETRs are imperfect 
measures to capture aggressive tax planning activities. In line with that statement, Hanlon and 
Heitzman (2010) point out that the definition of aggressive tax behavior is in the “eyes of the 
beholder”. While ETRs are one of the most common measures used in empirical analyses, my 
paper improves the understanding of the information content of different ETR measures and 
sensitizes for their suitability for measuring tax aggressiveness. 
Third, my paper analyzes why research comparing tax expenditures between US and 
non-US firms comes to conflicting results. While PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) suggests 
higher GAAP ETRs for US firms than for European firms, Avi-Yonah and Lahav (2012) find 
lower CURRENT ETRs for US firms. Lower CASH ETRs for US firms than for firms from 
Australia, France, Germany and the UK are found by Markle and Shackelford (2012). My study 
supports the interpretation of empirical results and helps to understand the differences that arise 
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due to the ETR measure used. Moreover, my analyses expand prior comparisons by considering 
the long-run CASH ETR5 and the FOREIGN ETR as additional measures for tax expenditures. 
Fourth, my paper discusses potential influences arising from the recent US tax reform. 
The US statutory tax rate was reduced from 35 % to 21 % and the worldwide tax system was 
replaced by a territorial one in the beginning of 2018 to “eliminate a source of competitive 
disadvantage for US companies”11. With regard to the firms selected for my case study, I 
discuss the impact of the US tax reform on their ETRs.  
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I review the 
definitions of different ETR measures and describe the institutional background. The sample 
selection and analytical results regarding the differences in ETRs between US and European 
firms are described in section 2.3. A case study is implemented in section 2.4. Section 2.5 
concludes. 
2.2 Theoretical Background and Prior Literature 
2.2.1 Alternative Measures of Tax Expenditures 
A number of measures are used to analyze tax expenditures. Thereby, the information 
content of each measure is crucial to know. As ETRs are common measures used in empirical 
analyses, I focus on (i) GAAP ETR, (ii) CURRENT ETR, (iii) CASH ETR and the related long-
run CASH ETR5, and (iv) FOREIGN ETR to compare tax expenditures between US and 
European firms. With the subsequent descriptions, I clarify the definition of each ETR measure 
to build a basic understanding for the comparison of ETRs between US and European firms 
that follows.12  
                                               
11  NY Mag (19/11/2017), available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/11/how-the-trump-tax-cuts-
would-reshape-our-economy.html. 
12  Table A1 of the appendix summarizes the findings. For a detailed variable description, please see table A2 of 
the appendix. 
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 (i) GAAP ETR 
Following ASC 74013 and IAS 12, the GAAP ETR is the ratio of total tax expenses to 
pre-tax income. Thus, it reflects the average tax rate payable for one unit of financial income 
(Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley, 2012; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010; Frank, Lynch, and 
Rego, 2009; Gupta and Newberry, 1997). Firms preparing their financial statements under US 
GAAP or IFRS are required to disclose this ratio in their notes, and thus, the GAAP ETR has 
several functions. As a reporting tool, the GAAP ETR should inform the stakeholders of the 
financial statements about the amounts, timing and uncertainty of future tax outcome (Demeré, 
Lisowsky, Li, and Snyder, 2017). 
GAAP ETR is calculated on an accrual basis and thus does not reflect the tax liability 
(or refund) arising from the current period’s tax return (Blouin, 2014). The numerator consists 
of the sum of current and deferred tax expenses. While current tax expenses (should) reflect tax 
expenses payable for the current period,14 deferred tax expenses represent future tax payments 
resulting from reversals of temporary book-tax differences. Tax planning strategies that defer 
tax payments to future periods (e.g., a more rapid depreciation for tax purposes) lead to a 
decrease in current tax expenses and a corresponding increase in deferred tax expenses. Thus, 
deferred tax planning strategies do not affect the GAAP ETR, while the ratio is affected by tax 
planning strategies that result in a permanent benefit (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). 
Permanent book-tax differences do not cause deferred tax expenses and solely lead to a decrease 
in current tax expenses (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). For example, dividends are tax exempted 
in certain countries and thus, result in a permanent difference that would lower the firm’s GAAP 
ETR in the year the dividend is received. 
                                               
13  Formerly known as SFAS 109 “Accounting for Income Taxes”. 
14  That current taxes do not necessarily reflect the current tax liability will be discussed below when explaining 
the information content of the CURRENT ETR. 
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Previous literature (Badertscher, Katz, Rego, and Wilson, 2017; Salih, Sheikh Obid, and 
Annuar, 2013) differentiates between conforming and nonconforming tax avoidance. The 
deductibility of interests is an example of a conforming tax strategy, as it reduces the taxable 
and the financial income. In contrast, a lower statutory tax rate in the subsidiary’s country of 
residence is seen as a nonconforming tax strategy, as the lower tax rate reduces only the taxable 
income, whereas the financial (pre-tax) income is not affected. While the nominator of the 
GAAP ETR is related to taxable income, the denominator (pre-tax income) reflects the financial 
income. For this reason, the GAAP ETR is affected only by nonconforming tax strategies, while 
conforming tax strategies reduce the nominator and denominator and thus have no impact on 
the GAAP ETR (Badertscher, Katz, Rego, and Wilson, 2017). 
The accrual basis might further cause variations in the GAAP ETR that are unrelated to 
tax planning activities. For example, changes in the tax contingency reserve or changes in the 
valuation allowance affect current or deferred tax expenses. However, those changes have no 
impact on pre-tax income and thus influence the GAAP ETR even if no (obvious) tax planning 
strategies were pursued (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). 
As a ratio, the GAAP ETR involves the issue of difficulties related to the interpretation 
of negative values. The ratio becomes negative if either the tax revenues exceed the tax 
expenses or the firm is making a loss, and thus, the pre-tax income becomes negative. In both 
scenarios, the informative value of the GAAP ETR is difficult to interpret. Interpretations should 
further be made carefully when a positive GAAP ETR arises from a negative nominator and a 
negative denominator. For these reasons, observations with a negative pre-tax income or 
negative tax expenses are usually not considered in analyses (Henry and Sansing, 2014). 
(ii)  CURRENT ETR 
CURRENT ETR is defined as current tax expenses divided by pre-tax income (Hope, 
Ma, and Thomas, 2013; Chen, Dhaliwal, and Trombley, 2012; Hanlon and Shevlin, 2002). 
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Deviating from the GAAP ETR, the numerator of the CURRENT ETR does not include deferred 
tax expenses. CURRENT ETR is thereby affected by deferral tax strategies, as a reduction in 
current tax expenses is not compensated by a corresponding increase in deferred tax expenses 
in the numerator. All other issues discussed in context with the GAAP ETR are also valid for 
the CURRENT ETR, as the CURRENT ETR is also based on accruals and builds a ratio of 
taxable and financial data (Salih, Sheikh Obid, and Annuar, 2013). 
However, Hanlon (2003) explains that current tax expenses are not a perfect 
approximation of current tax liabilities arising from a firm’s tax return. For example, she points 
out that employee stock options under US GAAP result in an overstatement of current tax 
expenses.15 Further typical examples for over- or understatements of current tax liabilities are 
specific accounting legislation for tax cushions and intra period tax allocation (e.g., McGill and 
Outslay, 2004; Gleason and Mills, 2002). 
 (iii) CASH ETR and CASH ETR5 
CASH ETR is the ratio of cash taxes paid to pre-tax income (Lennox, Lisowsky, and 
Pittman, 2013). Cash taxes paid are payments made in the current period and are usually 
reported in the cash flow statement. The CASH ETR reflects the taxes paid for one unit of 
financial income (Lee, Dobiyanski, and Minton, 2015; Chen, Chen, Cheng, and Shevlin, 2010). 
Like the GAAP ETR and the CURRENT ETR, the CASH ETR does not capture conforming tax 
avoidance, as pre-tax income still composes the denominator (Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010). 
The major difference compared to the previously discussed ETR measures is that the 
nominator of the CASH ETR is based on a payment instead of an accrual basis. This leads to 
some different informative values of the CASH ETR compared to the GAAP ETR and the 
CURERNT ETR: first, the CASH ETR does not explicitly reflect taxes accrued in the current 
                                               
15  Hanlon (2003) describes in detail how employee stock options do not result in expenses for accounting 
purposes while deductions are entitled for tax purposes. Another example is given by Edwards, Graham, Lang, 
and Shackelford (2012). 
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period. Instead, tax payments accrued in prior periods (e.g., subsequent payments after an IRS 
audit) or advance tax payments increase the ratio. The potential timing mismatch of nominator 
and denominator might result in a distorting CASH ETR. For example, the use of a loss carry 
forward can reduce the CASH ETR towards zero, even if a financial profit is reported. Second, 
unlike the GAAP ETR and the CURRENT ETR, the CASH ETR is not affected by changes in 
the tax contingency reserve or in the valuation allowance, as these affect solely the current or 
deferred tax expenses and not the cash taxes paid (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008).  
Furthermore, the CASH ETR does not suffer from an overstated numerator as, for 
example, caused by employee stock options (Gebhart, 2017). However, regarding the CASH 
ETR, another inconsistency arises with stock-based compensations: while the exercise of 
employee stock options reduces the tax payments in the respective year, a record of related 
stock options expenses and tax benefits is not required.16 Thus, the pre-tax income is not 
affected when options are exercised and typically overstated. The CASH ETR decreases as the 
numerator of the CASH ETR is reduced due to the tax deduction, while pre-tax income remains 
unchanged (Edwards, Graham, Lang, and Shackelford, 2012). 
The CASH ETR is in particular criticized for the timing mismatch. Thus, Dyreng, 
Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) developed a long-run CASH ETR to overcome this shortcoming. 
The CASH ETR5 sets a ratio of the sum of cash taxes paid over five years and the sum of pre-
tax income over the same period. The long-run CASH ETR can also be calculated for a longer 
period (e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008 analyze the CASH ETR10, which is measured 
over ten years). The long-run CASH ETR has in particular three properties (De Waegenaere, 
Sansing, and Wielhouwer, 2015; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). First, a potential timing 
mismatch between the nominator and denominator becomes less material. Second, a potential 
                                               
16  Instead, those tax benefits were added to equity without affecting net income. 
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overweight of extremely large or small effective tax rates is mitigated over time. Third, loss-
making years will not necessarily be excluded. 
 (iv) FOREIGN ETR 
FOREIGN ETR is defined as foreign tax expenses divided by foreign pre-tax income 
(Hope, Ma, and Thomas, 2013). It reflects the average foreign tax rate payable for one unit of 
foreign financial income. Unlike the three other ETRs presented above, the FOREIGN ETR 
does not consider the worldwide activities of a firm. Instead, it focuses on foreign activities and 
the related tax expenses, while tax expenses related to the respective home country are 
excluded. In addition to this difference, the FOREIGN ETR is comparable to the GAAP ETR. 
2.2.2 Conceptual Framework of Foreign Earnings 
The explanations above demonstrate that tax and accounting legislation, as for example 
the recognition of deferred taxes, have (different) impacts on ETR measures. Thus, it is 
important to understand the differences arising from tax and accounting legislations when 
comparing ETR measures between US and European firms. In particular, tax and accounting 
legislations regarding foreign earnings differ between the US and most European countries prior 
to the US tax reform in 2017.  
Until 2017, the worldwide tax system was applicable in the US. Thereby, foreign 
earnings were taxed in the US when repatriated. While taxes already paid in foreign countries 
could be credited on the US tax liability, foreign tax rate differentials granted only a temporary 
liquidity advantage for US firms, as the difference between the lower foreign tax rate and the 
higher US tax rate had to be paid when foreign earnings were repatriated. Those temporary 
differences were recognized as deferred tax liabilities. However, under US GAAP, permanent 
differences were considered when undistributed foreign earnings were intended to be 
indefinitely reinvested outside the US. In that case, no deferred tax liabilities were recognized 
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and a lower GAAP ETR were reported because the differences would not reverse over time 
(Baumann and Schadewald, 2001). 
In contrast to the worldwide tax system in the US, all European countries except Ireland 
have implemented a territorial tax system.17 Under the territorial tax system, foreign earnings 
are excluded from taxation when repatriated. As a consequence, tax rate differentials result in 
permanent differences and thus do not cause the recognition of deferred tax liabilities. However, 
with the tax reform in 2017 the US switched from the worldwide tax system to the territorial 
tax system and thus, became more comparable to most European countries.  
2.2.3 Deviating Results of Prior Research 
Different ETR measures are used by prior literature that analyzes tax differentials 
between US and European firms. Taking into account that GAAP ETR is based on accruals and 
in particular reflects permanent and nonconforming tax planning strategies, it is a common 
measure to compare tax expenses. Studies investigating the differences in tax expenses between 
US and European firms suggest that GAAP ETRs of US firms are higher than the GAAP ETRs 
of European firms. For example, a study of PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) analyzes the Forbes 
Global 2000 list and finds a 5.8 percentage points difference between the GAAP ETRs of US 
and European firms in the period from 2006 to 2009. 
As discussed above, the CURRENT ETR should preferably be used compared to the 
GAAP ETR when research is interested in deferral tax strategies. In contrast to the comparisons 
of GAAP ETRs between US and European firms, prior research finds a lower CURRENT ETR 
for US firms. Avi-Yonah and Lahav (2012) suggest a 4.0 percentage points lower CURRENT 
ETR for the largest US firms during the period from 2001 to 2010.  
                                               
17  See further worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
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While research analyzing the CASH ETR and the long-run CASH ETR5 has increased 
over the last years, a detailed analysis of the differences between US and European firms’ CASH 
ETRs does not exist so far to the best of my knowledge. However, Markle and 
Shackelford (2012) compare the CASH ETR between US firms and firms from Australia, 
France, Germany, and the UK in the period from 1988 to 2009 and suggest a lower one for US 
firms. Swenson and Lee (2008) confirm a lower CASH ETR for US firms than for non-US firms 
in 2006 and 2007. However, empirical evidence regarding the differences in the long-run CASH 
ETR between US and European firms is still rare. 
Furthermore, research that compares the FOREIGN ETR over different countries is 
scarce. A comparable analysis over different countries is complicated due to the rareness of 
data. While US firms are required to report foreign tax expenses and foreign pre-tax income, 
most other accounting standard setters worldwide do not require reporting foreign tax expenses 
and foreign pre-tax income.  
Concluding, higher tax expenditures in terms of GAAP ETR are found for US firms 
compared to European firms while comparisons regarding the CURRENT ETR or CASH ETR 
suggest lower tax expenditures for US firms.18 As most previous studies focus on a single ETR 
measure only and each study considers a different sample or approach, it is not clear whether 
deviating results can be attributed to the use of different ETR measures. Therefore, the 
following comparisons of tax expenditures between US and European firms consider all ETR 
measures presented above. Furthermore, the analyses demonstrate the importance of 
differences in tax and accounting legislations when comparing tax expenditures between US 
and European firms. 
                                               
18  The more detailed analyses of tax differentials between US and European firms that follows in chapter 3 of 
this thesis confirm the findings regarding different ETR measures. The analyses of chapter 3 are based on a 
matched sample of firms listed on the S&P500 and StoxxEurope600 stock market indices. 
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2.3 Differences in ETRs between US and European Firms 
2.3.1 Sample Selection 
In order to conduct my analyses, I require consolidated financial information of US and 
European firms. To maximize the number of observations, I impose only a minimum of 
requirements on my sample. I select firms from Compustat and Compustat Global that are 
incorporated in the US or Europe during the years 2011 through 2015. Then, I require non-
missing financial information to calculate GAAP ETR, CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR in order 
to conduct a comparison between different ETRs. However, I do not require non-missing 
financial information to calculate FOREIGN ETR, as this restriction would drop all domestic 
firms from my sample. I exclude countries with less than 100 observations over the considered 
five year period to mitigate a potential bias arising from countries with a limited data coverage. 
I define GAAP ETR in line with ASC 740 as tax expenses divided by pre-tax income. I 
adjust the latter for extraordinary items.19 CURRENT ETR is defined as current tax expenses 
divided by pre-tax income, and CASH ETR is calculated as taxes paid divided by pre-tax 
income.20 CASH ETR5 is defined as the sum of cash taxes paid of the last five years divided by 
the sum of the pre-tax income derived over the same period. I exclude observations if the 
numerator or denominator of the ETR is negative and generally exclude ETRs with values 
greater than one. These requirements reduce my sample to 3,456 US and 2,826 European 
firms.21 
For US MNCs, FOREIGN ETR is defined as foreign taxes divided by foreign pre-tax 
income. As European firms usually do not report foreign taxes and foreign pre-tax income in 
                                               
19  Please refer to table A2 of the appendix for a detailed variable description.  
20  While it is common in previous literature to adjust the pre-tax income by extraordinary items when computing 
the GAAP ETR, the adjustment is usually not made for other ETR measures. However, the results of the 
following analyses stay constant when computing the CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR considering the adjusted 
pre-tax income.  
21  Please refer to table A3 of the appendix for a detailed sample selection. 
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their consolidated financial statements, I follow the same approach as in chapter 3 of this thesis 
to calculate the FOREIGN ETR of European MNCs. Thereby, I approximate the foreign 
variables by subtracting domestic taxes and domestic pre-tax income from the overall tax 
expenses and the overall pre-tax income. The domestic information is obtained by combining 
ownership information with micro level financial information from the Amadeus database, 
which is provided by Bureau van Dijk. The domestic taxes (pre-tax income) of a European 
MNC are thereby calculated by summing up the tax expenses (pre-tax income) reported in the 
financial statements of all domestic subsidiaries. This approximation enables the comparison 
of 1,417 US and 466 European firms with regard to the FOREIGN ETR.22 
2.3.2 Univariate Analyses 
In the following analyses, I compare the average of five ETR measures between US and 
European firms. Thereby, I illustrate differences that arise between varying ETR measures. I 
continue with demonstrating differences between the US and several European countries and 
between different subsamples and illustrate the changes in ETRs arising over time. 
(i) Differences between ETRs 
Based on the ETR definitions and the sample selection described in section 2.2.1 and 
2.3.1, the following figure demonstrates the mean values of alternative ETR measures for US 
and European firms. 
                                               
22  An example of how the FOREIGN ETR is calculated is given within the variable description in table A2 of the 
appendix. Table A3 of chapter 3 of this thesis (page 117) provides a more detailed example of calculation. 
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Figure 1. Alternative ETRs 
 
Notes: The figure compares the averages of alternative ETRs between US and European firms. The sample is 
based on the years from 2011 through 2015. ETRs are defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
Figure 1 shows that US firms report a GAAP ETR that is 1.1 percentage points higher 
than that of European firms. As a statutory tax rate of 35 % is applicable in the US,23 the GAAP 
ETR of 28.6 % of US firms demonstrates that permanent differences reduce the tax expenses of 
US firms by 6.4 percentage points. In contrast, the average statutory tax rate of the European 
sample is 27.3 %.24 The slightly higher GAAP ETR of 27.5 % indicates that permanent 
differences increase the tax expenses of European firms. Thus, the higher GAAP ETR of US 
firms does not imply that they are less involved in tax planning strategies than European firms 
                                               
23  The statutory tax rate of 35 % is applicable during the considered time period from 2011 to 2015 and refers 
only to the statutory tax rate. Thus, it does not consider state and local taxes. The average combined statutory 
tax rate for the considered sample period is approximately 39 %. As the ETR reconciliation in the notes to 
income taxes of US firms typically refers to the statutory tax rate of 35 %, I will also concentrate on this rate.  
24  The statutory tax rates were collected from the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
Please refer to the descriptive statistics of this sample in table A4 of the appendix. 
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are. This finding leads to an important conclusion: it is important to know the statutory tax rate 
of the home country when interpreting the GAAP ETR.25 
Regarding the other four measures, figure 1 demonstrates lower ETRs for US firms than 
for European firms. While the CURRENT ETR of European firms is very similar to their GAAP 
ETR, US firms report on average a CURRENT ETR that is 14.7 % (4.2 percentage points) lower 
than their GAAP ETR. This implies that US firms recognize higher deferred tax expenses and 
thus are more involved in tax deferral strategies.26 
US firms also report a lower CASH ETR than European firms do. Notably, the difference 
between the cash-related measure (CASH ETR) and the accrual-related measure (CURRENT 
ETR) is higher for US firms (difference of 8.2 %) than for European firms (difference of 2.6 %). 
As US firms usually prepare their financial statements under US GAAP and European firms 
under IFRS, the finding implies higher deviations between current tax expenses and tax 
payments when preparing financial statements under US GAAP. As CASH ETRs decrease when 
employee stock options are exercised, and stock-based compensations are more common in the 
US than in Europe (Boeri, Licifora, and Murphy, 2013), a lower CASH ETR of US firms than 
of European firms seems reasonable. Figure 1 demonstrates further that the CASH ETR5 of US 
firms is higher compared to the single-year CASH ETR. Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008) 
obtain similar results and conclude that low CASH ETRs are not easy to obtain over a longer 
period of time. However, figure 1 demonstrates that these findings cannot be confirmed for 
European firms, as their average CASH ETR5 is slightly smaller than the single-year CASH 
ETR.  
                                               
25  In particular for domestic firms the home country statutory tax rate is a suitable benchmark level when 
analyzing GAAP ETRs. Herbert and Overesch (2015) argue that the average statutory tax rates of the home 
country and all host countries of a firm is a better benchmark level for MNCs. However, the home country 
statutory tax rate might also be a good starting point for MNCs as usually most of the income is generated, and 
thus taxable, in the home country of an MNC. 
26  The descriptive statistics in table A4 of the appendix further support this assumption. US firms report an overlap 
of deferred tax expenses, while European firms recognize on average an overlap on deferred tax earnings.  
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The tax differential between US and European firms is particularly high regarding the 
FOREIGN ETR: US firms face a FOREIGN ETR that is 7.5 percentage points lower than that 
of European firms. While the FOREIGN ETR is lower than the GAAP ETR of US firms, figure 1 
demonstrates the opposite for European firms. It is plausible to find foreign tax expenses lower 
than the overall tax expenses for US firms, as during the considered sample period, the US 
statutory tax rate is the highest in a worldwide comparison, and thus, foreign activities will 
usually be taxed at a lower foreign tax rate. Further, the higher FOREIGN ETR for European 
firms can be explained by foreign statutory tax rates that are on average higher than the 
applicable statutory tax rate in the respective home country. For example, the US activities of 
a UK firm are taxed at the higher US tax rate and thus lead to higher foreign tax expenses, while 
the applicable statutory tax rate in the home country is only 20 %.27 
All in all, my comparisons are in line with prior findings, as they suggest higher GAAP 
ETRs and lower CURRENT ETRs for US firms than for European firms. Furthermore, my 
findings expand prior comparisons by using additional ETR measures and suggest lower tax 
expenditures for US firms compared to European firms in terms of CASH ETR, CASH ETR5, 
and FOREIGN ETR, as well. 
(ii) Differences between Countries 
When comparing tax expenditures between US and European firms, tax expenditures 
from different European countries were combined into one measure. However, the home 
country of a firm might affect its ETR, as accounting and tax legislations differ across 
                                               
27  Note that this finding cannot necessarily be generalized, as the sample size is reduced by approximately 60 % 
when considering the FOREIGN ETR. 
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countries.28 To better understand the differences in ETRs between the US and certain European 
countries, the following figure shows the average GAAP ETR for each country.29 
Figure 2. GAAP ETRs of Different Countries 
 
Notes: The figure shows the average GAAP ETR of different countries. The sample is based on the years from 
2011 through 2015. GAAP ETR is defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
Figure 2 demonstrates that US firms have neither extremely high nor extremely low tax 
expenses compared to other firms headquartered in European countries. Italian firms have the 
highest average GAAP ETR with 39.2 %. While a statutory tax rate of 27.5 % is applicable for 
Italian firms within the considered sample period, an additional regional tax of 3.9 % on the net 
value of production applies to manufacturing firms. As the latter is calculated on the net value 
of production and thus is not related to pre-tax income, the Italian GAAP ETR is difficult to 
                                               
28  While each European country has its national accounting rules, all listed European firms prepare their 
consolidated statements in line with IFRS and are thus subject to uniform accounting rules. However, my 
sample also considers firms that are not listed and thus prepare their consolidated statements in line with the 
respective national GAAP. 
29  For presentational purposes, I will focus on GAAP ETRs in the following. However, all analyses are also 
conducted with the other ETR measures and are presented in the appendix. 
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interpret (Beuselinck and Pierk, 2018; Jaafar and Thornton, 2015). The lowest GAAP ETR is 
found for firms located in Ireland. This finding might be explained by the low statutory tax rate 
(12.5 %) applicable in Ireland.30 
Figure A1 of the appendix demonstrates the difference between the countries with 
regard to the other ETRs. It shows that US firms report the second lowest CASH ETR within 
the comparison of different countries. Moreover, irrespective of the ETR measure, Italian firms 
always have the highest ETR, while the ETRs of Irish firms are always quite low compared to 
other countries.  
(iii) Differences between Subsamples 
I continue with splitting the sample into different groups to examine whether the results 
vary within specific subsamples. I differentiate between multinational (MNCs) and domestic 
firms. In line with prior literature, I define a firm to be multinational either if its foreign pre-tax 
income is greater than zero (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2017) or if it has at least 
one majority-owned subsidiary located in a foreign country (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Firms 
that do not fulfill one of these requirements are then considered domestic. Another additional 
subsample includes firms that are listed on the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market 
indices. While my analyses compare the average ETRs only and thus do not look for differences 
in firm-specific characteristics, this subsample concentrates on US and European firms that 
should have at least some comparable characteristics (e.g., legal structure and firm size). 
Further, European firms that are listed on the stock market indices are required to prepare their 
consolidated financial statements in line with IFRS. Thus, the ETRs of those European firms 
are based on financial data prepared under the same accounting principles.31 
                                               
30  As mentioned above, Ireland is the only European country where the worldwide tax system is implemented. 
However, additional taxes on the repatriation of foreign income might not be substantial because Ireland has 
one of the lowest statutory tax rates in a worldwide comparison.  
31  While IFRS is obligatory for European firms listed on stock market indices, other firms can choose the 
accounting rules specific to their home country to prepare their consolidated statements. 
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Figure 3. GAAP ETRs of Subsamples  
 
Notes: The figure compares the average GAAP ETR between different subsamples of US and European firms. The 
sample is based on the years from 2011 through 2015. The first two bars (All) include all observations. A firm is 
considered as multinational (MNCs) if it has at least one foreign subsidiary or its foreign pre-tax income is greater 
than zero, all other firms are considered domestic (Domestics). The last two bars (Index) consider firms that are 
listed on the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market indices. The GAAP ETR is defined in table A2 of the 
appendix. 
Figure 3 shows the differences in GAAP ETRs between the different subsamples. In line 
with the prior finding of higher GAAP ETRs for US firms, US MNCs and the US firms listed 
on the stock market indices report also higher GAAP ETRs than do European firms. However, 
lower GAAP ETRs are found for purely domestic US firms and not for purely domestic 
European firms. This finding is particularly surprising, as US domestic firms face on average a 
higher statutory tax rate than do European domestic firms. 
Some remarks can further be given on differences arising within US or European 
subsamples. Comparing the GAAP ETR between European MNCs and European domestic 
firms, my results suggest lower tax expenses for MNCs. This result seems to be reasonable, as 
MNCs face permanent differences due to lower foreign tax rates, while those permanent 
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differences do not exist for domestic firms and thus do not affect their GAAP ETR.32 In contrast, 
US domestic firms report on average lower GAAP ETRs than do US MNCs. This implies that 
US domestics firms face either higher permanent differences or lower deferred tax liabilities 
than do MNCs. The latter possibility is more reasonable, as in contrast to domestic firms, US 
MNCs have to recognize deferred tax liabilities for the foreign tax rate differential related to 
undistributed foreign earnings (if they are not intended for reinvestment indefinitely).  
Figure A2 of the appendix shows the differences between the US and European 
subsamples with regard to the CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, CASH ETR5, and FOREIGN ETR. 
The figure demonstrates that in line with my basic results, the considered ETRs are lower for 
US firms than for the respective European subsample.33 It further shows that US domestic firms 
report in general lower ETRs than do US MNCs.34 The difference between the GAAP ETR and 
the CURRENT ETR demonstrates that deferred tax strategies reduce tax expenses by 24.3 % 
(6.3 percentage points) for US domestic firms and 10.5 % (3.2 percentage points) for US MNCs. 
These findings suggest that differences exist not only between US and European tax 
expenditures but also between US MNCs and US domestic firms.35 In contrast, the differences 
in ETRs between European MNCs and European domestics firms are quite small.  
(iv) Differences over Time 
While the previous comparisons are based on the recent years of 2011 through 2015, it 
is also interesting to determine whether the differences between US and European firms already 
                                               
32  This finding indicates that foreign activities reduce the overall tax expenses due to foreign tax rate differentials. 
This conclusion might be in contrast to the prior finding that European firms face a higher FOREIGN ETR than 
GAAP ETR. Those divergent results may arise due to the sample composition: the sample size is reduced by 
approximately 60 % when FOREIGN ETR is considered. However, more specific research is needed to 
understand these puzzling results. 
33  Only with regard to the CASH ETR5 US MNCs report a slightly higher rate than do European MNCs. 
34  Please note that the FOREIGN ETR cannot be calculated for domestic firms. 
35  Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2017) also note that US domestic firms are not disadvantaged 
compared to US MNCs. However, little is known about how US domestic firms compensate for the 
disadvantage arising from not having access to international tax avoidance strategies as US MNCs have.  
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existed in prior years. To understand the time trend in ETRs, the following figure demonstrates 
that the differences in US and European firms’ GAAP ETR have risen over time. 
Figure 4. Development of GAAP ETR over Time 
 
Notes: The figure compares the development in the average GAAP ETR between US and European firms. The 
sample is based on the years from 1996 through 2015. The GAAP ETR is defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
First, it is notable that the GAAP ETR decreased for US and European firms.36 The 
average GAAP ETR of US (European) firms was 32.2 % (33.1 %) from 1996 to 2000 and 
decreased by 3.6 (5.6) percentage points within the following fifteen years. A general decline 
in statutory tax rates (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock, 2017) and changes in tax 
legislations can be potential explanations. 
Interestingly, a higher GAAP ETR for US firms than for European firms is found in the 
more recent years only. While the average GAAP ETRs of US and European firms are very 
close to each other from 2001 to 2005, a higher average is found for European firms for the 
                                               
36  This finding is in line with prior research, e.g., Graham and Tucker (2006). 
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early years from 1996 to 2000. Even if the US tax legislation changed over time, the worldwide 
tax system and the (high) statutory tax rate were applicable until the last US tax reform in 2017. 
The combination of both tax legislation characteristics might explain why the GAAP ETR of 
US firms decreased (11.1 %) less than did the GAAP ETR of European firms (16.9 %), and thus, 
US firms have benefited less from a decline in statutory tax rates over the last twenty years. 
However, further research is necessary to prove this assumption. 
Figure A3 of the appendix demonstrates the trend over time for the CURRENT ETR, 
CASH ETR, CASH ETR5, and FOREIGN ETR of US and European firms. While all ETRs 
decreased over time for US and European firms, the FOREIGN ETR of European firms 
increased slightly. Consistent with the prior findings regarding those four ETRs, US firms also 
report in general lower ETRs than do European firms in earlier years. 
2.3.3 Explorative Analyses 
While the previous analyses focus on comparisons of the average ETRs between US 
and European firms, the findings do not inform about differences in the distribution of ETRs. 
Thus, it is unexplained whether the differences found in ETRs have general implications for the 
tax expenditures of US and European firms or whether notable differences exist within both 
groups. To analyze the differences in distributional characteristics of tax expenditures between 
US and European firms, the following figure presents histograms of the GAAP ETR for both 
samples. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of GAAP ETR 
 
Notes: The figure compares the distribution of the average GAAP ETR between US and European firms. The 
sample is based on the years from 2011 through 2015. The GAAP ETR is defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
To construct these histograms, I divide the sample with regard to the GAAP ETR into 20 
groups. Thus, the first bar on the left of each histogram presents the percentage of observations 
having a GAAP ETR below 5 %, the second bar presents the observations with a GAAP ETR 
between 5 % and 10 %, and so on. While the two fractions with the most observations of 
European firms belong to a GAAP ETR between 20 % and 30 %, the two fractions with the 
most observations of US firms belong to a GAAP ETR between 30 % and 40 %. However, it is 
clear when looking at figure 5 that more US firms report very low GAAP ETRs; the histograms 
show that 11.8 % of the US observations report a GAAP ETR below 5 %, while only 3.7 % of 
the European observations archive such a low GAAP ETR.  
This finding is even more pronounced with regard to the CURRENT ETR and the CASH 
ETR, as shown by figure A4 in the appendix. It demonstrates that the fraction with the most 
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observations of US firms belong to a CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR below 5 %, while the 
fractions with the most European observations belong to CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR 
between 20 % and 30 %. The finding implies that some notable differences exist in the 
distributions of the respective ETRS between US and European firms. The histograms further 
suggest that tax payments are unbalanced within the US: for example, more than 21 % of the 
US firms have a CASH ETR below 5 %, while more than 20 % of the US sample has a CASH 
ETR equal to or higher than 35 %. 
The distribution of the cash taxes paid tightens when considering the CASH ETR5 for 
US and European firms. Figure A4 of the appendix implies further that it is more difficult to 
maintain low CASH ETRs over several years. This finding is in line with the suggestions of 
Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew (2008). 
2.4 Clarification of Results – A Case Study Example 
2.4.1 Firm Selection and Procedure 
While the previous comparisons of ETRs between US and European firms allow a scope 
of interpretations and possible explanations only, the following case study investigates the 
raised assumptions using selected examples. Several MNCs, such as Apple, Amazon, and 
Google, are considered to be engaged in tax sheltering activities due to very low tax payments 
measured by ETRs.37 The following case study concentrates on these three US firms to assess 
the claims. I analyze their ETRs and demonstrate differences that arise in particular from 
different classification choices on undistributed foreign earnings. To understand those 
classification choices and additional issues that affect ETRs, I use more specific information 
                                               
37  Reuters (22/05/2013), available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-tax-avoidance/factbox-apple-
amazon-google-and-tax-avoidance-schemes-idUSBRE94L0GW20130522. For example Senator John McCain 
criticized Apple “as among America’s largest tax avoiders”, see New York Times (21/05/2013), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/technology/ceo-denies-that-apple-is-avoiding-taxes.html. 
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from the consolidated statements. The case study focuses on the year 2011, as the criticism on 
low ETRs arose in 2012 and thus is based on the prior year’s ETRs.  
Analyzing the differences in the ETRs between US and European firms, I further 
consider the German-based SAP SE (in the following “SAP”). I select SAP as a European firm, 
as it is comparable to the selected US firms because it is an MNC listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange. Thus, in addition to meeting IFRS reporting requirements, SAP also meets the 
reporting requirements of the Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”). This is why SAP 
reports foreign tax expenses and foreign pre-tax income in its annual report, although it is not 
required to do so under IFRS. As a consequence, all ETRs can be analyzed with the information 
from the consolidated statement.38  
I acknowledge that (as all case study results) the following findings depend on the firms 
selected for the study. However, I do not intend to make general conclusions based on this case 
study. Instead, I give examples and explanations for the findings of section 2.3. Thus, I am not 
concerned about the unbalanced selection of three US firms compared to one European firm. 
As the recent US tax reform will have an impact on tax expenditures, I will further discuss the 
potential changes on ETRs. The case study concludes with sensitizing for judgments based on 
the value of a single ETR. 
2.4.2 Differences in the ETRs of Selected Firms 
The following figure shows the different ETRs for Apple, Amazon, Google, and SAP 
in the year 2011. 
                                               
38  Please note that Compustat and Compustat Global collect their data from consolidated statements. Thus, the 
ETR measures calculated on the Compustat databases in section 2.3 can be confirmed and further analyzed 
with consolidated statement information. As SAP reports its foreign taxes and pre-tax income, the 
approximated FOREIGN ETR of section 2.3 can also be confirmed with the consolidated statement 
information; the approximated FOREIGN ETR differs from the FOREIGN ETR calculated on consolidated 
data information by less than 1 percentage point. For a more precise analysis, I will in the following consider 
the FOREIGN ETR calculated on the consolidated statement information.  
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Figure 6. Alternative ETRs of Selected Firms 
 
Notes: The figure shows the ETRs of Apple, Amazon, Google, and SAP. The data is based on the year 2011. ETRs 
are defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
Figure 6 shows that, for a given firm, material differences exist between the prior 
discussed ETRs. Without having further information, three crucial findings can be mentioned 
for the selected US firms in 2011. First, the GAAP ETR is below the US statutory tax rate 
of 35 % in all three cases. Second, the CURRENT ETR is always lower than the GAAP ETR. 
Third, the CASH ETR (and CASH ETR5) is smaller than the CURRENT ETR for all three US 
firms. 
The explanations of ETRs in section 2.2.1 and the notes on income taxes of the 
consolidated financial statements39 help in understanding those findings. In accordance with 
the definition of GAAP ETR, the first finding of a downward deviation compared to the US 
                                               
39  The consolidated financial statements of Apple, Amazon, and Google are available at https://www.sec.gov. 
The consolidated financial statements of SAP are available at https://www.sap.com/investors/en/reports/ 
downloadcenter.html. 
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statutory tax rate implies that the considered US firms are engaged in permanent tax planning 
strategies. For example, figure 6 shows that permanent tax planning strategies reduce Apple’s 
GAAP ETR to 24.2 %. Usually, the ETR reconciliation in the notes to income taxes explains 
the components of those permanent tax planning strategies. The ETR reconciliation of Apple40 
indicates that permanent differences arise in particular due to lower statutory tax rates 
applicable to permanently reinvested earnings of foreign subsidiaries. Tax rate differentials 
between the US and other countries, where earnings of foreign subsidiaries are reinvested 
permanently, decrease Apple’s GAAP ETR (total tax expenses) by 
approximately 11.4 percentage points ($3,898 million).41 Even if the magnitude differs in total 
values, the ETR reconciliations of Amazon and Google show that permanent differences also 
arise in particular due to foreign tax differentials and thus also explain the downward deviation 
of their GAAP ETRs from the US statutory tax rate.42 These findings suggest that the selected 
US firms benefit from lower foreign statutory tax rates and explain further why the reported 
FOREIGN ETR is lower than the reported GAAP ETR in all three cases. 
The second finding mentioned above is attributed to the difference between GAAP ETR 
and CURRENT ETR, in that the latter does not consider deferred taxes in the numerator. Thus, 
a lower CURRENT ETR arises from a lower numerator than that in the GAAP ETR and indicates 
that deferred tax liabilities exceed the deferred tax assets. As deferred tax liabilities present 
future tax payments, the three US firms presented in figure 6 are engaged in deferral tax 
strategies. The notes to income taxes report the composition of deferred taxes and thus show 
the reasons for the deviation between GAAP ETR and CURRENT ETR: in line with the 
expectation mentioned above, Apple’s deferred tax liabilities exceed its deferred tax assets.43 
                                               
40  C.f. Apple 10-K (2011), p. 63. 
41  Apple reports in its 10-K form of 2011 that no deferred tax liabilities have been provided on a cumulative total 
of $23,400 million, please refer to Apple 10-K (2011), p. 62. 
42  C.f. Amazon 10-K (2011), p. 66; Google 10-K (2011), p. 79. 
43  C.f. Apple 10-K (2011), p. 63. 
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Further, Apple reports in its notes that 97 % of the deferred tax liabilities arise from unremitted 
earnings of foreign subsidiaries and thus explain the major part of the deviation between the 
GAAP ETR and the CURRENT ETR.44  
The recognition of deferred tax liabilities on undistributed foreign earnings shows that 
Apple does not classify all its undistributed foreign earnings as permanently reinvested outside 
the US. A similar procedure is found for Amazon.45 In contrast, Google classifies all its 
undistributed foreign earnings as permanently reinvested outside the US.46 Google’s uniform 
classification explains the substantial deviation from its GAAP ETR to the US statutory tax rate: 
Google’s ETR reconciliation shows that its GAAP ETR is reduced by 16.2 percentage points 
due to permanent differences on foreign tax rate differentials. Moreover, the conducted 
classification of undistributed foreign earnings explains the small difference between Google’s 
GAAP ETR and CURRENT ETR, as no deferred tax liabilities are recognized for foreign tax 
rate differentials.47 
The third finding above mentions a lower CASH ETR compared to the CURRENT ETR 
for those selected US firms. Without having more information, it is not possible to interpret this 
as an overstatement of current tax expenses.48 However, additional information in the notes to 
cash taxes paid explains the deviation: Apple, Amazon and Google each refer to tax benefits 
arising from the excess of stock-based compensation as an explanation for their low cash taxes 
paid.49 Comparing the CASH ETRs with the firms’ CASH ETR5s indicates further that the three 
US firms were not able hold their CASH ETRs as low as in 2011 over several years.  
                                               
44  C.f. Apple 10-K (2011), p. 63. Dividing deferred tax liabilities on unremitted earnings of foreign subsidiaries 
($8,896 million) by total deferred tax liabilities ($9,168 million) results in 97 %. 
45  Deferred tax liabilities raising from foreign tax rate differentials also explain Amazon’s higher GAAP ETR 
compared to the CURRENT ETR. Amazon further informs about the magnitude of its permanently reinvested 
earnings: while $3,600 million are remitted in foreign subsidiaries, $2,0 million are classified as permanently 
reinvested outside the US. Please refer to Amazon 10-K (2011), p. 23.  
46  C.f. Google 10-K (2011), p. 78. 
47  C.f. Google 10-K (2011), p. 78–79. 
48  E.g., lower cash taxes paid compared to current tax expenses could also be explained by tax refunds in the 
current period. 
49  C.f. Apple 10-K (2011), p. 63; Amazon 10-K (2011), p. 65; Google 10-K (2011), p. 41. 
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In contrast to the three selected US firms, not all prior findings can be confirmed for the 
German-based SAP. First, the GAAP ETR of SAP is 27.9 % and thus slightly higher than the 
applicable German statutory tax rate of 26.3 % in 2011.50 The ETR reconciliation of SAP shows 
that the higher GAAP ETR arises from nondeductible tax expenses, withholding taxes and tax 
rate differentials.51 This indicates that SAP is liable to tax payments in foreign countries with 
higher statutory tax rates than those applicable in Germany. Related to this finding, it is further 
reasonable to find a higher FOREIGN ETR than SAP’s GAAP ETR. Consistent with the second 
finding of the US firms, SAP’s CURRENT ETR is also below its GAAP ETR. While deferral 
tax strategies result in a substantial difference between both measures for Apple (8.4 percentage 
points) and Amazon (14.8 percentage points), the smaller difference between SAP’s GAAP ETR 
and CURRENT ETR (3.7 percentage points) is more comparable to the difference found 
between Google’s ETRs (2.8 percentage points). In contrast to Apple and Amazon, Google and 
SAP are both not required to recognize deferred tax liabilities on foreign tax rate differentials, 
and thus, this similarity seems to be reasonable.52Also in line with the third finding for US firms 
mentioned above, SAP’s CASH ETR is smaller than its CURRENT ETR. However, unlike the 
three selected US firms of this case study, SAP mentions neither employee stock options nor 
other reasons for the deviation between the two ETRs.  
Three aspects should be mentioned to conclude: first, until 2017, the US statutory tax 
rate was among the highest worldwide and thus explains the difference between the GAAP 
ETRs and FOREIGN ETRs of US firms. Second, the territorial tax system is applicable in most 
European countries, and thus, foreign tax rate differentials are treated as permanent differences 
that affect a firm’s GAAP ETR. In contrast, the worldwide tax system was applicable in the US 
                                               
50  SAP explains that the applicable statutory tax rate in Germany of 26.3 % consists of the corporate income tax 
rate, solidarity surcharge and trade taxes. See further SAP Consolidated Statements (2011), p. 206. 
51  C.f. SAP Consolidated Statements (2011), p. 206. 
52  While Google has no deferred tax liabilities on tax rate differentials due to undistributed foreign earnings, as 
those are classified as permanently reinvested, SAP does not have related deferred tax liabilities due to the 
territorial tax system applicable in Germany. 
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until 2017, and the GAAP ETRs and CURRENT ETRs of US firms depend on the classification 
choices made on undistributed foreign earnings. Third, the deviation between the CASH ETRs 
and CURERNT ETRs of US firms can be explained by specific accounting legislation for 
employee stock options under US GAAP.  
2.4.3 Potential Influence of the US Tax Reform 
In December 2017, US President Donald Trump signed the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” 
and reformed the US tax system. Those amendments affect not only tax expenditures of US 
firms but also tax expenditures of European firms with a US tax presence. The following 
discussion demonstrates the impacts on ETRs and focuses in particular on two crucial 
amendments of the US tax reform: first, the decline of the statutory tax rate from 35 % to 21 %, 
and second, the switch from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system. 
First, a lower statutory tax rate in the home country of a firm leads in general to lower 
tax expenditures. Thus, the CURRENT ETRs and CASH ETRs of US firms will decrease due to 
a lower statutory tax rate. The overall effect on a firm’s GAAP ETR, in contrast, is ambiguous 
and depends on whether deferred tax expenses or deferred tax revenues are higher because 
deferred taxes have to be calculated at the tax rate applicable on the reversal date of temporary 
differences. Section 2.3.2 demonstrates that, on average, deferred tax expenses are higher than 
deferred tax revenues for US firms from 2011 to 2015. Assuming that deferred tax expenses 
still exceed deferred tax revenues in 2018, lower GAAP ETRs will result due to the decline in 
the statutory tax rate. Taken into account that European firms also have activities in the US, 
although to a lesser extent than US firms, (smaller) effects will also be found on their ETRs. 
While a lower US statutory tax rate will also decrease the FOREIGN ETR of European firms 
with US activities, the FOREIGN ETR of US firms will not be affected. 
While these demonstrated impacts will first arise when the US tax reform becomes 
effective in 2018, already recognized deferred taxes have to be remeasured before. On the 
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enactment date of the US tax reform, which was in December 2017, already recognized deferred 
taxes (payable in the US) have to be remeasured with the lower statutory tax rate of 21 %.53 As 
mentioned before, deferred tax liabilities exceed deferred tax assets for most US firms in prior 
years, and thus, future tax payments that were expected at a rate of 35 % are now expected at 
the rate of 21 %. Thus, the remeasurement of deferred tax liabilities leads to tax benefits that 
increase the net income of 2017 and results in a lower GAAP ETR.54 For example, Apple reports 
an overlap on deferred tax liabilities over deferred tax assets in 2017.55 The lower US statutory 
tax rate will decrease the book value of its already recognized deferred tax liabilities. Thus, 
Apple’s deferred tax expenses and GAAP ETR will decrease, while its net income will increase 
due to the remeasurement.  
However, the remeasurement of deferred taxes is not favorable for everyone, i.e., when 
deferred tax assets exceed the liabilities.56 For example, Amazon and Google report an overlap 
of deferred tax assets in 2016.57 These already recognized deferred tax assets become less 
valuable under the new applicable statutory tax rate and thus have to be written down. The 
remeasurement of these deferred tax assets first increases the GAAP ETR and second decreases 
the net income of those firms in 2017.58 
                                               
53  C.f. Amir, Kirschenheiter, and Willard (1997), p. 601.  
54  For example, Pfizer Inc. recently reported a $ 10,070 million benefit arising from the re-measurement of 
deferred tax liabilities. See further The Wall street Journal (30/01/2018), available at 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pfizer-plans-5-billion-boost-in-u-s-manufacturing-from-tax-law-changes-
1517319342. 
55  C.f. Apple 10-K (2017), p. 55. Apple’s fiscal year ends on September 30. Thus, the 10-K of the year prior to 
the US reform (2017) is already available for Apple at the time this paper is written. 
56  In particular, banks still report deferred tax assets due to loss carry forwards that originated during the financial 
crisis. Those losses become less valuable under the new applicable statutory tax rate, and thus, these deferred 
taxes have to be written down. For example, Citigroup Inc., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank 
AG suffer from the re-measurement of deferred tax assets due to the US tax reform. See further Business 
Insider (29/12/2017), available at http://www.businessinsider.de/goldman-citigroup-booking-losses-on-
trumps-new-tax-rules-gop-tax-plan-2017-12?r=US&IR=T; Financial Times (05/01/2018), available at 
https://www.ft.com/ content/306e51ce-f215-11e7-b220-857e26d1aca4. 
57  C.f. Amazon 10-K (2016), p. 63; Google 10-K (2016), p. 78. Amazon’s and Google’s fiscal years end on 
December 31, and thus, the 10-K of 2016 is the most recent information available at the time this paper is 
written. 
58  Please note that the CURRENT ETR and the CASH ETR will be unaffected in 2017, as current tax expenses 
and cash taxes payables will decrease first when the new tax law enters into force in 2018. 
 
53 
 
The impacts on SAP ETRs are ambiguous without additional information. To give 
suggestions of the effect on its GAAP ETR, it is necessary to know how much of the deferred 
tax assets and liabilities are attributable to US activities. However, assuming that SAP’s 
international business model stays comparable to 2016, when SAP earned approximately 32 % 
of its overall revenue in the US, a decrease due to the lower US tax rate in its CURRENT ETR, 
CASH ETR, and FOREIGN ETR is expected after 2017.59 
The second crucial amendment of the US tax reform is the switch from a worldwide tax 
system to a territorial one. This change circumvents additional tax payments when foreign 
earnings are repatriated to the US and thus will lower the CURRENT ETR and the CASH ETR 
for US firms.60 However, the so-called “toll charge” will have an opposing one-time impact: 
taxes on a mandatory deemed repatriation of undistributed foreign earnings are required. The 
toll charge depends on whether undistributed foreign earnings are reinvested in cash and liquid 
assets (15.5 %) or in no liquid assets (8.0 %). The toll charge can be paid in instalments over 
eight years. As Google’s undistributed foreign earnings of $60,700 million reported at the end 
of 2016 might have increased in 2017,61 the toll charge will be at least between $4,900 million 
and $9,400 million. 
While the FOREIGN ETRs of US firms are not directly affected by the implementation 
of a territorial tax system, the GAAP ETR is affected. Deferred tax liabilities are no longer 
required for foreign tax rate differentials, as foreign earnings are now tax exempted. Instead, 
permanent differences arise due to tax rate differentials after the US tax reform. Thus, the switch 
to the territorial tax system results in a lower (higher) GAAP ETR for US firms when foreign 
earnings are earned in countries with an applicable statutory tax rate on average lower (higher) 
                                               
59  C.f. SAP Consolidated Statements (2016), p. F-63. 
60  The ETRs of European firms can also be affected if their US subsidiaries receive foreign earnings.  
61  C.f. Google 10-K (2016), p. 77. 
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than 21 %. Moreover, the GAAP ETR of US firms is no longer affected by classification choices 
on undistributed foreign earnings.   
SAP’s ETRs will only be affected by the switch to a territorial tax system in the US if a 
US subsidiary itself has foreign subsidiaries. However, even assuming that SAP has such an 
ownership structure, the impact will be less material than that for US headquartered firms.  
2.4.4 Suitability of ETRs to Define Tax Avoidance 
The public debate concerning very low tax expenditures of US firms is mostly based on 
CASH ETRs and FOREIGN ETRs.62 The following examples intend to show why accusing a 
firm of being tax aggressive based on one of these measures might be a hasty conclusion. 
First, FOREIGN ETRs consider only foreign tax expenses and pre-tax earnings. Thus, 
FOREIGN ETRs do not consider tax expenses that are related to foreign activities but payable 
in the firm’s home country (e.g., transfer pricing adjustments, withholding taxes or taxes on 
foreign dividends under a worldwide tax system). Even if US firms such as Apple, Amazon, 
and Google have (very) low FOREIGN ETRs, their overall tax expenditures with regard to those 
foreign activities might be (much) higher in particular when foreign earnings are repatriated 
and taxed at the higher US statutory tax rate. Thus, the FOREIGN ETR is only an incomplete 
measure to judge about a firm’s tax aggressiveness (worldwide).63 Nevertheless, these 
arguments become less material after the US tax reform. In particular due to the implementation 
of the territorial tax system in the US, foreign earnings will no longer be taxed when repatriated 
to the US.  
                                               
62  For example a low FOREIGN ETR is mentioned by BBC (04/11/2012), available at 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20197710, while critics on its CASH ETR arises in a report from 
Huffington Post (17/04/12), available at https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/17/apple-corporate-income-
tax-rate_n_1429955.html. 
63  Counterarguments might state that firms such as Google that intended to never repatriate their foreign earnings 
to the US, benefit permanently from lower foreign statutory tax rates. Furthermore, obviously due to the switch 
to the territorial tax system after 2017, Google can now circumvent the higher US statutory tax rate when 
repatriating foreign earnings. However, Google is liable to pay a toll charge of 8 % or 15.5 % on those foreign 
earnings. 
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My second argument is related to the CASH ETR as a measure used to classify a firm as 
tax aggressive. The case study has shown that US firms were in particular able to reduce their 
CASH ETR due to tax benefits of employee stock options. To the best of my knowledge, those 
stock options are not seen as tax aggressive strategies. Of course, the low cash taxes paid could 
be due to other reasons that are not mentioned in the notes to the consolidated statements. 
However, figure 6 shows that none of the four selected firms are able to hold a low CASH ETR 
over several years, as in all cases, the CASH ETR5 is higher. Figure 6 demonstrates further that 
the CASH ETR5 of Apple is very close to its CURRENT ETR. In addition, as explained above, 
the differences between Apple’s CURRENT ETR and its higher GAAP ETR is mostly based on 
temporary differences arising from lower foreign statutory tax rates. This means that Apple 
does not avoid these tax payments; instead, Apple defers these to future periods. 
Third, ETRs are affected not only by tax planning activities but also by the applicable 
tax and accounting legislation. The statutory tax rate in the home country, therefore, plays an 
important role: the higher GAAP ETR found for US firms in section 2.3.2 indicates lower tax 
expenses for European firms. However, due to the on average lower applicable statutory tax 
rate in Europe, the finding does not imply that European firms are more tax aggressive than are 
US firms.64 Moreover, different classification choices regarding undistributed foreign earnings 
made by Apple, Amazon, and Google explain the differences between their ETRs and 
demonstrates that lower ETRs do not necessarily imply more tax aggressiveness. Due to the US 
tax reform in 2017 and the abolishment of the worldwide tax system, those classification 
choices become less material, and the US tax legislation becomes more comparable to the 
majority of tax legislations in Europe. However, these classification choices and the statutory 
tax rate are just examples to state that the overall circumstances should be considered before a 
firm is accused of being tax aggressive just because it has a low ETR. 
                                               
64  Please refer to the discussion in section 2.3.2. 
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This leads to my last and more general argument: at what level of ETR is a firm 
considered to be tax aggressive? This obviously depends on the definition of tax aggressiveness. 
Blouin (2014) tries to define tax aggressiveness by separating it from tax planning activities. 
However, she comes to the same conclusion as Hanlon and Heitzman (2010) that no objective 
definition of tax aggressiveness has been found yet. 
Even if ETRs seem not to be suitable to define tax aggressiveness, ETRs allow 
statements on whether a firm has lower (higher) tax expenditures than other firms do. To 
complete my analyses on the tax expenditures of Apple, Amazon, Google, and SAP for the 
year 2011, I set their ETRs in relation to all other US and European firms considered before in 
section 2.3. Table 1 shows the decile ranks of those four firms with regard to the different ETRs 
and thus indicates whether their ETRs are lower (higher) than the ETRs of the other firms of 
the sample.  
Table 1. Deciles of ETRs 
  
Decile of 
 
Firms 
GAAP  
ETR 
CURRENT  
ETR 
CASH  
ETR 
CASH  
ETR5 
FOREIGN  
ETR 
Apple 4th 3rd 3rd  2nd 1st 
Amazon 6th 3rd 2nd 1st  2nd 
Google 3rd  4th 3rd  3rd 1st 
SAP 5th 5th 4th 6th 7th 
Notes: This table presents the deciles of Apple’s, Amazon’s, Google’s, and SAP’s different ETRs for the 
year 2011. The reference group includes all US and European firms based on the sample of section 2.3. While the 
lowest possible score is the 1st decile, the highest possible score is the 10th decile. ETRs are defined in table A2 of 
the appendix. 
The three US firms considered in my case study, considering their FOREIGN ETR, 
belong to the lowest 2nd and 1st deciles. This means that at least 80 % of the sample has a higher 
FOREIGN ETR. In contrast, only 20 % of the sample has a higher FOREIGN ETR than the 
Europe-based SAP. Apple, for example, is claimed to be tax aggressive because of its very low 
FOREIGN ETR and CASH ETR. With regard to the FOREIGN ETR, this might be reasonable, 
as the results show that Apple’s FOREIGN ETR belongs to the lowest within the considered 
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sample. However, at least 20 % of the considered sample has a lower CASH ETR than Apple 
does in 2011. Furthermore, Amazon, for example, belongs to the 2nd decile with regard to its 
FOREIGN ETR, while it belongs to the 6th decile with its GAAP ETR. A similar pattern, 
although not as strong, can be found for Google. All in all, these findings are in line with 
Blouin (2014), as she claims that future research should not rely on one single measure when 
analyzing tax aggressiveness. In contrast to the selected US firms, SAP’s FOREIGN ETR is 
higher than 60 % of the considered sample, while its other ETRs are neither conspicuously high 
nor conspicuously low. 
Summarizing the case study, three aspects should be mentioned: first, the analyses do 
not intend to classify a firm as being tax aggressive or not. This is because, second, the 
usefulness of ETRs is doubtful in defining a firm as tax aggressive. However, when 
understanding the informative value and the applicable accounting and tax legislations, ETRs 
are suitable for comparing tax expenditures. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This paper describes the information content and investigates the differences of five 
different ETR measures. By analyzing the differences of ETRs between US and European 
firms, my results suggest that the higher GAAP ETRs of US firms are in particular attributable 
to deferred tax liabilities that are higher than those of European firms. Moreover, the 
comparisons demonstrate that due to the relatively high statutory tax rate applicable in the US 
until 2017, US firms benefit more from foreign tax differentials than do European firms. 
The results of the case study demonstrate the implications that arise due to classification 
choices on undistributed foreign earnings under US GAAP. While deferred tax liabilities 
increase the GAAP ETR when undistributed foreign earnings are not permanently reinvested 
outside the US, a lower GAAP ETR results if undistributed foreign earnings are classified as 
being permanently reinvested. However, those classification choices will become less material 
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after the US tax reform in 2017. The notes to the income taxes of the three US firms selected 
for the case study suggest further that US firms face lower CASH ETRs due to specific 
accounting legislation on employee stock options.  
Moreover, the case study cautions against conclusions that rely on single ETR values, 
as a low ETR does not necessarily arise due to aggressive tax strategies. While my discussion 
suggests that ETRs are not perfect measures to identify tax aggressiveness, they are, however, 
suitable for comparisons of tax expenditures. Therefore, researchers should always keep in 
mind the applicable tax and accounting legislation of each firm when analyzing ETRs. 
I acknowledge that my comparisons and analyses of differences in ETRs are primarily 
anecdotal and that more detailed analyses, which follow in the next chapter of this thesis, are 
necessary to strengthen my findings. However, my analyses support the understanding of the 
information content of different ETR measures and tax differentials between US and European 
firms. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Overview of Effective Tax Rates 
     
ETR Measure Reflects 
Deferral Tax 
Strategies? 
Reflects 
Permanent 
Tax 
Strategies? 
Reflects 
Conforming 
Tax 
Avoidance? 
Reflects Non-
conforming 
Tax 
Avoidance? 
Affected by 
changes in 
the tax 
contingency 
reserve or 
valuation 
allowance? 
Able to 
interpret 
years with 
negative tax 
expenditures 
or pre-tax 
income? 
 
GAAP ETR NO YES NO YES YES NO 
CURRENT ETR YES YES NO YES YES NO 
CASH ETR YES YES NO YES NO NO 
CASH ETR5 YES YES NO YES NO YES* 
FOREIGN ETR NO YES NO YES YES NO 
Notes: This table gives an overview of the information content of different ETRs. It is in principle based on an 
overview given by Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010 (p. 140) and completed with additional information. ETRs are 
defined in table A2 of the appendix. (*)Years with negative tax expenditures (pre-tax income) are considered when 
calculating the CASH ETR5. However, CASH ETR5 is only interpretable when the summated tax expenditures 
(pre-tax income) over five years are positive. 
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Table A2. Variable Definitions 
US Dummy, which is one for US MNCs and zero for European MNCs 
EU Dummy, which is one for European MNCs and zero for US MNCs 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi), i.e., income taxes divided by pre-tax income, adjusted 
for extraordinary items (set to zero if missing); exclude outliers 
CURRENT ETR (txt - txdi) / pi, i.e., current taxes divided by pre-tax income; exclude 
outliers 
CASH ETR txpd / pi, i.e., taxes paid divided by pre-tax income; exclude outliers 
CASH ETR5 (txpd 5yr) / (pi 5yr), i.e., cash taxes paid (sum over five years) 
divided by pre-tax income (sum over five years); exclude outliers 
FOREIGN ETR txfo / pifo for US MNCs, i.e., foreign income taxes divided by 
foreign pre-tax income; exclude outliers; 
(txt – txdom) / (pi – pidom) for European MNCs, i.e., domestic taxes 
subtracted from total taxes divided by pre-tax income excluding 
domestic pre-tax income; exclude outliers. E.g., the France-based 
Danone SA has 14 subsidiaries in France. Adding up the tax 
expenses of these subsidiaries (derived from unconsolidated 
financial information offered by the Amadeus Database) creates the 
approximated domestic (French) tax expenses of Danone SA. 
Subtracting this domestic figure from the overall tax expenses 
(derived from consolidated statements offered by Compustat Global) 
of Danone SA results in foreign tax expenses. Same method is 
applied in order to determine the foreign pre-tax income and thus, to 
calculate the FOREIGN ETR of Danone SA. Note that the parent firm 
is excluded from the calculation of the domestic data, as double 
counting of subsidiaries profits would potentially overstate the pre-
tax income compared to tax expenses. 
STR  Statutory corporate tax rate applicable in the home country 
MNC Dummy, which is one for firms having at least one foreign subsidiary 
or foreign pre-tax income is greater than zero 
Domestic Dummy, which is one for firms that do not have a foreign subsidiary 
or foreign pre-tax income greater than zero 
Index Dummy, which is one for firms listed on the S&P500 or 
StoxxEurope600 stock market indices 
Notes: Data are taken from Compustat and Compustat Global. Foreign tax expenses and pre-tax income for 
European MNCs were calculated by combining the Compustat and Amadeus databases. The statutory tax rates 
were collected from the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
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Table A3. Sample Selection 
 US Firms   European Firms 
 Description Firms Firm-Years   Firms Firm-Years 
Headquarters in EU / US 10,123 39,835  8,400 34,837 
Non-Missing Financial Data 3,456 10,361  2,997 9,413 
At least 100 observations per country 3,456 10,361  2,826 8,975 
- thereof Non-Missing FOREIGN ETR 1,417 4,249   466 1,320 
Notes: The sample is based on firms that were incorporated in the US or Europe during the time from 2011 
through 2015. 
 
  
Table A4. Descriptive Statistics 
 Variable 
  US Firms   European Firms 
       N Mean Std. Dev.          N Mean Std. Dev. 
GAAP ETR  10,361 28.60 14.44 8,975 27.46 13.75 
CURRENT ETR  10,361 24.43 16.89 8,975 27.02 15.25 
CASH ETR  10,361 22.44 17.29 8,975 26.26 17.34 
CASH ETR5  6,107 24.21 12.31 5,144 25.67 10.66 
FOREIGN ETR  4,249 25.19 15.07 1,320 32.74 19.18 
Total Tax Expenses  10,361 194.08 892.50 8,975 122.78 799.23 
Current Tax Expenses   10,361 169.87 806.83 8,975 125.45 795.34 
Deferred Tax Expenses  10,361 24.22 219.27 8,975 -2.68 129.22 
STR   10,361 35.00 0.00 8,975 27.25 5.10 
MNC  10,361 0.67 0.47 8,975 0.49 0.50 
Index   10,361 0.21 0.41   8,975 0.24 0.43 
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of the sample during the time from 2011 through 2015. Variables 
are defined in table A2. 
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Figure A1. ETR Comparison over different Countries 
 
Notes: The figure compares the average ETRs of different countries. The sample is based on the years from 2011 
through 2015. ETRs are defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
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Figure A2. ETR Comparison over Subsamples 
 
Notes: The figure compares the average ETRs between different subsamples of US and European firms. The 
sample is based on the years from 2011 through 2015. The first two bars (All) of each comparison include all 
observations. A firm is considered as multinational (MNCs) if it has at least one foreign subsidiary or its foreign 
pre-tax income is greater than zero, all other firms are considered as being domestic (Domestics). The last two 
bars (Index) of each comparison consider firms that are listed on the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market 
indices. ETRs are defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
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Figure A3. ETR Comparison over Time 
 
Notes: The figure compares the development of the average ETRs between US and European firms over time. The 
sample is based on the years from 1996 through 2015. Please note that due to missing data, I am not able to 
compute the CASH ETR for European firms for the years from 1995 through 2000. Thus, the CASH ETR5 can also 
not be calculated for the years from 2000 through 2004 which implies that the bar related to the CASH ETR5 of 
the years from 2000 through 2005 includes only the year 2005 for European firms. Further, the FOREIGN ETR 
cannot be calculated for European firms for the years from 1995 through 2005. ETRs are defined in table A2 of 
the appendix.  
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US EU
Figure A4. Distribution of ETRs 
 
 
 
Notes: The figure compares the distribution of the average ETRs between US and European firms. The sample is 
based on the years from 2011 through 2015. The ETRs are defined in table A2 of the appendix. 
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examine effective tax differentials between US multinational corporations (MNCs) and their 
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3.1 Introduction 
Until the fundamental US tax reform was enacted in December 2017, the US statutory 
tax rate on corporate profits was one of the highest in a worldwide comparison.65 Many agree 
that the high home country tax was particularly problematic in an international context, as 
foreign profits are taxed upon repatriation under the US system of worldwide taxation, while 
most European countries exempt foreign income from any home taxation. The “Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act” in December 2017 has responded to these arguments. The US corporate tax rate was 
cut to 21 % and the worldwide tax system was replaced by a territorial system.  
Yet not everyone shares the concern of a potential competitive disadvantage of US 
MNCs. In an interview on the Irish tax ruling of Apple Inc. Margrethe Vestager, the European 
Union’s commissioner for competition, said that “it is irritating when American companies pay 
less in taxes than European ones”.66 Apple Inc., with an effective foreign tax rate of below 4 % 
in recent years, is one of quite a few examples of well-known US MNCs reporting low effective 
tax rates (ETRs) on their foreign incomes.67 The statement by Mrs. Vestager highlights a 
common concern that US MNCs had already a competitive advantage relative to their European 
competitors through substantially lower tax expenses before the major US tax reform was 
enacted.  
The objective of this study is to add to this debate by comparing and analyzing the tax 
expenses of US MNCs and their European peers. Our analysis focuses on large MNCs listed 
either on the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market indices. One main contribution of our 
study is that we examine effective tax differentials between US MNCs and their European 
                                               
65  For example, Swenson and Lee (2008) emphasize that “US companies are overtaxed relative to their 
international competitors”. 
66  Bloomberg (19/09/2016), available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-19/eu-s-vestager-
signals-apple-just-the-start-of-u-s-tax-probes. 
67  For more examples, see The Financial Times (30/09/2013), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c6ff0ebc-
29c4-11e3-bbb8-00144feab7 de.html. 
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competitors. While previous evidence suggests that the headquarters location of an MNC has a 
major effect on its worldwide tax expenses (Markle and Shackelford, 2012a), existing studies 
do not provide clear evidence on whether US or European MNCs pay less taxes (Avi-Yonah 
and Lahav, 2012; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011). Moreover, it is largely unexplained whether 
tax differentials between European and US MNCs must be attributed to differences in home 
country tax legislation or if they can be explained by firm characteristics. Therefore, the second 
aim of our analysis is to understand the determinants of tax differentials and whether these 
reflect differences in firm characteristics distinctive to either US or European MNCs (e.g., 
technology) or are rather driven by tax legislation. We investigate the impact of (i) home 
country statutory tax rates, (ii) tax planning opportunities, (iii) Controlled Foreign Company 
(CFC) legislation, and (iv) home country taxation of foreign income. Issues that were also 
recently addressed by the US “Tax Cuts and Jobs Acts”.  
We propose an empirical approach that recognizes fundamental problems of 
identification in this context. First, we identify pairs of similar US and European MNCs, given 
observable firm characteristics. Besides firm characteristics, the matching of firm-pairs imposes 
further restrictions, such as the exact matching on the industry a firm is operating in. For 
example, the European Danone S.A. is found to be the best match for the US headquartered 
Kellogg Corp., and the Europe-based SAP SE is found to be the best match for the US-based 
Oracle Corp. Running regressions on the matched sample conditional on pair fixed effects 
allows us to analyze the determinants of effective tax rate differentials that arise between very 
similar US and European MNCs. Of particular interest, then, is determining whether 
differentials are the result of policy reforms or whether responses to changes in policy depend 
on individual tax planning opportunities. To the best of our knowledge, a thorough comparative 
study of US and European MNCs in terms of tax expenses has not been provided so far.  
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Based on our matched sample of MNCs listed either in the S&P500 or the 
StoxxEurope600, we start our analysis by comparing the effective tax rates (ETRs) of US and 
European MNCs over recent years. The findings suggest that US MNCs have paid significantly 
less foreign taxes (measured as a foreign effective tax rate, FOREIGN ETR) but have reported 
significantly higher total tax expenses (measured by GAAP ETR) compared to their European 
counterparts. To be precise, the FOREIGN ETRs of US MNCs are found to be 9.6 percentage 
points lower compared to European MNCs, while the GAAP ETR of US MNCs was 
approximately 2.1 percentage points higher. Moreover, additional analyses demonstrate that 
US MNCs have reported significantly lower ETR measures that exclude deferred tax expenses 
(measured by CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR). 
We then test whether differences in tax institutions and tax planning opportunities can 
explain the tax rate differentials. First, our analysis suggests that the high GAAP ETR of US 
MNCs can be attributed to the high corporate tax rate in the US prior to the fundamental US 
tax cut in 2017. Second, while US firms usually paid less foreign taxes, we show that a 
significant part of the difference can be attributed to enhanced profit shifting opportunities of 
US MNCs. A central result of our analysis is that US MNCs, compared to European ones, were 
able to reduce tax expenses through profit shifting, which compensates for a higher tax rate at 
home. 
Additional analysis is concerned with tax policy as a determinant of tax differentials 
between US MNCs and their European peers. Based on our matched sample of comparable US 
and European MNCs, we estimate our regression model with pair fixed effects (given the 
matched pairs) and a difference-in-differences approach to pinpoint responses to changes in 
policy.  
With the goal of restricting tax planning activities and to prevent erosion of their 
corporate tax bases, most countries have implemented a vast number of tax laws and 
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regulations. The US CFC rules are often mentioned to be ineffective and thus one of the main 
causes of the low foreign tax expenses of US MNCs.68 We therefore analyze the effectiveness 
of US and European CFC rules as a potential explanation for the tax differentials between US 
and European MNCs. We exploit two tax law amendments that changed the application of CFC 
rules: the introduction of the Check the Box (CTB) option, which allows US MNCs to avoid 
US CFC rules, is expected to increase the tax differential between US and European firms. 
Similarly, in 2006, European CFC rules were adjusted after the European Court of Justice’s 
(ECJ) “Cadbury Schweppes” judgment,69 with the result that the rules today apply only to 
“wholly artificial arrangements”. We find that European MNCs have reduced their tax expenses 
significantly since the ECJ judgment. To be precise, our results suggest that European firms 
reduced their GAAP ETRs by approximately 2.6 percentage points after the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. The introduction of CTB in the US led to 4.6 percentage points lower ETRs of US 
MNCs. This means that both US and European CFC rules became more lenient and less 
effective over time. 
Another issue raised by the fundamental US tax reform is the replacement of the 
worldwide tax system by a territorial tax system. We analyze whether the international tax 
system has implications for tax differentials between competitors. While the change in the US 
international tax system in 2018 cannot yet be evaluated, we exploit the 2009 UK tax reform, 
through which the UK switched from a worldwide system of taxation to a territorial one. Based 
on a matched sample, we find that the reform has reduced the GAAP ETRs of UK MNCs by 
more than 2 percentage points. However, we do not find evidence that firms with additional 
profit shifting opportunities have benefited more from the switch to a territorial system. 
Moreover, the FOREIGN ETR of UK MNCs was unaffected by the reform.  
                                               
68  Tax Justice Blog (20/07/2015), available at http://www.taxjusticeblog.org/archive/2015/07/like_a_campy_ 
horror_ movie_the.php#.V-gdyclrPo0. 
69  Judgment from September 12, 2006, C-196/04. 
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Our study contributes to the literature and to the recent public debate on the tax expenses 
of MNCs in several ways. In contrast to previous studies, our paper compares ETRs of US and 
European MNCs at the micro level, uses different measures of ETRs, allows for pairwise 
comparisons, conditions on firm-specific characteristics, and provides causal evidence on the 
consequences of tax reforms. Let us highlight that, to the best of our knowledge, none of the 
previous studies has conditioned on between-pair unobserved heterogeneity combined with a 
difference-in-differences approach to provide causal evidence on the consequences of policy 
reform in the empirical analysis, has calculated FOREIGN ETRs for non-US MNCs (and other 
alternative measures of tax expenditures), and has provided heterogeneous estimates on the 
determinants of ETRs to better understand why there is so much variation in firms’ effective 
tax expenses. However, our paper is related to previous studies. First, earlier contributions have 
analyzed the determinants of tax avoidance and effective tax expenses. For example, a broad 
body of literature examines the ETRs of US MNCs (Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and 
Thornock, 2017; Yin, 2003). Only a few studies investigate the differences in tax expenses 
between the US and other countries of the world (Markle and Shackelford, 2012a; Swenson 
and Lee, 2008). To the best of our knowledge, only two studies compare (aggregate) tax 
expenses between the US and Europe (Avi-Yonah and Lahav, 2012; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2011).  
Second, our analysis is closely related to studies investigating the impact of home 
country tax systems and tax legislation, such as CFC rules and the system of international 
taxation. Dunbar and Duxbury (2015) find evidence that US MNCs reported 9 percentage points 
lower FOREIGN ETRs directly after the CTB introduction. Ruf and 
Weichenrieder (2013, 2012) investigate the consequences of the German CFC rule on the 
allocation of financial assets across affiliates held by German MNCs. Their findings suggest 
that the German CFC rule prevented German MNCs from holding financial assets in tax haven 
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countries until 2006, while German firms started to use low-tax countries within Europe much 
more heavily after the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes judgment. Related to this, previous research 
has found that the international tax system of the home country has implications for the tax 
planning activities of MNCs (Markle, 2016; Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers, 2012). Egger, 
Merlo, Ruf, and Wamser (2015) exploit the UK tax reform in 2009 and find that the abolishment 
of the worldwide tax system has affected repatriation behavior (see also Hasegawa and 
Kiyota, 2017, for a study on the Japanese switch to a territorial system).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the 
institutional background and develop testable hypotheses. The data and research design are 
described in section 3.3. Empirical results regarding the differences in tax expenses between 
US and European MNCs are shown in section 3.4. The impact of tax planning opportunities 
and the home countries’ tax rules are presented and discussed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2 Institutional Background and Research Hypotheses 
The question of whether US MNCs are paying their fair share of taxes has become a 
central public concern. The argument is often used that European firms are unable to avoid 
taxes to the same extent and are therefore disadvantaged relative to their US competitors. 
Particularly well-known US firms, such as Google Inc., Amazon.com Inc., and Starbucks Corp., 
are mentioned in public debate and are accused of avoiding taxes to a significant degree.70 
Having said that, many tax experts argue in turn that prior to the US tax reform, US MNCs were 
subject to the high US statutory tax rate on corporate profits and a worldwide tax system. 
While many empirical studies analyze the tax expenses (measured as ETRs) of US 
firms, only a few empirical studies compare the tax expenses between different countries. These 
                                               
70  BBC News Magazine (21/05/2013), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-20560359. 
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studies come to opposing conclusions: Markle and Shackelford (2012a) compare the ETRs of 
US MNCs to those of Australian, French, German and UK firms and find a 1 percentage point 
lower average ETR of US firms compared to those of the other four countries. The study of 
Swenson and Lee (2008) suggests higher US ETRs if US MNCs are compared to MNCs 
headquartered in OECD71 member states. We know of only two studies that compare US MNCs 
and European MNCs. PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) analyzes the Forbes Global 2000 list 
and finds a 5.8 percentage points higher ETR for US MNCs for the period 2006 to 2009, 
whereas Avi-Yonah and Lahav (2012) find a 4.0 percentage points lower ETR for the largest 
US firms during the period 2001 to 2010. Our paper is related to these studies because we 
analyze tax expense differentials between comparable US and European MNCs. Taking into 
account the aforementioned debate and, in particular, the concern of the high US corporate tax 
rate prior to the US tax reform, we test the following hypothesis: 
 H1a: US MNCs report higher GAAP ETRs compared to European MNCs.  
The public debate about taxation of MNCs often refers to international tax avoidance. 
Accordingly, the public discussion is to a large extent based on the FOREIGN ETR of those 
firms.72 Particularly, very low FOREIGN ETRs of some prominent US MNCs are mentioned. 
Regarding the tax expenses associated with foreign operations, we therefore test the following 
hypothesis:  
H1b: US MNCs report lower FOREIGN ETRs compared to European MNCs. 
Earlier studies suggest that differences in ETRs are naturally related to differences in 
industry membership and firm characteristics (Richardson and Lanis, 2007; Plesko, 2003; 
Rego, 2003; Gupta and Newberry, 1997; Stickney and McGee, 1982). By using matching 
techniques, our analysis addresses potentially confounding effects of firm characteristics. In 
                                               
71  OECD is the abbreviation for Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
72  E.g., BBC (04/11/2012), available at http://www.bbc.com/news/business-20197710. 
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particular, we compare pairs of US and European MNCs73 that belong to the same industry and 
have very similar firm characteristics. 
While our analysis is based on novel data and techniques, which we believe are 
particularly suitable for making such a comparison, we primarily contribute to the literature by 
focusing on possible explanations for the observed tax expense differentials between US and 
European MNCs. In the following, we will formulate more-specific hypotheses along the 
determinants of effective taxes to learn about the origins of the tax differential between US and 
European firms. As possible determinants thereof, we suggest differences in (i) home country 
statutory tax rates, (ii) tax planning opportunities, (iii) CFC legislation, and (iv) home country 
taxation of foreign income. 
(i) Home Country Statutory Tax Rates 
A potential reason for differences in tax expenses between US and European MNCs 
might simply be the direct effect of the level of the corporate income tax rate at home. While 
the US statutory tax rate was among the highest in the world prior to the “Tax Cuts and Jobs 
Act”,74 corporate income tax rates in Europe vary across countries and were, on average, 
significantly lower than in the US. Home country statutory tax rates affect the ETR, as the 
profits of the ultimate parent company and operations in the home country are taxed at this rate. 
Moreover, given the worldwide tax system, the high US statutory tax would be the minimum 
tax rate when profits were repatriated. Many US firms urged therefore policymakers to cut the 
statutory tax rate in order to avoid a competitive disadvantage.75 All this suggests that naive 
comparisons between US and European firms might be misleading with regard to tax avoidance, 
                                               
73  Our comparison focuses on the MNCs listed on the two leading stock market indices, S&P500 and 
StoxxEurope600. 
74  Tax Foundation (07/09/2017), available at https://taxfoundation.org/corporate-income-tax-rates-around-the-
world-2017/. Note that our sample period ends in 2015. Nowadays, the US do no longer have the highest 
corporate tax rate worldwide due to the US tax rate cut in 2017.  
75  The Financial Times (02/05/2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/03/business/economy 
/03rates.html?_r=1. 
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and the empirical analysis should be conditional on the home statutory tax rate. This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
H2:  US MNCs report lower effective tax rates compared to European MNCs, 
conditional on the high statutory corporate tax rate in their home country. 
(ii) Tax Planning Opportunities 
International tax planning seems to be an important determinant of MNCs’ tax expenses. 
Previous literature provides convincing evidence that MNCs shift taxable income to low-tax 
subsidiaries in order to minimize their overall tax expenses (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017; 
Huizinga and Laeven, 2008; Hines and Rice, 1994). The main channels through which income 
is shifted are transfer prices for intrafirm transactions and the strategic use of internal capital 
markets and internal debt financing. For example, MNCs may determine transfer prices such 
that high expenses accrue at subsidiaries located in high-tax countries, while high earnings 
should accrue at low-tax subsidiaries (Davies, Martin, Parenti, and Toubal, 2018; Cristea and 
Nguyen, 2016). A similar strategy allows MNCs to utilize their internal capital markets: 
providing loans from subsidiaries at low-tax locations to subsidiaries at high-tax locations gives 
rise to a tax shield at the high-tax location (Buettner and Wamser, 2013; Huizinga, Laeven, and 
Nicodème, 2008; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006).  
The opportunities to reduce tax expenses through profit shifting depend on the specific 
business models of firms. For example, large amounts of intangible assets or R&D-intensive 
businesses facilitate the profit shifting activities of MNCs (Grubert, 2003; Harris, 1993). Hence, 
differences in tax expenses between US and European MNCs may relate to differences in the 
fundamental characteristics of firms and their businesses. But even if we compare very similar 
firms and align firm characteristics, US MNCs might still avoid more (or less) taxes compared 
to their European peers if the shifting opportunities differ between US and European firms. 
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These differences may arise from specificities in business models, products, or production 
processes. Hypothesis H3 follows:  
H3: Differences in tax expenses of very similar US and European MNCs are related 
to differences in profit shifting opportunities associated with fundamental firm 
characteristics. 
(iii) Controlled Foreign Company Rules 
The extent to which MNCs engage in tax saving activities might be determined by the 
taxation of foreign income in the home country of the firm. In particular, so-called Controlled 
Foreign Company (CFC) rules are implemented by the home countries of MNCs to restrict 
profit shifting activities. Thus, CFC rules should affect ETRs. While such rules are established 
in the US and in many European countries, they often differ in application and scope. What 
they have in common, however, is that they aim at preventing MNCs from shifting passive 
income (such as royalty or interest income) to low-tax countries. If a foreign subsidiary meets 
the criteria of a controlled foreign company, foreign profits to which a CFC rule is applied to 
will be taxed at the (higher) tax rate of the country of the parent firm. In addition, the usual 
privilege of exemption upon deferral is not granted to income taxed under a CFC rule. We 
therefore expect that changes in the scope and application of CFC rules should be reflected in 
tax differentials between European and US firms. 
Tax experts have considered the implementation of the so-called “Check the Box” 
(CTB) regulation in 1997 as a substantial change in the practical application of US CFC law. 
The CTB option was introduced in the US with the aim to simplify entity classification rules. 
However, part of the new legislation allows US MNCs to avoid Subpart F by checking the box 
to classify an affiliate as a “disregarded entity”. 
Altshuler and Grubert (2006) suggest that using the CTB rule was associated with 
foreign tax savings of approximately $7.0 billion in 2002. Costa and McGrath (2010) also argue 
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that CTB is an important tool to avoid Subpart F, as 69 % of new foreign entities checked the 
box in order to be a disregarded entity for US tax purposes. Grubert (2012) finds that the 
FOREIGN ETR of US MNCs has declined by nearly 2 percentage points since the introduction 
of CTB. Dunbar and Duxbury (2015) provide evidence that US MNCs were able to reduce their 
FOREIGN ETRs by approximately 9 percentage points compared to non-US MNCs 
immediately after the introduction of CTB in 1997. Furthermore, a decrease in the CASH ETR 
of US MNCs due to CTB is suggested by Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock (2017). 
European CFC rules were also subject to a drastic change in the way CFC legislation is 
applied by European countries. In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided that CFC 
rules infringe upon the European principle of freedom of establishment, and it restricted their 
applicability. The so-called “Cadbury Schweppes” judgment limited the application of CFC 
rules within Europe to wholly artificial arrangements that do not reflect any economic activity 
(e.g., pure letter boxes). European countries had to adjust their CFC rules. It seems that Cadbury 
Schweppes rendered CFC application within Europe more or less ineffective, as wholly 
artificial arrangements can be easily avoided by firms (Bräutigam, Spengel, and Streif, 2017). 
While German MNCs appear to have held only small financial investments in European low-
tax countries before the ECJ judgment, they substantially increased passive investments in the 
aftermath of the ECJ judgment (Ruf and Weichenrieder, 2013, 2012). By and large, it seems 
that the literature agrees on the interpretation that the ECJ judgment has facilitated tax planning 
within Europe for European MNCs since 2006 to a significant degree. 
We examine how changes in the application of CFC rules in the US and Europe affected 
the tax differentials between European and US MNCs. Based on the explanations above, we 
state our fourth hypothesis: 
H4a:  Changes in the application of CFC rules in the home countries affect the effective 
tax expenses of MNCs. 
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CFC rules are anti-tax avoidance measures applied by home countries to prevent home 
resident MNCs from allocating mobile income to low-tax countries. Thus, we expect that 
changes in the CFC rules affect particularly MNCs with more profit shifting opportunities. This 
suggests the following:  
H4b:  Changes in the application of CFC rules in the home countries should 
particularly affect MNCs with large profit shifting opportunities. 
(iv) Home Country Taxation of Foreign Income 
An additional feature of a home country tax system is the general taxation of foreign 
income. Nearly all European countries have implemented a territorial system.76 In the US, a 
worldwide tax system had been applicable until 2017 when the foreign tax credit was replaced 
by a territorial tax system.  
Under a worldwide tax system, dividends from foreign subsidiaries are taxed upon 
repatriation. The overall tax expenditures is equal to the (possibly) high tax level of the home 
country, but only when profits are repatriated to the parent. In contrast, under a territorial tax 
system, dividends repatriated to the parent are partially or wholly exempt from tax in the home 
country.  
Due to the additional tax on dividends repatriated to US parent firms, many argue that 
this was a competitive disadvantage for US MNCs relative to MNCs operating under a 
territorial system (e.g., Hines, 2011). In line with these arguments, earlier research has found 
enhanced tax planning activities for MNCs headquartered in countries with a territorial tax 
system compared to MNCs from countries with a worldwide tax system (Dyreng and 
Markle, 2016; Markle, 2016; Atwood, Drake, Myers, and Myers, 2012). In contrast, anecdotes 
of US MNCs suggest that different strategies, such as using a series of short-term loans, have 
                                               
76  Nowadays, Ireland is the only European country with a worldwide tax system. See further worldwide corporate 
tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
 
85 
 
been used to shift money back to the US without paying repatriation tax.77 Although the US 
have recently replaced their worldwide tax system, an evaluation is not possible at this point in 
time due to missing data. In 2009, however, the UK already switched from a system of 
worldwide taxation to a territorial system. We exploit the UK tax reform to learn about the 
impact of the international tax system on effective tax expenses. We will test the following 
hypothesis: 
H5:  The switch from a system of worldwide taxation to a territorial system affects the 
effective tax expenses of MNCs. 
3.3 Data and Research Design 
3.3.1 Data and Exploratory Analysis 
The main objective of our paper is to provide reliable estimates about the determinants 
of tax differentials between US and European MNCs. We focus on firms with US or European 
headquarters listed on the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market indices, and we consider 
their consolidated financial information taken from the Compustat and Compustat Global 
databases.  
Many different measures have been suggested to gauge the effective tax level of a firm. 
Following a recent stream of literature in accounting, we base our analysis on variations in 
effective tax rates (ETRs) as ex post measures of tax expenses (e.g., Markle and 
Shackelford, 2012a, 2012b; Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2010; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). 
The data to compute ETRs are taken from the consolidated financial statements.78 ETR 
measures the overall tax expenses of a firm. Thus, it reflects numerous choices made by the 
                                               
77  E.g., HP is accused of repatriating billions of dollars each year from offshore entities to the US without paying 
taxes; see Forbes (20/09/2012), available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/janetnovack/2012/09/20/senate-
report-hits-hp-microsoft-for-offshore-ploys-saving-billions-in-tax/#2b35c9a6229e. 
78  The ETR used in this study should not be confused with the effective tax rate as described in Devereux and 
Griffith (1998) and King and Fullerton (1984), who define it differently as a forward-looking measure. 
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firm, including tax avoidance or tax planning activities. In our main analysis, we focus on a 
firm’s GAAP ETR. According to ASC 740, we define GAAP ETR as tax expenses (txt) divided 
by pre-tax income (pi). We adjust the latter for extraordinary items (xi).79 See table A1 of the 
appendix for detailed variable description.  
Our base sample includes MNCs that have been listed on either the S&P500 or 
StoxxEurope600 at least once during the period 1995 to 2015. In sum, 965 US firms and 1,015 
European firms for which financial information are reported in Compustat or Compustat 
Global, enter our sample (see table A2 of the appendix for more detailed information).  
We investigate effective tax differentials between US and European MNCs for different 
time periods dating back to 1995. However, the recent debate about the aggressive tax planning 
structures of several MNCs started around 2012.80 Thus, to gain a first idea about the 
distribution of US and European GAAP ETRs, we have calculated ETRs for the years 2012 
to 2015 and display them in figure 1. The statistics suggest that the average GAAP ETR of US 
MNCs equals 28.9 %, which is 2.0 percentage points higher than the mean of the European 
firms, which is 26.9 %. The median values of 30.5 % for the US MNCs and 25.4 % for the 
European ones suggest that the distribution of US ETRs is also more left-skewed – implying 
that a few US MNCs save a lot of taxes but many others face relatively high effective tax 
payments – compared to the distribution of European ETRs.  
                                               
79  We replace missing values in the latter variable by including zeros. We delete a firm-year observation if the 
numerator or denominator of the ETR is negative, and we generally exclude ETRs with negative values or with 
values greater than one.  
80  For example, public hearings on aggressive tax planning in the U.S. or the United Kingdom, e.g., U.S. Senate, 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearing On Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax 
Code (20/09/2012); House of Commons, Committee of Public Accounts (12/11/2012). 
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Figure 1. GAAP ETR 
Notes: Comparison of GAAP ETR between US and European MNCs. The figure is 
based on data for the years 2012 to 2015. A box portrays the interquartile range of 
the GAAP ETR distribution. The horizontal line in the box represents the median. 
In additional tests we will also consider CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, and long-run ETR 
measures although the sample size becomes smaller due to missing data, in particular, of 
European MNCs.81 However, in our main analysis, we prefer the GAAP ETR because data is 
available for most firms and the public debate mainly refers to the GAAP ETR or its counterpart, 
the FOREIGN ETR.82  
The FOREIGN ETR focuses only on tax expenses associated with foreign operations. 
For US MNCs, the FOREIGN ETR is calculated as “foreign taxes” (txfo + txdfo) divided by 
“foreign income” (pifo). Unfortunately, European MNCs are not obligated to disclose foreign 
taxes and foreign pre-tax income. Therefore, we approximate the FOREIGN ETRs for European 
MNCs by subtracting domestic taxes and domestic pre-tax income from the overall tax 
expenses and pre-tax income. We obtain the domestic information for European MNCs by 
combining ownership information with financial information taken from the Amadeus 
                                               
81   Moreover, we cannot compute CASH ETRs of European firms for years before 2005 due to a lack of data. 
82  E.g., The Financial Times (30/08/2016), available at https://www.ft.com/content/3e0172a0-6e1b-11e6-9ac1-
1055824ca907. 
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database.83 We provide an example of the calculation of the FOREIGN ETR of European MNCs 
in table A3 of the appendix. 
We believe that we can calculate comparable measures reasonably well. In particular, 
Compustat reports foreign tax information for very few European firms. Thus, we are able to 
validate our measure with the reported tax information for a very limited number of firms. The 
overall good approximation is documented in table A4 of the appendix. Note, moreover, that 
the second part of our empirical analysis focuses on time-variation and should therefore not be 
too sensitive to cross-sectional inconsistencies (if there are any). 
Figure 2. FOREIGN ETR 
Notes: Comparison of FOREIGN ETR between US and European MNCs. The figure 
is based on data for the years 2012 to 2015. A box portrays the interquartile range 
of the FOREIGN ETR distribution. The horizontal line in the box represents the 
median.  
The findings, presented in figure 2, suggest that the distinction between foreign taxes 
and overall taxes matters: on average, the US FOREIGN ETR (23.7 %) is 6.8 percentage points 
lower compared to the European one (30.5 %), and the whole distribution of US ETRs has 
substantially shifted to the left (or down, in the boxplots depicted) compared to figure 1.  
                                               
83  The ownership data from Amadeus are available only for the most recent years, so the group structure 
information we use is usually from the year 2012.  
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We can conclude that descriptive statistics do not provide a clear answer to the question 
of whose tax expenses – US or European – are lower. This obviously depends on how we 
measure tax expenses. Moreover, firm characteristics, which determine ETRs as well, clearly 
differ between US and European firms in our sample (although we focus on large public firms). 
Table A5 of the appendix presents summary statistics on firm variables. The time period of 
panel A in table A5 of the appendix corresponds to the years 2012 to 2015. A rough comparison 
between the US and European MNCs suggests that the former are larger and more profitable 
than the latter. While European firms own more intangible assets, US MNCs face higher R&D 
expenses. Because previous literature has shown that firm characteristics affect ETRs, 
systematic differences therein may also bias estimated tax differentials between US and 
European MNCs. 
3.3.2 Empirical Approach  
We proceed with a multivariate empirical analysis of the ETR-differential between US 
and European MNCs. Our identification strategy is based on the following steps. First, we use 
propensity score matching to identify similar US and European firms. Second, we run panel 
regressions in which we condition on fixed effects at the level of firm-pairs, which we identify 
in step 1. To these regressions, we add a number of time-variant variables measured at the level 
of firms. Third, we focus on firm heterogeneity in explanatory variables to learn about the 
determinants of tax differentials. Fourth, we exploit policy reforms in a difference-in-
differences setting to identify the consequences of particular tax legislation on effective tax 
expenses.  
(i)  Finding Firm-Pairs 
Let us first define the indicator variable ܷ ௜ܵ to indicate whether firm i is US based 
(ܷ ௜ܵ = 1) or European based (ܷ ௜ܵ = 0). Note that the variable is not indexed by time t. We are 
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primarily interested in how ܷ ௜ܵ and interactions thereof (interacted with firm- and tax-law 
variables) affect ܧܴܶ௜௧. The latter denotes the different measures of effective tax expenses. 
The first step involves estimating the probability ݌పෝ  that firm i is US based. Thus, we 
specify  ܷ
௜ܵ ,ଶ଴ଵଵ 	= 		ߚଵ	 ௜ܺ,ଶ଴ଵଵ + 	 	ߝ௜,ଶ଴ଵଵ (1) 
to determine the linear index in a probability model.84 Equation (1) indicates that the 
probability of being a US firm depends on firm-i-specific determinants, captured by	ࢄ࢏,૛૙૚૚, 
where the 2011 index denotes that all variables are measured in 2011. Note that our first 
regression-based analysis (see below) starts in 2012, which is why we base the estimates of the 
propensity scores on the year 2011.  
The choice of regressors in (1) is based on determinants of tax expenses (e.g., Caliendo 
and Kopeinig, 2008; Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001). To be specific, we consider ܵܫܼܧ௜, defined 
as the logarithm of total assets (at) of firm i.85 ܴܱܣ௜ is the return on assets as a proxy for 
profitability. ܮܧ ௜ܸ is the liability (dltt)-to-total-assets (at) ratio of i. ܴܦ௜ captures the R&D 
expenses (xrd) relative to total assets (at). ܫܰܶܣ ௜ܰ are the intangible assets (intan) divided by 
total assets (at).86  
Estimating (1) produces two vectors of propensity scores: one for the US firms, ݌̂௎ௌ, 
and one for the European firms, ݌̂ா௎. Once we have estimated ݌̂௎ௌ and ݌̂ா௎, we aim at finding 
so-called nearest neighbors for each US unit, i.e., the best comparable match from the group of 
European firms. We may use ߱௜ to denote a matched European unit m that is identified as the 
best match for the US unit i. The best match is determined as	߱௜ = min{௠} (|݌̂௜௎ௌ − ݌̂௠ா௎|) , ݅ ≠ ݉, 
where we additionally ensure that only firms operating in exactly the same industry are 
                                               
84  We will estimate equation (1) assuming a probit model.  
85  To guarantee comparability, we have used yearly exchange rates to convert total assets to US dollars.  
86  The latter two variables are set equal to zero in case they are missing in our data.  
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matched.87 Furthermore, to ensure acceptable matching quality, we require a difference in 
propensity scores of less than 0.02.88 Note that our approach produces firm-pairs {ܷ ௜ܵ =1;ܷܵ௠ = 0}, where units (firm-pairs) are very similar (comparable).89  
In the following, we analyze different periods of time. Because our objective is to 
analyze pairs of very similar firms over time, we repeat our matching procedure whenever 
analyzing different time periods and treatment events.  
(ii) Estimating Conditional ETR Differentials  
To learn about ETR differentials between US and European firms, we suggest the 
following regression model:  
ܧܴܶ௜௧ 	= 	 ߙଵ	ܷ ௜ܵ 	+ 	 ߠ௧ + ߱௜ + ݑ௜௧. (2) 
The dependent variable is an ETR measure of firm i in year t. The first tests focus on 
the GAAP ETR. Additional regressions consider the FOREIGN ETR as well. The explanatory 
variable of interest is the indicator variable ܷ ௜ܵ, which equals one if the MNC is located in the 
US and zero if the MNC is located in Europe. The coefficient ߙଵ measures the tax differential 
between US and European MNCs, conditional on the pair-(߱௜) and year-(ߠ௧) fixed effects. 
Hence, equation (2) allows us to average over all pair-specific differentials, i.e., conditional on 
the propensity score.  
(iii) Different Tax Planning Opportunities 
In additional analysis, we can augment equation (2) by firm- and country-specific time-
variant regressors that could lead to bias in ߙଵ. In particular, we control for firm characteristics 
associated with international tax planning opportunities. Moreover, we can analyze whether 
                                               
87  According to the Fama and French classification of 17 different industry groups. 
88  According to Austin (2011), the optimal caliper width lies at 20% of the standard deviation of the propensity 
score, and calipers equal to 0.02 or 0.03 show superior performance. 
89  Note that matching on the propensity score is based on two central assumptions. The first assumption is called 
ignorability of treatment. The second assumption is the so-called balancing property. The latter assumption is 
testable. 
 
92 
 
distinct tax planning opportunities between US and European MNCs exist by introducing 
interaction terms between firm characteristics and the indicator variable ܷ ௜ܵ. 
(iv) The Effect of Home Country Tax Rules  
One particular advantage of the identification approach suggested above is that it allows 
us to effectively combine the pair-matching with a difference-in-differences approach to 
analyze the differential impact of tax policy reforms. As described in section 3.2, we consider 
US and European reforms of CFC legislations, as well as the UK’s switch to a territorial tax 
system.  
The difference-in-differences approach ensures that the estimates are not biased by time-
constant differences in the treatment and control groups (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; 
Heckman, Ichimura, Smith, and Todd, 1998).90 The approach also helps us understand and pin 
down where possible ETR differentials come from and how these have changed after the 
reforms of tax rules. Let us define the variable	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ, which is equal to one if firm i is 
affected by the change in tax legislation, and zero otherwise. Since the reforms we study affect 
either US firms or European firms, the indicator ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ usually captures the location 
of the MNCs as above. We estimate the following equation:  
ܧܴܶ௜௧ 	= 	 ߛଵ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ	+	ߛଶ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ × ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ + 	 ߠ௧ + ߱௜ + ݑ௜௧.          (3) 
In equation (3), ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ=1 denotes the periods of and after a policy reform. The 
coefficient ߛଶ is the treatment effect we are interested in, as it measures the differential response 
of a treated firm i relative to a firm that is not affected by a reform.  
                                               
90  Note that our regressions are still based on a pair-matched sample. We thereby ensure that the common trend 
assumption in a difference-in-differences setting is not an issue.  
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3.4 Comparing Effective Tax Expenses: US vs. European Firms 
3.4.1 Conditional Comparisons 
We start with a comparison of ETR measures of US and European firms for the most-
recent years available in our data (2012 to 2015). Before we do so, we need to estimate 
propensity scores and find the best matching pairs of US and European firms. The matching is 
based on the year before our panel analysis starts, i.e., propensity scores are calculated for the 
year 2011.  
Table 1 suggests that the matching removes most of the bias in firm characteristics 
between US (ܷ ௜ܵ = 1) and European (ܷ ௜ܵ = 0) firms. The nearest neighbor matching (with 
a 2 % caliper as suggested above) finds 352 matched pairs (see panel B in table A5 of the 
appendix for descriptive statistics). The matching produces very reasonable results. For 
example, the European-based SAP SE is matched to the US-headquartered Oracle Corp. 
Table 1. Nearest Neighbor Matching, Balancing Property (2011) 
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:1 
  Mean Bias Bias  Reduction t-test 
  Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 2.5143 2.2614 15.9  2.66 0.008 
  Matched 2.5032 2.4437   3.7 76.5 0.49 0.627 
ROA Unmatched 0.1046 0.0846 25.8  4.35 0.000 
  Matched 0.0844 0.0892 -6.2 76.1 -0.92 0.359 
LEV Unmatched 0.2421 0.2496 -4.2  -0.71 0.475 
  Matched 0.2526 0.2538 -0.7 83.7 -0.09 0.928 
RD Unmatched 0.0192 0.0148 11.8  1.98 0.048 
  Matched 0.0142 0.0177 -9.4 20.5 -1.29 0.197 
INTAN Unmatched 0.2177 0.2318 -6.8  -1.15 0.251 
  Matched 0.2317 0.2180  6.6  2.5  0.86 0.391 
Notes: Balancing property tests. The tests are based on observations from the year 2011. The matching applies 
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, which requires a difference in propensity scores of less than 0.02.  
Based on the matched sample, we then run equation (2). The results are presented in 
table 2. Columns (1) to (3) of table 2 are regressions where the dependent variable corresponds 
to GAAP ETR. Column (1) reports a specification that includes only year and pair fixed effects. 
The coefficient of interest, US, is positive and statistically significant.  
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Table 2. Regression Analysis, ETR Differentials  
Variables GAAP ETR FOREIGN ETR 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
US 0.0209*** 0.0221*** -0.0328** -0.0961*** -0.0961*** -0.0696* 
  (0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0146) (0.0141) (0.0144) (0.0392) 
SIZE  -0.0059 -0.0098*  0.0042 0.0067 
   (0.0052) (0.0052)  (0.0102) (0.0103) 
ROA  -0.2457*** -0.2405***  -0.1490 -0.1460 
   (0.0868) (0.0852)  (0.1890) (0.1890) 
LEV  -0.0195 -0.0196  -0.0514 -0.0478 
   (0.0222) (0.0215)  (0.0554) (0.0547) 
RD  -0.2450 -0.2810  -0.0067 0.0141 
   (0.1860) (0.1750)  (0.3360) (0.3470) 
INTAN  0.0295 0.0292  0.0376 0.0386 
   (0.0202) (0.0203)  (0.0546) (0.0538) 
STR   0.4832***   -0.2220 
      (0.1150)     (0.2980) 
Year FE      
Pair FE      
N 2,314 2,314 2,314 1,101 1,101 1,101 
Adj. R² 0.283 0.288 0.300 0.364 0.364 0.364 
Notes: Regressions are based on a matched sample, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe; 
years from 2012 to 2015 (panel B) are included. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
We add firm characteristics in column (2). While the matching procedure has aligned 
firm characteristics of our firm-pairs in the benchmark year, our results show that changes in 
SIZE, ROA and LEV may have an impact on the effective tax expenses, even though that impact 
is either almost zero (SIZE) or insignificant (SIZE and LEV). To control for profit shifting 
possibilities, we further include RD and INTAN. The effect of RD on GAAP ETR is negative 
but (statistically) insignificant. The coefficient for the dummy US suggests that the GAAP ETRs 
of US firms are approximately 2 percentage points higher compared to European ones, which 
confirms our hypothesis H1a and the findings of our unconditional comparison in section 3.3.1.  
In specifications (4) to (6) of Table 2, we consider the FOREIGN ETR as the dependent 
variable. Our results confirm the findings of the descriptive analysis in section 3.3.1 that US 
MNCs pay less foreign taxes compared to their European peers: being a US firm suggests an 
almost 10 percentage points lower FOREIGN ETR. This means that an unconditional 
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comparison even underestimates the tax differential. Thus, when we focus on foreign taxes, we 
can confirm H1b.91  
3.4.2 Influence of the Home Country Tax Rate 
Many argue that it is mainly the high home country tax level faced by US MNCs during 
the considered sample period that affects US firms’ competitiveness. We therefore add the 
statutory tax rate (STR) of an MNC’s home country in column (3) of table 2. The difference in 
statutory corporate tax rates is substantial. Whereas the mean tax rate in the home countries of 
European MNCs is 27.5 % in our sample period, the US corporate tax rate is significantly 
higher.92 Note that the European MNCs are headquartered in different countries. Within the 
European sample, statutory tax rates vary across home countries and over time. Rates range 
from approximately 12.5 % (as, for example, in Ireland,) to almost 39 % (as, for example, in 
France, where a statutory tax rate of 38.9 % applies). 
As expected, the home country tax rate is positively related to GAAP ETR. The 
coefficient can be interpreted. It suggests that a 1 percentage point higher STR increases the 
effective tax rate by about 0.5 percentage point. Given that we measure total worldwide tax 
payments on the left-hand side, this is quite substantial. Conditional on the statutory tax level, 
the sign of the US coefficient becomes negative. That is, controlling for the different levels of 
the statutory tax rate, the GAAP ETRs of US MNCs are approximately 3.3 percentage points 
lower compared to those of European MNCs.  
                                               
91  Comparing our measurement of FOREIGN ETRs with the available Compustat FOREIGN ETRs for a limited 
number of European firms indicates that our approximation is very close to and just slightly below the reported 
FOREIGN ETR for European firms during the very recent years. Overall, this suggests that the tax differential 
in terms of FOREIGN ETRs between US and European firms may potentially be underestimated (see table A4 
of the appendix). 
92  See panel B of table A5 of the appendix. The statutory tax rates were collected from the worldwide corporate 
tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY and from the OECD statistics website (http://stats.oecd.org/). The US 
statutory tax rate is the combined corporate income tax rate taken from the OECD statistics website. 
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A comparison of the results shown in columns (1) to (2) and (3) suggests that the 
relatively high US effective tax burden we find in unconditional comparisons is explained by 
the differences in statutory tax rates. Hence, the fact that US firms faced a high statutory tax 
burden at home during the sample period might be interpreted as a competitive disadvantage 
for US firms. Since we are interested in the tax differential that is associated with being a US 
firm relative to being a European firm, conditional on tax law and observable firm 
characteristics, our estimates suggest that the GAAP ETR of a US firm is approximately 3.3 
percentage points below the GAAP ETR of a comparable European firm. At this point, we may 
interpret the negative US coefficient as an indicator capturing the tax avoidance behavior of US 
MNCs to compensate for the higher home country tax rate. Thus, the findings support H2. 
In specification (6) of Table 2, we consider the FOREIGN ETR as a dependent variable. 
The result for the tax differential measured by the FOREIGN ETR is unaffected by the 
additional consideration of the home country tax level. The coefficient for the dummy US 
confirms a 7 percentage points lower FOREIGN ETR of US MNCs compared to their European 
peers.  
3.4.3 Robustness Checks 
Table 3 presents the results of several robustness checks. All specifications in 
column (1) include fixed effects only, whereas the regressions in column (2) include the full set 
of our control variables. We report only results for the dummy US, which captures the ETR 
differentials between US and European firms.  
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Table 3. Additional Sensitivity Checks (Treatment: US)  
 Coeffcient on US 
  1 2 
(1)    Probit: 0.0209*** -0.0328** 
Exact matching by industry (0.0059) (0.0146) 
(2)    Probit: 0.0227*** -0.0439*** 
Only Year FE (0.0076) (0.0142) 
(3)   Probit: 0.0223*** -0.0363*** 
Year FE and Industry FE (0.0073) (0.0137) 
(4)   Probit: 0.0240*** -0.0357* 
Year-Pair-FE (0.0082) (0.0199) 
(5)   Probit: 0.0143*** -0.0380*** 
No Exact Matching (0.0053) (0.0122) 
(6)   Probit: 0.0262*** -0.0263* 
2nd order polynomial (0.0062) (0.0136) 
(7)   Probit: 0.0209*** -0.0268* 
3rd order polynomial (0.0064) (0.0147) 
(8)   Probit: 0.0281*** -0.0328** 
Size interactions (0.0065) (0.0142) 
Notes: Regressions are based on matched samples, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe; 
years from 2012 to 2015 are included. Unless otherwise described, year and firm-pair fixed effects are included in 
all specifications. Regressions in column (2) include the control variables SIZE, ROA, LEV, RD, INTAN, and STR. 
The dependent variable is GAAP ETR in specifications (1) to (8). Specification (1) repeats our basis regression 
(Panel B). Specifications (2) to (4) are based on Panel B and differ due to the use of different fixed effects, while 
in specifications (5) to (8), different matching procedures apply. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
The dependent variable is still the GAAP ETR, but the specifications differ in the use of 
different fixed effects and the matching procedures applied. While row (1) repeats our 
benchmark results, we consider only year fixed effects in row (2) and add industry fixed effects 
in row (3). Specification (4) considers year-pair fixed effects. The results in row (5) are based 
on a similar matching as the benchmark matching, with the only difference being that we do 
not require an exact industry matching of firm-pairs. Rows (6) to (8) consider higher-order 
polynomials of explanatory variables as well as interaction terms between size and explanatory 
variables when computing propensity scores.  
All in all, the variations shown in table 3 suggest that our approach produces quite 
reliable estimates. If we control for the home country tax level, such as in all specifications in 
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column (2) of table 3, our results always suggest that the remaining tax differential between US 
and European firms is negative, i.e., US firms have less tax expenses conditional on the higher 
US corporate tax rate.  
3.4.4 Additional Analyses Using Different ETR Measures 
In additional analyses in table 4, we consider alternative definitions of the ETR measure 
as proposed by earlier literature (for an overview see chapter 2 of this thesis). In row (1) and 
(2) of table 4 we consider the CURRENT ETR and the CASH ETR, respectively. Moreover, in 
rows (3) to (5) we consider long-run ETR specifications to mitigate a potential year-to-year 
volatility in the respective tax measure (Dyreng, Hanlon, and Maydew, 2008). We compute the 
long-run ETRs over a period of three years. 
Table 4. Alternative ETR Measures (Treatment: US) 
 Coefficient on US 
  1 2 
(1)   Probit, CURRENT ETR: -0.0193** -0.0648*** 
Exact matching by industry (0.0075) (0.0145) 
(2)   Probit, CASH ETR: -0.0367*** -0.0958*** 
  Exact matching by industry (0.0084) (0.0190) 
(3)   Probit, GAAP ETR3: 0.0310*** -0.0208* 
Exact matching by industry (0.0054) (0.0120) 
(4)   Probit, CURRENT ETR3: -0.0320*** -0.1030*** 
Exact matching by industry (0.0083) (0.0174) 
(5)   Probit, CASH ETR3: -0.0211*** -0.0847*** 
Exact matching by industry (0.0075) (0.0158) 
Notes: Regressions are based on matched samples, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe; 
years from 2012 to 2015 are included. Year and firm-pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. 
Regressions in column (2) include the control variables SIZE, ROA, LEV, RD, INTAN, and STR. The dependent 
variables in specifications (1) and (2) are CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR, respectively. The dependent variables 
in specifications (3), (4), and (5) are the long-run specifications over three years of GAAP ETR, CURRENT ETR, 
and CASH ETR, respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
We use the same matching procedure as in section 3.4.1 and again estimate the tax 
differentials between US and European MNCs, here in terms of CURRENT ETR and CASH 
ETR, for the matched sample. Specifications in column (1) include fixed effects only, whereas 
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the regressions in column (2) include the full set of our control variables. Again, we report 
results for the dummy US, which captures the ETR differential between US and European firms. 
 Interestingly, using the CURRENT ETR and CASH ETR as tax measures (row (1) 
and (2) of table 4), our results suggest that the effective tax expenditures of US MNCs are lower 
than those of European MNCs. This finding contrasts with our results considering the GAAP 
ETR. Moreover, if we control for home country tax rates (column (2) of table 4), the tax 
differentials between US and European firms are larger for both CURRENT ETR and CASH 
ETR compared to our results for the GAAP ETR. While our comparison using the GAAP ETR 
suggests that US MNCs had higher tax expenses than their European peers prior to the US tax 
reform, a comparison using the two alternative measures clearly suggests that US MNCs had 
lower tax expenditures already prior to the US tax reform in 2017. The results for long-run 
specifications of the ETR measures in rows (3) to (5) of table 4 further confirm this finding.93 
Moreover, our results correspond well with findings by previous literature. While 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2011) suggests higher GAAP ETRs for US firms than for European 
firms, Avi-Yonah and Lahav (2012) find lower CURRENT ETRs for US firms and Markle and 
Shackelford (2012a) also find lower CASH ETRs for US firms. Further, the findings are in line 
with the prior results of chapter 2 of this thesis. 
Consequently, the definition of the tax measure affects the conclusions that can be 
drawn from a comparison between US MNCs and their European competitors. The most 
important conceptual difference between the GAAP ETR and the alternative measures (in 
particular, the CURRENT ETR) is the exclusion of deferred tax expenses. Therefore, the 
findings suggest that the higher GAAP ETR of US MNCs compared to their European peers can 
be attributed to higher deferred tax expenses. Under the US worldwide tax system, foreign 
                                               
93  Please note that we do not consider the long-run specification of the FOREIGN ETR. In particular, for European 
MNCs the sample size becomes too small to establish reliable estimates. 
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income is one potential source of deferred tax expenses that might explain the higher GAAP 
ETR of US MNCs.94 Therefore, the disadvantage of US MNCs measured by GAAP ETR must 
be interpreted carefully, in particular when taking into account the recent devaluation of 
deferred tax liabilities due to the significant US tax rate cut.   
3.5 Explaining the Tax Differentials between US and European MNCs  
In additional analyses, we attempt to explain the identified tax differentials between US 
and European MNCs. First, we test whether additional tax planning opportunities associated 
with certain firm characteristics can explain the tax differential. Second, we investigate the 
consequences of CFC legislation, since implementing CFC rules is discussed at the policy level 
as a central countermeasure against base erosion and profit shifting. Third, we analyze the 
impact of the home country tax system for foreign income.  
3.5.1 Does Tax Planning Associated with Firm Characteristics Explain Tax 
Differentials? 
We proceed with a test of H3 and investigate whether US MNCs have enhanced tax 
planning and profit shifting opportunities. Using the same sample of matched firm-pairs as in 
section 3.4, we additionally interact firm variables with the US dummy. Of particular interest 
is a potential differential response of ETRs to proxies of firm-level profit shifting opportunities. 
The variables RD and INTAN are often interpreted as proxies for profit shifting opportunities. 
MNCs with particularly high R&D expenses are able to shift more profits and taxes (which is 
                                               
94  However, some US firms classified their foreign income as permanently reinvested earnings and thus, avoided 
deferred tax expenses (see discussion in chapter 2 of this thesis). The case study in section 2.4 of this thesis 
demonstrates that US MNCs report lower (higher) GAAP ETRs when undistributed foreign earnings are (not) 
classified as permanently reinvested outside the US. However, only one of the three selected US MNCs of the 
case study classifies all its undistributed foreign earnings as permanently reinvested outside the US. While the 
other MNCs of the case study do not classify all their undistributed foreign earnings as permanently reinvested, 
they report higher deferred tax expenses and thus higher GAAP ETRs (see section 2.4.2 of this thesis). 
 
101 
 
in line with Grubert, 2003; Harris, 1993). Thus, we interact these two variables with the US 
dummy. Table 5 presents the results. 
Table 5. Firm Characteristics  
Variables 
GAAP ETR FOREIGN ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
US -0.0328** -0.0254* -0.0425** -0.0696* -0.0475 -0.0370 
  (0.0146) (0.0150) (0.0167) (0.0392) (0.0381) (0.0419) 
RD -0.2810 -0.0813 -0.2730 0.0141 0.3870 -0.0200 
  (0.1750) (0.1740) (0.1760) (0.3470) (0.2740) (0.3360) 
US x RD  -0.5250**   -1.0620**  
   (0.2370)   (0.4100)  
INTAN 0.0292 0.0233 0.0076 0.0386 0.0190 0.1160 
  (0.0203) (0.0204) (0.0251) (0.0538) (0.0542) (0.0765) 
US x INTAN   0.0395   -0.1230 
    (0.0326)   (0.0906) 
Control Variables      
Year FE      
Pair FE      
N 2,314 2,314 2,314 1,101 1,101 1,101 
Adj. R² 0.300 0.303 0.301 0.364 0.371 0.366 
Notes: Regressions are based on a matched sample, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe; 
years from 2012 to 2015 (panel B) are included. Year and firm-pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. 
Regressions include the control variables SIZE, ROA, LEV, and STR. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are 
shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Columns (2) and (5) support H3: high RD values enable US MNCs to reduce their GAAP 
ETR and FOREIGN ETR substantially more compared to European MNCs. A one standard 
deviation higher value of RD enables US MNCs to decrease their GAAP ETR by 
approximately 1.9 percentage points more than the European counterparts. The advantage is 
even higher if we consider the FOREIGN ETR: an increase of one standard deviation in RD 
leads to a 3.8 percentage points lower FOREIGN ETR of US MNCs compared to their European 
peers. Note that RD does not have an effect on the ETRs of European MNCs (the estimated 
coefficient on RD becomes insignificant).  
Because the US dummy becomes smaller in column (2) – or even insignificant, as in 
column (5), compared to our base specifications, while the interaction terms with RD are 
negative – we can say that one channel through which lower effective taxes materialize is the 
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tax avoidance channel associated with R&D expenditures. Thus, we may conclude that a 
substantial part of the negative ETR differential between US and European firms can be 
attributed to enhanced profit shifting opportunities associated with R&D expenses. Moreover, 
we should mention that specifications (2) and (5) achieve the highest values in the adjusted R², 
which suggests that the variable RD is highly relevant in this context. All in all, the findings 
support H3, as tax differentials are particularly large if profit shifting opportunities (measured 
by RD) are large as well.  
We do not find such an effect for the variable INTAN. However, we interpret this finding 
cautiously. The amount of intangible assets might be sometimes a crude proxy for a firm’s profit 
shifting opportunities because R&D expenses are not always capitalized and self-generated 
intangibles are not recognized in the balance sheet. 
3.5.2 Does Home Country CFC Legislation Explain Tax Differentials? 
We further explore whether ETR differentials are related to home country tax rules. 
Differences in tax legislation at the location of the headquarters may explain differences in the 
opportunities to shift profits.  
Let us first focus on CFC rules. In particular, ineffective CFC rules might explain the 
influence of our proxies for profit shifting on tax rate differentials. Since we do not have a 
measure for the effectiveness of CFC rules, we make use of two important changes in CFC rule 
application. As described in section 3.2, European CFC rule application has been adjusted since 
the 2006 ECJ “Cadbury Schweppes” judgment, and US Subpart F legislation has changed in a 
way that has facilitated tax avoidance since the CTB introduction in 1997.  
As before, we base our analysis on samples of matched firm-pairs of US and European 
MNCs. To evaluate the effect of the policy changes, we will compare time periods before and 
after the two important tax reforms. To mitigate the problem that both events could influence 
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tax expenses and to be better able to separate the effects, we focus on the time period 2002 
to 2015 to investigate the ECJ judgment and on the years 1995 to 2003 for the CTB introduction. 
(i) Evaluating “Check the Box” 
In this section, we test whether the US CFC rules have become less effective in the 
aftermath of the CTB introduction. The TREATMENTUS variable indicates whether an MNC is 
located in the US (TREATMENTUS =1) and has been affected by the CTB introduction. Again, 
we use propensity score matching to generate pairs of similar US and European MNCs (see 
table A6 of the appendix for the balancing of covariates). Based on the matched samples and 
observations from 1995 to 2003, we estimate equation (3) as described in section 3.3.2. Table 6 
presents the results.  
Table 6. Consequences of Check the Box Introduction 
Variables  
GAAP ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 
TREATMENTUS (TUS) 0.0295*** 0.0316*** 0.0300*** 0.0388*** 0.0275*** 
  (0.0066) (0.0057) (0.0060) (0.0065) (0.0075) 
TUS x POST -0.0132** -0.0174*** -0.0457*** -0.0422*** -0.0375*** 
  (0.0061) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0072) (0.0079) 
TUS x RD    -0.5860***  
     (0.1480)  
TUS x POST x RD    -0.3580**  
     (0.1460)  
TUS x INTAN     0.0257 
      (0.0363) 
TUS x POST x INTAN     -0.0642** 
          (0.0317) 
Control Variables     
Year FE     
Pair FE     
N 6,160 5,868 4,849 4,849 4,849 
Adj. R² 0.335 0.281 0.365 0.371 0.365 
Notes: Regressions are based on matched samples, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe. 
The data of column (1) refer to a matching based on the year 1996, and the year of treatment is 1997. The data of 
column (2) refer to a matching based on the year 1998, and the year of treatment is 1999. The data of columns (3) 
to (5) refer to panel C. Control variables include SIZE, ROA, LEV, RD, INTAN, and STR. Robust standard errors 
clustered by firms are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, 
respectively. 
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Specification (1) of table 6 considers 1997 as the year of treatment. Propensity score 
estimates are based on the year 1996. However, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence, regularly 
coming from the exchange of arguments between IRS employees and international tax lawyers 
that the widespread use of CTB for tax planning activities was delayed.95 We therefore 
consider 1999 and 2002 as alternative treatment years in specifications (2) and (3); matching is 
then based on data from 1998 and 2001, respectively.  
We consider the GAAP ETR as the dependent variable. All specifications in the table 
control for the usual set of firm characteristics, pair-effects, as well as aggregate year effects. 
The differential impact we are interested in is the estimated coefficient on TREATMENTUS x 
POST. Across all specifications, we find a negative treatment effect. The treatment effect 
increases in absolute values if we consider 1999 (column (2)) or even 2002 (column (3)) as 
treatment years. Thus, our findings support the anecdotal evidence from discussions between 
IRS employees and international tax lawyers arguing that there was some delay in using CTB 
for tax avoidance. 
The point estimate of specification (3) suggests that US firms reduce their GAAP ETR 
by 4.6 percentage points after the introduction of the CTB option compared to their European 
counterparts. Our estimated effect of a 4.6 percentage points decline in the GAAP ETR in 
response to the CTB option is close to the finding by Dyreng, Hanlon, Maydew, and Thornock 
(2017), who suggest a decline of 3.9 percentage points in the US MNC’s CASH ETRs.96 Hence, 
it happened at this point in time when the change in CFC legislation allowed US MNCs to pay 
less taxes compared to their European peers (conditional on STR). In further untabulated tests, 
                                               
95  For further information, see Dunbar and Duxbury (2015). 
96 Moreover, Dunbar and Duxbury (2015) suggest a decline of 9 percentage points in the US MNCs’ FOREIGN 
ETRs. Because Amadeus only provides financial data for the last ten years, we are unable to compute the 
FOREIGN ETR for European MNCs prior to 2003.  
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we repeat our regressions with CURRENT ETR as the dependent variable and obtain an effect 
very close to our baseline effect.  
We further test for specific channels or heterogeneity in treatment effects by including 
interaction terms between TREATMENTUS, POST, and firm-specific proxies for profit shifting. 
As argued above, as well as in previous contributions, high RD and INTAN values facilitate 
profit shifting to a significant extent. Columns (4) and (5) are based on the same sample as 
column (3), and they correspond to panel C of table A5. Specification (4) of table 6 confirms a 
negative and significant treatment effect (TREATMENTUS x POST). In addition, we include the 
interaction term between the treatment indicator and our proxy for profit shifting opportunities, 
RD. The coefficient of the interaction between TREATMENTUS, POST, and RD is negative and 
statistically significant. The same pattern is found for the interaction with INTAN in column (5). 
All these results are consistent with the hypothesis that the CTB introduction affects those firms 
that can respond to changes in the application of CFC rules. If a firm lacks the capacity for 
international tax planning, a more-lenient application of CFC rules should, ceteris paribus, be 
less relevant. 
To conclude, two findings are particularly interesting. First, the basic ETR-differential 
between US and European firms was positive during the considered period 1995 to 2003. 
Second, given the magnitude of the treatment effect, the CTB introduction makes the positive 
tax differential vanish or even turn negative.  
(ii) Evaluating Cadbury Schweppes 
To identify possible effects of the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes judgment, we focus on 
European MNCs that have been affected by the judgment. Because not all European countries 
had implemented CFC rules before 2006, and therefore, MNCs from these countries have not 
been affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, we exclude MNCs headquartered in 
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European countries where no CFC rule was implemented in 2005. Table A7 of the appendix 
provides information about the respective countries.  
Note that the treatment indicator TREATMENTEU now refers to European firms, which 
we indicate by the superscript EU. We use the year 2005 to estimate the propensity score, i.e., 
one year before the 2006 ECJ judgment. Moreover, Spain and France anticipated the ECJ 
judgment and changed their CFC rules already in 2004 and 2005. Because anticipation effects 
in these two countries could potentially blur the precise identification of the Cadbury 
Schweppes effect, we use the years 2003 and 2004 to estimate the propensity score for those 
observations. The balancing of covariates is clearly not an issue, as is documented in table A8 
of the appendix.97 The matching creates 324 pairs of US and European MNCs, and we consider 
all observations of these firms from 2002 to 2015 (see panel D in table A5 of the appendix for 
descriptive statistics). The results of the pair fixed effects regressions are shown in table 7.  
                                               
97  Note that the outcome equations (here, equation (3)) always condition on covariates used in the propensity 
score estimates. The balancing property should, in any case, never be an issue.  
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Table 7. The Consequences of Cadbury Schweppes 
Variables 
GAAP ETR FOREIGN ETR 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
TREATMENTEU (TEU) 0.0289*** 0.0218** 0.0181 0.0866*** 0.0692*** 0.0807*** 
 (0.0085) (0.0090) (0.0111) (0.0197) (0.0217) (0.0247) 
TEU x POST -0.0256*** -0.0223*** -0.0023 -0.0357** -0.0306* -0.0168 
 (0.0068) (0.0074) (0.0099) (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0192) 
TEU x RD  0.4940***   0.8820**  
  (0.1580)   (0.3490)  
TEU x POST x RD  -0.2780**   -0.2520  
  (0.1190)   (0.3530)  
TEU x INTAN   0.0697   0.0550 
   (0.0472)   (0.0785) 
TEU x POST x INTAN   -0.1250**   -0.1020 
   (0.0490)   (0.0648) 
Control Variables      
Year FE      
Pair FE      
N 7,189 7,189 7,189 3,130 3,130 3,130 
Adj. R² 0.256 0.257 0.259 0.314 0.316 0.314 
Notes: Regressions are based on a matched sample, where MNCs are headquartered either in the US or in Europe. 
The data refer to panel D, which includes firms from the US and firms from European countries with existing CFC 
rules in 2005. Year and firm-pair fixed effects are included in all specifications. Regressions include the control 
variables SIZE, ROA, LEV, RD, INTAN, and STR. Robust standard errors clustered by firms are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively.  
The negative treatment effect indicates that the ECJ judgment facilitated saving taxes. 
Quantitatively, the treatment effect is quite substantial (-2.6 percentage points). Hence, our 
estimates suggest that the ECJ judgment has allowed European firms to partially reduce the 
initial tax differential vis-á-vis US MNCs. Nevertheless, the responses of US MNCs to the CTB 
introduction were stronger than those of European MNCs to the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
 As before, we expect a stronger effect of the ECJ judgment if the activities of the MNCs 
facilitate profit shifting. We find a more pronounced treatment effect in columns (2) and (3) of 
table 7 for those firms that have more shifting opportunities associated with R&D expenses and 
intangible assets. In columns (4) to (6) of table 7, we consider the FOREIGN ETR as a 
dependent variable and repeat the previous regressions. The coefficient on 
TREATMENTEU x POST is negative and statistically significant (column (4)). It suggests that a 
laxer CFC practice allows European MNCs to avoid taxes, which shows in a 3.6 percentage 
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points lower FOREIGN ETR. While the coefficients of the interactions between 
TREATMENTEU, POST, and RD or INTAN are negative in specifications (5) to (6), the estimated 
coefficients are no longer significant. The reason for this may be that the sample size is 
approximately half that using the GAAP ETR.  
Additional unreported tests confirm our results. One such test excludes Spanish and 
French MNCs, as these countries anticipated the ECJ judgment. In another test, we focus on 
the years around the ECJ judgment (2004 to 2007), and again, we obtain similar results. In a 
further robustness check, we repeat the difference-in-differences approach based on the 
StoxxEurope600 MNCs as the treatment group and domestic firms from the same countries as 
the control group. The results show similar and significant coefficients for the interaction term. 
Moreover, we find similar results regarding CURRENT ETR as the dependent variable.  
In additional untabulated placebo-type tests, we consider European MNCs from 
European countries that had not implemented a CFC rule prior to the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. The tax planning of these firms should be unaffected by the ECJ judgment. While 
this reduces the number of observations substantially, the results are still based on 88 matched 
firm-pairs of European and US MNCs, which we observe over time. Results for the relevant 
estimate of the TREATMENTEU x POST interaction are insignificant. Since we would expect 
that firms from countries where no CFC rules are implemented are unaffected by the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment, this finding supports the reasoning that the significant responses found 
before are indeed related to the ECJ’s judgment.98  
3.5.3 Does Home Country Taxation of Foreign Income Explain Tax Differentials? 
An additional feature of a home country tax system is the taxation of foreign income. 
The fundamental US tax reform has replaced the worldwide tax system by a territorial system. 
                                               
98  We confirm our results when considering a shorter time span around the Cadbury Schweppes judgment (2004 
to 2007), and when we exclude the years of the financial crisis (2008 and 2009). 
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We, however, exploit the 2009 switch from a system of worldwide taxation to a territorial 
system in the UK to learn about this issue. Based on the same basic approach as above, we first 
define MNCs headquartered in the UK as the group of treated firms (TREATMENTUK), and US 
MNCs as the control group. The matching is based on the year 2008 and leads to 97 pairs (see 
table A9 of the appendix for the balancing of covariates). The following regressions consider 
observations of these 97 pairs from 2006 to 2015 (see panel E of table A5 of the appendix for 
descriptive statistics). 
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Table 8 provides the results of our regression analysis. The main variable of interest is 
the interaction term between TREATMENTUK and POST, which equals one for MNCs 
headquartered in the UK in 2009, and all following years. The coefficient in column (1) 
indicates that UK MNCs reduced their GAAP ETR by 2.4 percentage points after the switch to 
a territorial tax system.99 The recent US switch to a territorial system may have even a bigger 
effect, as the US statutory tax rate (39 %) before the reform was more than 10 percentage points 
higher than the UK (28 %) one at the time of the reform.  
The worldwide tax system affects the tax burden on repatriated foreign profit and might 
reduce incentives for international tax avoidance. However, the additional home country tax 
can be deferred if foreign profits are reinvested abroad. In columns (2) and (3), we test for 
specific channels or heterogeneity in treatment effects by including interaction terms between 
TREATMENTUK, POST, and firm-specific proxies for profit shifting opportunities. We do not 
find any statistically significant effects, neither with RD nor with INTAN as proxies for profit 
shifting opportunities.  
The latter finding deviates from the conclusion of Dyreng and Markle (2016), who 
suggest that adopting a territorial tax system would increase (outbound) income shifting 
activities. In contrast to Dyreng and Markle (2016), we do not use a proxy to analyze the 
influence of a territorial tax system but instead are able to analyze the effect of a policy change 
(UK tax reform). Our results are reasonable given anecdotal evidence100 and given our findings 
in section 3.5.1, suggesting that US firms engaged in and benefited from profit shifting 
activities, although the US applied a worldwide tax system during the considered sample period.  
In columns (5) to (7) of table 8, we consider the FOREIGN ETR as a dependent variable 
and repeat the previous regressions. The result is clear: there is no differential impact of the 
                                               
99  Together with the switch to the territorial tax system the UK lowered its corporate statutory tax rate by 
2 percentage points. We control for that change by including the statutory tax rates (STR) into our regressions.  
100  See the example of HP in section 3.2 (footnote 77). 
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reform with respect to the UK’s switch from worldwide to territorial. This finding confirms the 
previous result that foreign tax avoidance is not significantly affected by the home country 
taxation of foreign income.  
In columns (4) and (8) of table 8, we present the results of an alternative comparison. 
We run regressions based on a matched sample of similar UK MNCs and MNCs headquartered 
in the remaining (non-UK) European countries (see panel F in table A5 of the appendix for 
descriptive statistics and table A10 of the appendix for the balancing of covariates of the 
respective matching). In line with the previous results, we find a negative treatment effect of 
the UK tax reform with a point estimate of -2.7 if the GAAP ETR is the dependent variable. 
Again, we do not find any effect for the FOREIGN ETR.  
Overall, our results confirm a decrease in tax expenses after the home country (here, the 
UK) has switched from a worldwide to a territorial system of taxation. This supports H5. Our 
results also suggest that the effect should be attributed to the abolishment of additional home 
country taxes if foreign income is repatriated, while we find no evidence that firms with 
enhanced profit shifting opportunities respond more (or less) to the switch to a territorial 
system. Moreover, the FOREIGN ETR of UK MNCs was unaffected by the reform. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The objective of this paper is to produce reliable estimates on the tax expenses of US 
MNCs and their European peers. By applying matching techniques, we first create pairs of very 
similar US and European MNCs. Based on these matched pairs, we find, for the most recent 
years of 2012 to 2015, that the GAAP ETRs of US MNCs were in fact higher compared to their 
European peers. However, conditional on the home country tax rates, the GAAP ETRs of US 
MNCs are approximately 3.3 percentage points lower than the GAAP ETRs of European MNCs. 
Moreover, US MNCs clearly reported lower FOREIGN ETRs than their European counterparts. 
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Our analysis suggests that these findings are mainly related to enhanced profit shifting 
opportunities of US MNCs associated with R&D expenditures.  
We additionally examine the impact of tax legislation on effective tax differentials 
between US and European MNCs. First, we confirm that home country CFC legislation affects 
the tax expenses of MNCs. In particular, we analyze how changes in the application of CFC 
rules in the US and Europe have affected tax expenses. Our results suggest that the ETRs of US 
MNCs decreased significantly after the CTB introduction. We also find that the GAAP ETRs of 
European MNCs fell by approximately 2.6 percentage points after the ECJ Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment in 2006. Additional analyses reveal that MNCs whose activities allow for profit 
shifting have benefited most from a more lenient application of CFC rules. Second, we examine 
the switch from a worldwide tax system to a territorial tax system in the UK in 2009. Our 
analysis reveals that MNCs have reported significantly lower ETRs since this change in the 
taxation of foreign income. The switch to a territorial tax system in 2009 has reduced the GAAP 
ETR but has not influenced the FOREIGN ETR of UK-headquartered MNCs. Let us finally 
highlight that observables (tax law as well as firm characteristics) explain most of the difference 
in ETRs between US and European firms. However, a residual differential in the GAAP ETR 
has to be attributed to unobservable effects associated with being a US firm. Such 
unobservables may relate to specific preferences in what has been called “tax aggressiveness” 
in recent policy discussions. 
Let us interpret three of our results in light of the current US tax reform. First, our 
findings may give ex-post support to the US tax rate cut, as our study confirms a disadvantage 
of US MNCs due to the high tax level in the US until 2017. However, conditional comparisons 
imply that the magnitude of the rate cut to a tax rate of 21 % will result in a competitive 
advantage for US MNCs compared to European ones. Additional analyses reveal that higher 
taxes of US MNCs were associated with higher deferred tax expenses, which are now likely to 
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become less important after the reform. Second, the switch to a territorial system will 
additionally benefit US firms. Our results suggest that the GAAP ETRs of US MNCs will further 
decrease after abolishing the worldwide tax system, while the FOREIGN ETRs will be 
unaffected by the implementation of the territorial tax system. Third, given a relatively lax US 
CFC legislation allowing for the CTB option, stricter rules on international tax avoidance may 
increase foreign and home effective tax payments.  
Our findings have policy implications. One of the arguments in favor of a territorial 
system (as opposed to a worldwide system) is that it ensures a level playing field for competing 
firms in host markets. We show, however, that tax planning opportunities as well as tax law 
(implemented in the home country) are significant determinants of effective tax payments 
abroad (in the host market). This suggests that the system of international taxation is inefficient 
and that even a territorial system will not guarantee that firms compete on equal terms with 
each other. Hence, our findings support the view that there is first a need for more coordination 
in international tax policy. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Variable Definitions 
GAAP ETR txt / (pi – xi), i.e., income taxes divided by pre-tax income, adjusted 
for extraordinary items (set to zero if missing); exclude outliers 
FOREIGN ETR txfo / pifo for US MNCs, i.e., foreign income taxes divided by 
foreign pre-tax income; exclude outliers; 
(txt – txdom) / (pi – pidom) for European MNCs, i.e., domestic taxes 
subtracted from total taxes divided by pre-tax income excluding 
domestic pre-tax income; exclude outliers 
CASH ETR txpd / pi, i.e., taxes paid divided by pre-tax income; exclude outliers 
CURRENT ETR (txt - txdi) / pi, i.e., current taxes divided by pre-tax income; exclude 
outliers 
GAAP ETR3 (txt 3yr) / (pi 3yr), i.e., income taxes (sum over three years) divided 
by pre-tax income (sum over three years); exclude outliers 
CASH ETR3 (txpd 3yr) / (pi 3yr), i.e., cash taxes paid (sum over three years) 
divided by pre-tax income (sum over three years); exclude outliers 
CURRENT ETR3 (txt 3yr - txdi 3yr) / (pi 3yr), i.e., current taxes (sum over three years) 
divided by pre-tax income (sum over three years); exclude outliers 
SIZE log (at), i.e., logarithm of total assets 
ROA  
(Return on Assets) 
pi / at, i.e., pre-tax income divided by total assets 
LEV  
(Leverage) 
(dlc + dltt) / at, i.e., total debt divided by total assets 
RD  
(Research & Development) 
xrd / at, i.e., research and development expense divided by total 
assets (set to zero if missing xrd) 
INTAN  
(Intangibles) 
intan / at, i.e., intangibles divided by total assets (set to zero if 
missing intan) 
STR  
(Statutory Tax Rate) 
Statutory corporate tax rate of the MNC’s home country 
US Dummy, which is one for US MNCs and zero for European MNCs 
TREATMENT (T) Dummy, which is one for MNC treated, and zero otherwise; 
depending on the respective analysis, the indicator refers to 
European, US, or UK firms 
POST Dummy, which is one for the year of treatment and following years 
Notes: Data are taken from Compustat and Compustat Global. Foreign taxes and pre-tax income for European 
MNCs were calculated by combining the Compustat and Amadeus databases. 
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Table A2. Sample Selection 
 European Firms   US Firms 
 Description Firms Firm-Years   Firms Firm-Years 
Index Firms 1,078 17,707  1,086 17,343 
Headquarters in EU / US 1,052 17,289  977 15,452 
Non-Missing GAAP ETR  1,031 14,038  966 12,636 
Non-Missing Control Variables 1,015 13,136   965 12,574 
Notes: The sample is based on firms that were included in the S&P500 or StoxxEurope600 stock market indices 
at least once during the period 1995 to 2015.
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Table A3. Calculation of FOREIGN ETR  
 
 
FOREIGN ETR = 	 (்௢௧௔௟	்௔௫௘௦ି஽௢௠௘௦௧௜௖	்௔௫௘௦)(௉௥௘௧௔௫	ூ௡௖௢௠௘ି஽௢௠௘௦௧௜௖	௉௥௘௧௔௫	ூ௡௖௢௠௘) = (଻ଶସ.଼ହିଽଷ.ସ଼)(ଶ,ଶସଵ.ଵଵିଷ଺଺.଺଺) 
 
FOREIGN ETR =  ଺ଷଵ.ଷ଻	
ଵ,଼଻ସ.ସହ = 33.68 %		 Eq. (A1) 
 
We calculate the FOREIGN ETRs for European MNCs by subtracting domestic taxes and 
domestic pre-tax income from the overall tax expenses and pre-tax income. We obtain the 
domestic figures of European MNCs by combining ownership information with financial 
information taken from the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk. The example 
calculation above is given for the French-based Danone S.A. and is based on financial 
information from the year 2014.  
Note that there could be a potential bias of our measure due to the subtraction of an aggregated 
unconsolidated figure (domestic data) from a consolidated base (worldwide data). Because 
double counting of subsidiaries profits would particularly occur at the parent level, we exclude 
the parent company from our calculation of the domestic data. However, untabulated results are 
robust to a modified calculation of FOREIGN ETR that includes the parent data. 
  
 
Total Taxes  
(in Mio. USD) 
Pre-tax Income  
(in Mio. USD) 
 
Compustat Data (Worldwide Data) 
 
724.85 
 
2,241.11 
   
   
Amadeus Data   
1st French Subsidiary 41.05 127.72 
2nd French Subsidiary 28.02 112.88 
…  …   …  
14th French Subsidiary      1.77       6.39 
∑ Domestic Data 93.48 366.66 
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Table A4. Validation of FOREIGN ETR  
  
 
Sample Period  
from 2002 to 2015  
Sample Period  
from 2012 to 2015 
   N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
FOREIGN ETRApproximation  92 0.2789 0.1324  21 0.2232 0.1080 
FOREIGN ETRCompustat  92 0.2726 0.1143  21 0.2227 0.1037 
Notes: Validation Test for FOREIGN ETR calculation. Sample includes those European firms for which the 
FOREIGN ETR can be calculated first by using only Compustat data and second by combining Compustat and 
Amadeus data. FOREIGN ETRApproximation is calculated by combining Compustat and Amadeus data, as explained 
above. FOREIGN ETRCompustat is defined as txfo / pifo, i.e. foreign income taxes divided by foreign pre-tax income; 
data are taken from Compustat. 
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Table A6. Nearest Neighbor Matching, Balancing Property (2001) 
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:1 
 Mean Bias 
Bias  
Reduction t-test 
 Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 1.8270 1.1770 37.4  6.02 0.000 
  Matched 1.5610 1.5820 -1.2 96.8 -0.16 0.874 
ROA Unmatched 0.0948 0.0863 10.3  1.65 0.099 
  Matched 0.0849 0.0880 -3.7 63.6 -0.47 0.639 
LEV Unmatched 0.2729 0.2661 3.9  0.62 0.533 
  Matched 0.2693 0.2707 -0.8 79.5 -0.10 0.919 
RD Unmatched 0.0163 0.0111 15.5  2.50 0.013 
  Matched 0.0127 0.0134 -2.1 86.6 -0.26 0.795 
INTAN Unmatched 0.1255 0.1303 -3.0  -0.48 0.629 
  Matched 0.1203 0.1327 -7.7 -156.6 -0.94 0.345 
Notes: Balancing property tests. The tests are based on observations from the year 2001. The matching applies 
one-to-one nearest neighbor matching, which requires a difference in propensity scores of less than 0.02.  
 
 
Table A7. CFC Countries 
Countries with a CFC Rule Countries without a CFC Rule 
Denmark Austria 
Finland Estonia 
France Belgium 
Germany Bulgaria 
Greece (from 2014) Croatia 
Hungary Cyprus 
Iceland (from 2010) Czech Republic 
Italy Ireland 
Lithuania Latvia 
Norway Liechtenstein 
Poland (from 2015) Luxembourg 
Portugal  Malta 
Spain Netherlands 
Sweden Romania 
United Kingdom Slovakia 
USA Slovenia 
Notes: The table is based on a list provided by Deloitte (see further: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/guide-to-controlled-
foreign-company-regimes. html) and the worldwide corporate tax summaries of 
PwC, KPMG, and EY. 
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Table A8. Nearest Neighbor Matching, Balancing Property (2005) 
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:1  Mean Bias 
Bias  
Reduction t-test 
 Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 1.7204 2.0680 -20.7  -4.30 0.000 
  Matched 2.1110 2.0669 2.6 87.3 0.37 0.715 
ROA Unmatched 0.0971 0.1001 -3.4  -0.72 0.470 
  Matched 0.0958 0.0993 -3.9 -15.2 -0.52 0.600 
LEV Unmatched 0.2457 0.2309 8.8  1.74 0.082 
  Matched 0.2386 0.2506 -7.1 18.8 -0.98 0.325 
RD Unmatched 0.0110 0.0170 -18.9  -3.64 0.000 
  Matched 0.0127 0.0107 6.5 65.6 0.96 0.336 
INTAN Unmatched 0.1708 0.1678 1.7  0.33 0.741 
  Matched 0.1702 0.1813 -6.1 -269.1 -0.82 0.415 
Notes: Balancing property tests. The tests are based on observations from the year 2005. The matching of French 
and Spanish MNCs is based on 2004 and 2003, respectively. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching is applied, 
which requires a difference in propensity scores of less than 0.02.  
 
 
Table A9. Nearest Neighbor Matching, Balancing Property (2008)  
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:1  Mean Bias 
Bias  
Reduction t-test 
 Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 1.5969 2.2104 -40.1  -4.40 0.000 
  Matched 1.8507 2.0369 -12.2 69.7 -0.79 0.430 
ROA Unmatched 0.1048 0.1195 -16.9  -1.73 0.085 
  Matched 0.1061 0.1057 0.5 97.3 0.03 0.973 
LEV Unmatched 0.2625 0.2474 8.1  0.83 0.406 
  Matched 0.2736 0.2499 12.7 -57.0 0.89 0.373 
RD Unmatched 0.0107 0.0216 -31.2  -2.90 0.004 
  Matched 0.0141 0.0086 15.7 49.6 1.51 0.134 
INTAN Unmatched 0.2517 0.2172 16.4  1.70 0.089 
  Matched 0.2507 0.2769 -12.5 24.1 -0.79 0.428 
Notes: Balancing property tests. The tests are based on observations from the UK and the US in the year 2008. 
One-to-one nearest neighbor matching is applied, which requires a difference in propensity scores of less than 0.02.  
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Table A10. Nearest Neighbor Matching, Balancing Property (2008)  
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:1 
  
Mean Bias 
Bias  
Reduction t-test 
  Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
SIZE Unmatched 1.5969 2.4133 -47.9  -4.75 0.000 
  Matched 1.9644 1.9615 0.2 99.7 0.01 0.991 
ROA Unmatched 0.1048 0.0835 25.4  2.54 0.011 
  Matched 0.0897 0.0803 11.3 55.6 0.88 0.380 
LEV Unmatched 0.2625 0.2839 -11.8  -1.17 0.241 
  Matched 0.2880 0.2684 10.8 8.6 0.75 0.455 
RD Unmatched 0.0107 0.0143 -12.3  -1.16 0.245 
  Matched 0.0125 0.0104 7.5 39.1 0.55 0.581 
INTAN Unmatched 0.2517 0.2173 17.0  1.72 0.085 
  Matched 0.2629 0.2464 8.2 52.0 0.53 0.593 
Notes: Balancing property tests. The tests are based on observations from the UK and other European countries in 
the year 2008. One-to-one nearest neighbor matching is applied, which requires a difference in propensity scores 
of less than 0.02.  
 
 
Table A11. Probability of being US or treated Firm 
  Panel B Panel C Panel D Panel E Panel F 
Variables US Treatment Treatment Treatment Treatment 
  1 2 3 4 5 
SIZE 0.1260*** 0.1960*** -0.1050*** -0.2250*** -0.1670*** 
  (0.0264) (0.0263) (0.0199) (0.0440) (0.0420) 
ROA 2.9840*** 2.7240*** -0.6810* -2.0230** 0.7760 
  (0.5440) (0.5970) (0.3850) (0.7880) (0.8190) 
LEV 0.1550 0.3740 0.2150 -0.1890 -0.4120 
  (0.2240) (0.2480) (0.1830) (0.3430) (0.3750) 
RD 2.3150** 3.0580** -3.6950*** -7.0780*** -6.5090*** 
  (1.0610) (1.2330) (0.9960) (2.1400) (2.5000) 
INTAN -0.1260 0.1420 -0.0962 0.3750 0.5780* 
  (0.1870) (0.2550) (0.1630) (0.2910) (0.3370) 
N 1,139 1,036 2,263 554 457 
Notes: The table presents the results of the probit estimates in respective years upon which the matching is based. 
*, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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Abstract: 
In 2006, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided with the Cadbury Schweppes judgment 
that European Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules infringe the principle of freedom of 
establishment and restricted the applicability thereof. This paper analyzes the impact of 
mandatory amendments to European CFC rules on tax planning activities within Europe. Using 
a difference-in-differences approach, my results provide robust evidence that pre-tax earnings 
of subsidiaries located in European low-tax countries have increased by around 10 % after the 
Cadbury Schweppes judgment. My analyses show further that the increase of pre-tax earnings 
is related to facilitated profit shifting activities. Multinational corporations with high incentives 
or enhanced profit shifting opportunities react more pronounced to the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. The findings point out that CFC rules became less effective and thus, profit shifting 
activities within Europe are less restricted after the ECJ judgment. Additional tests suggest 
further that on average 90 % of the increase in pre-tax earnings is attributable to strategic 
transfer pricing determination, while less than 10 % is attributable to debt shifting activities. 
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4.1 Introduction 
In recent years, aggressive tax planning strategies of multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have triggered an intense public debate. So-called Controlled-Foreign-Company (CFC) rules 
should limit profit shifting activities. Even though CFC rules exist in most European countries, 
many European MNCs are still engaged in aggressive tax strategies in order to shift taxable 
income to low-tax countries.101 A potential explanation is that the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) “Cadbury Schweppes” judgment from September 12, 2006 (C-196/04) limited the 
applicability of this anti-tax avoidance rule within Europe. This paper investigates whether 
European CFC rules really became less effective after the ECJ judgment to provide evidence 
on that assumption.  
Implementing a difference-in-differences approach, I show that pre-tax earnings of 
European low-tax subsidiaries increase by around 10 % if the parent company was affected by 
the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. I analyze changes in pre-tax earnings of European-owned 
low-tax subsidiaries, which are affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, compared to US-
owned low-tax subsidiaries, which are not affected by the judgment. The result gives a first hint 
of an increased activity of European MNCs in European low-tax countries after the ECJ 
judgment in 2006. My finding is robust to several variations of the dependent variables and 
different subsamples. Repeating the same analysis after employing different matching 
approaches ensures the comparability between treatment and control group and further supports 
my finding.  
In the second part of my analyses I analyze whether the increase of pre-tax earnings is 
caused by profit shifting activities, as those are expected to be less restricted by CFC rules after 
the ECJ judgment in 2006. The findings suggest that in particular European MNCs with 
                                               
101  E.g., Ikea and Vodafone are accused, see further Bloomberg (19/12/2017), available at 
https://www.bna.com/eu-launches-tax-n73014473326/; The Guardian (22/10/2010), available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/22/vodafone-tax-case-leaves-sour-taste. 
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enhanced incentives or facilitated profit shifting opportunities increase their pre-tax earnings in 
European low-tax subsidiaries after 2005. 
The third part of my paper examines which techniques in particular are used to shift pre-
tax earnings to low-tax countries after CFC rules became less effective. I analyze the relative 
importance of the main profit shifting channels identified in previous literature: transfer pricing 
distortion and debt shifting activities (Dharmapala, 2014). Employing two different approaches, 
my results suggest that the increase of pre-tax earnings in low-tax subsidiaries after the ECJ 
judgment is mainly caused by strategic transfer pricing (on average more than 90 % of the 
overall pre-tax earnings increase is explained by transfer pricing), while debt shifting plays only 
a minor role (on average less than 10 %).  
My study contributes to already existing literature and political discussions in several 
ways. First of all, the paper is related to prior research that analyzes the effectiveness of CFC 
rules (e.g., Egger and Wamser, 2015; Karkinsky and Riedel, 2012; Ruf and 
Weichenrieder, 2012). While literature focusing on CFC rules has been increasing over time, 
less attention is paid to the Cadbury Schweppes judgment and most of the mentioned studies 
above still ignore this crucial judgment. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) investigate the 
consequences with regard to the allocation of passive assets and find that German MNCs 
relocate those to low-tax subsidiaries more intensively after the ECJ judgment. The analyses of 
chapter 3 of this thesis show that the effective tax rate (ETR) of European MNCs decreases 
after 2005 and suggest facilitated profit shifting activities due to the ECJ judgment. As further 
research on this topic has not been provided so far, my study contributes to a better 
understanding of the impact of the Cadbury Schweppes judgment and the effectiveness of CFC 
rules. 
Second, my study extends previous research (Heckemeyer and Overesch, 2017; 
Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013) that examines the relative importance of transfer pricing and 
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debt shifting activities. Using the same approach to disentangle the effect of the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment on both profit shifting channels, my results support a stronger effect for 
non-financial profit shifting activities. 
Third, the results of my paper are interesting for ongoing policy reforms. In a joint effort, 
the OECD and G20 started to develop and implement an action plan against Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS). Among others, the BEPS action plan intends to strengthen and 
harmonize CFC rules, thin-capitalization rules and transfer pricing requirements. My findings 
suggest that strengthening CFC rules will not be effective in avoiding profit shifting at all, as 
long as the ECJ requires exceptions for European MNCs. As debt shifting activities are less 
affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, policy makers should particularly focus on anti-
tax avoidance measures that reduce the scope of strategic transfer pricing. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, I outline the 
impact of the Cadbury Schweppes judgment on profit shifting activities in detail and develop 
my hypotheses. Section 4.3 describes the research design and data. Empirical results regarding 
the influence of the ECJ judgment on pre-tax earnings is provided in section 4.4, while the 
explanations of this effect are presented in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes. 
4.2 Background and Research Hypotheses 
In line with the recent BEPS discussion, empirical literature provides convincing 
evidence that MNCs relocate taxable income to low-tax subsidiaries to minimize their overall 
tax expenses (Dischinger, Knoll, and Riedel, 2014; Dischinger, 2010; Huizinga and 
Laeven, 2008; Devereux and Maffini, 2007; Hines and Rice, 1994). In order to mitigate or even 
prevent income shifting to low-tax countries, several anti-tax avoidance measures are 
implemented worldwide. In this paper, I will focus on CFC rules, which are established in many 
countries. If a foreign subsidiary meets the criteria of a so-called controlled foreign company, 
CFC rules apply and foreign profits will be taxed as accrued at the (higher) tax rate of the parent 
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company’s country. The usual privilege of exemption or deferral is not granted to this income 
and thus further disincentives profit shifting. 
Even if CFC rules differ from country to country, they usually have three requirements 
in common to classify a foreign subsidiary as a controlled foreign company. First, the foreign 
subsidiary has to be controlled by the domestic shareholder. The requirement is generally 
fulfilled when the subsidiary is majority-owned (at least 50 %). Second, the foreign subsidiary 
has to be located in a low-tax country. A low-tax country is either defined by a low statutory 
tax rate (e.g., Germany defines a country as a low-tax regime when the statutory tax rate is 
below 25 %) or is located in a country listed on a so-called black list.102 Third and finally, CFC 
rules are applicable when the foreign subsidiary generates passive income. In particular mobile 
income, such as interests, licenses and royalties are thought to be passive income.  
A growing number of analyses confirm that CFC rules are effective in preventing 
income shifting to low-tax countries. Altshuler and Hubbard (2002) for example investigate 
essential changes made on the US CFC rules (Subpart F) in 1986 and argue that US CFC rules 
seem to be effective afterwards. Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) investigate the influence of 
European tax regimes on the number of patents located at subsidiaries and find a lower number 
of patents if CFC rules are binding. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2012) also confirm the economic 
relevance of CFC rules, as passive assets are quite lower in subsidiaries classified as controlled 
foreign companies. Egger and Wamser (2015) find also evidence for less investments in low-
tax countries under binding CFC rules.  
In 2006, the ECJ103 decided with the Cadbury Schweppes judgment that CFC rules 
infringe the European principle of freedom of establishment and restricted the applicability. To 
be precise, CFC rules within Europe are applicable only to wholly artificial arrangements that 
                                               
102  E.g., Portugal and Sweden have established such a black list. 
103  C.f. European Court of Justice, Judgment from September 12, 2006, C-196/04. 
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do not reflect any economic activity, e.g., pure letter boxes, after 2005. As a consequence, 
European member states had to adjust their CFC rules. Thus, nowadays the threshold to prevent 
the CFC rules application within Europe seems to be quite low as wholly artificial arrangements 
can be easily avoided (Bräutigam, Spengel, and Streif, 2017). 
Only a few empirical analyses have already analyzed the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
The analyses of chapter 3 of this thesis show that the ETR of listed European MNCs decreased 
by more than 2 percentage points after 2005 and suggest this as the intended result of increased 
profit shifting activities. Ruf and Weichenrieder (2013) find significant evidence that passive 
investments in European low-tax subsidiaries of German MNCs have increased after the ECJ 
judgment. 
By providing a more thorough understanding of the consequences of the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment, I expand prior studies. In the following, I will formulate hypotheses 
according to the implications of the ECJ judgment. First, I investigate whether changes in 
European CFC rules affect pre-tax earnings of low-tax subsidiaries. Second, I suggest an 
increase in profit shifting activities after the ECJ required amendments to European CFC rules. 
Third, I focus on the importance of different profit shifting channels through which MNCs may 
shift taxable income to low-tax countries after CFC rules became less effective. 
(i) Consequences on Pre-Tax Earnings 
First of all, I am interested in whether the ECJ judgment facilitates profit shifting 
activities and thus has an impact on pre-tax earnings in low-tax subsidiaries. If CFC rules 
became less effective after the ECJ judgment one would expect that pre-tax earnings in those 
controlled foreign companies will increase afterwards. This leads to my first hypothesis: 
H1: Pre-tax earnings of controlled foreign companies increase after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment. 
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(ii)  Effect of Profit Shifting Activities 
Assuming the confirmation of H1, the increase in pre-tax earnings should be analyzed 
in more detail. After 2005, European CFC rules are applicable only to wholly artificial 
arrangements and thus are meaningless for profit shifting activities involving any economic 
activity. Hence, profit shifting activities within Europe are less restricted by CFC rules after the 
judgment and may be the reason for the increase in pre-tax earnings of controlled foreign 
companies. Therefore, I test the following hypothesis:  
H2: The increase of pre-tax earnings of controlled foreign companies is caused by 
enhanced profit shifting activities after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
(iii)  Importance of Different Profit Shifting Channels 
In general, MNCs are able to influence the allocation of their taxable income to foreign 
subsidiaries in various ways. The primary channels are thought to be the tax efficient use of 
transfer prices and of intercompany debt (Dharmapala, 2014). Both channels are used to 
generate payments by high-tax subsidiaries to low-tax subsidiaries to relocate pre-tax earnings 
to low-tax countries. 
To minimize the overall tax payments, MNCs may determine transfer prices resulting 
in an increase of pre-tax earnings generated in a low-tax country with a corresponding decrease 
of pre-tax earnings generated in a high-tax country (Davies, Martin, Parenti, and Toubal, 2018; 
Cristea and Nguyen, 2016; Riedel, Zinn, and Hofmann, 2015; Blouin, Robinson, and 
Seidman, 2011; Clausing, 2003; Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003; Swenson, 2001). 
Intercompany prices are not unambiguously determinable and thus manipulable when market 
prices are not available. Market prices are unavailable for the use of intangibles (e.g., royalty 
payments) or individual firm specific goods and services. Furthermore, information about an 
MNC’s intercompany prices is usually not offered by common databases. Thus, prior research 
confirms a relation of profit shifting activities and research and development expenses 
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(Grubert, 2003), intangibles (Dischinger and Riedel, 2011), and patents (Karkinsky and 
Riedel, 2012). 
Analyzing profit shifting activities through the use of intercompany debt mainly focuses 
on the leverage of an MNC. MNCs thereby intend to generate deductible interest expenses in 
high-tax countries by granting loans from a subsidiary located in a low-tax country (Büttner 
and Wamser, 2013; Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2010; Desai, Foley, and Hines, 2006). Prior 
research shows evidence that the leverage structure is influenced by statutory tax rates (Feld, 
Heckemeyer, and Overesch, 2013; Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème, 2008; Altshuler and 
Hubbard, 2002). 
To distinguish between the different channels of profit shifting, one could compare the 
tax variable effect on earnings before taxes (EBT) to the effect on earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT). Whereas the effect on EBT captures transfer pricing and debt shifting activities, 
EBIT excludes the results of financial activities and thus, captures transfer pricing 
manipulations only (Dharmapala, 2014). A meta-regression study of Heckemeyer and 
Overesch (2017) suggests that the major fraction of the overall BEPS volume is related to the 
tax efficient use of transfer pricing, while less is attributable to the strategic use of debt.  
Both profit shifting channels discussed above are in general captured by CFC rules, as 
the implementation thereof involves passive income like royalty or interest payments. Thus, it 
is conceivable that both channels will be affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
However, further anti-abusive rules exist and still may mitigate profit shifting activities even 
when CFC rules became less effective within Europe. Transfer pricing rules and documentation 
requirements for example are proved to be effective in avoiding profit shifting activities (Beer 
and Loeprick, 2015; Riedel, Zinn, and Hofmann, 2015). However, Beer and Loeprick (2015) 
do not find a similar mitigation effect for MNCs with high intangibles. Thus, at least MNCs 
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with high intangibles should be able to benefit from the Cadbury Schweppes judgment and are 
expected to engage in enhanced profit shifting activities after the ECJ judgment. 
Further financing structures are restricted by so-called thin capitalization rules. 
Following prior research that those rules are effective in preventing internal debt shifting 
activities in general (Büttner, Overesch, and Wamser, 2017; Blouin, Huizinga, Laeven, and 
Nicodème, 2014; Wamser, 2014; Büttner, Overesch, Schreiber, and Wamser, 2012; 
Weichenrieder and Windischbauer, 2008), it is questionable to what extent the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment will affect debt shifting activities.  
Summing up prior research, thin-capitalization rules are effective in avoiding financial 
profit shifting activities, while transfer pricing rules and documentation requirements are not 
effective in avoiding profit shifting activities related to transfer pricing of MNCs with high 
intangibles overall. I expect that transfer pricing activities will be affected more by the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment than debt shifting activities and define my third hypothesis as follows: 
H3:  The increase of pre-tax earnings of controlled foreign companies is mainly 
driven by transfer pricing activities. 
4.3 Research Design and Data 
4.3.1 Empirical Approach 
Following the previous developed hypotheses, my empirical analyses are based on the 
subsequent steps. First, I exploit a difference-in-differences approach to identify the 
consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes judgment on pre-tax earnings of controlled foreign 
companies. Second, I add proxies for profit shifting activities into the regression to analyze the 
importance thereof. Third, I implement two different approaches to attribute the increase in 
profit shifting activities after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment to two different channels: 
transfer pricing distortions and debt shifting activities.  
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(i)  Consequences on Pre-Tax Earnings 
As discussed in section 4.2, I expect an increase of pre-tax earnings of European low-
tax subsidiaries affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, i.e., controlled foreign 
companies with a parent company located in a European country with binding CFC rules 
in 2005. To analyze the effect I employ a standard difference-in-differences approach 
(Meyer, 1995). 
ܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ 	= 	 	ߛଵ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ × ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ + 	ߛଶ	 ௜ܺ௧+		ߛଷ 	 ௝ܹ௧ + ߠ௜ + ߱௧ + ݑ௜௧ .  (1) 
The dependent variable is defined as the log of pre-tax earnings of subsidiary i in year t. 
Therefore, I use the log of earnings before tax (ܧܤ ௜ܶ௧) in the main tests, while in additional 
regressions I consider the log of earnings before interest and taxes (ܧܤܫ ௜ܶ௧). 
The variable ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ	 equals one if subsidiary i is owned by a European parent 
company with binding CFC rules in 2005, and zero if it is owned by a US parent company. 
Thus, European-owned subsidiaries form the treatment group and US-owned subsidiaries form 
the control group in the difference-in-differences setting. ܲ ܱܵ ௧ܶ denotes the periods of and after 
the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, i.e., years from 2006 onwards. The interaction of 
ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ	 and ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ represents the difference-in-differences set-up. Thus, the coefficient 
ߛଵ is the treatment effect I am interested in, as it measures the differential response of a treated 
subsidiary i relative to a subsidiary not affected by the ECJ judgment. I expect a significant 
positive effect, which would signify an increase of pre-tax earnings of European controlled 
foreign companies after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
௜ܺ௧ is a vector of selected subsidiary characteristics. These control variables on the 
subsidiary-level are in line with prior studies (Dischinger, 2010; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) 
and consist of the log of fixed assets (CAPITAL) as a proxy for the use of capital, log of 
employee costs (STAF) as a proxy for the labor input, and the ratio of long term debt to total 
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assets (LEV) as a proxy for the financial leverage. Finally, ௝ܹ௧  is a vector of the host country j 
characteristics and includes the logs of gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita (GDPC), 
the unemployment rate (UNEMPLOY), and the corruption perception index (CPI). 
In all regressions subsidiary (θ௜) and year (ω௧) fixed effects are included to control for 
unobservable subsidiary-specific factors, for a general time trend, and business cycle effects. 
Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years.	ݑ௜௧ is a zero mean disturbance term. 
Please note that it is not necessary to include ܶ ܴܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ and ܲ ܱܵ ௧ܶ as stand-alone variables 
into the regression model due to the fact that subsidiary and year fixed effects are included. 
(ii)  Effect of Profit Shifting Activities 
Equation (1) is modified when analyzing the explanations of the increase in pre-tax 
earnings. As profit shifting activities are expected to be one possible reason for the increase, I 
expect a stronger treatment effect for MNCs with enhanced incentives in or facilitated 
opportunities of profit shifting activities. Therefore I create proxies and include triple 
interactions consisting of	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ, ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ and the different profit shifting proxies into 
the basic regression model of equation (1), while keeping all other requirements equal.  
ܧܤ ௜ܶ௧ 	= 	 	ߛଵ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ × ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ + 	ߛଶ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ × ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ × ܲܵ	ܴܱܲܺ ௜ܻ +	ߛଷ ௜ܺ௧ + 	ߛସ ௝ܹ௧ + ߠ௧ + ߱௜ + ݑ௜௧ .	  (2) 
An MNC is stronger incentivized the larger the expected benefit of profit shifting 
activities will be. The benefit will be larger, the lower the applicable statutory tax rate in the 
host country or the higher the applicable statutory tax rate in the country of its parent company 
is. Therefore, the first proxy is ܮܱܹ	ܴܵܶ	ܣܨܨܫܮܫܣܶܧ௜, which equals one when the statutory 
tax rate in the host country is equal or below 15 % in 2005, and zero otherwise. The second 
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proxy interacted is ܪܫܩܪ	ܴܵܶ	ܲܣܴܧܰ ௜ܶ, which equals one when the statutory tax rate in the 
parent’s country is above 25 % in 2005, and zero otherwise.104 
Further, previous studies argue that in particular those MNCs operating in the income 
mobile sector (e.g., having high values of research and development expenses, and intangibles) 
benefit from facilitated profit shifting opportunities. Thus, the third triple interaction is made 
with ܫܰܥܱܯܧ	ܯܱܤܫܮܧ௜, a dummy which is one if the subsidiary’s parent is operating in the 
income mobile sector, and zero otherwise.105 
I expect a significant positive coefficient for	γଶ over all three modifications. This would 
indicate that MNCs with enhanced profit shifting incentives or profit shifting opportunities 
benefit most from the ECJ judgment. Thereby, I can control whether the increase of pre-tax 
earnings in low-tax countries is related to profit shifting activities. 
(iii)  Importance of Different Profit Shifting Channels 
I further analyze the relative importance of the profit shifting channels after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment. I am not able to analyze the influence on transfer pricing and debt shifting 
activities immediately as common databases do not report transfer prices or intercompany 
interest payments. However, to disentangle both channels I first follow prior research and 
compare the regression results regarding EBT as dependent variable with those results when 
considering EBIT as dependent variable (Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). To further examine 
the importance of transfer pricing and debt shifting channels afterwards, I modify the basic 
                                               
104  Please note that due to the use of subsidiary fixed effects I do not have to include the proxy variable as a stand-
alone variable into the regression.  
105  Firms with the three-digit SIC codes 283 (Pharmaceutical), 357, 367, 737 (Computers) and 738 (Services) are 
classified as firms operating in the income mobile sector. 
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regression of equation (1) and consider various proxies of both profit shifting channels 
(ܥܪܣܰܰܧܮ௜௧) as dependent variable:  
		ܥܪܣܰܰܧܮ௜௧ 	= 		ߛଵ	ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ × ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ + 	ߛଶ	ܵܣܮܧ௜௧ + 	ߛଷ	ܵܫܼܧ௜௧ + 	ߛସ ௝ܹ௧ +
	+	ߠ௧ + 	߱௜ + ݑ௜௧ .  (3) 
First, I use the log of intangible assets (ܫܰܶܣ ௜ܰ௧) as dependent variable to analyze the 
importance of transfer prices. This procedure is in line with prior studies (e.g., Dischinger and 
Riedel, 2011).106 Again I employ a difference-in-differences setting with the same definitions 
of ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰ ௜ܶ	and ܱܲܵ ௧ܶ	as above. I expect an increase of transfer pricing distortions in 
low-tax countries and related to that an increase of intangibles on low-tax subsidiaries after the 
Cadbury Schweppes judgment. Thus, a significant positive sign of	ߛଵ is expected. Controlling 
for subsidiary characteristics that could further influence intangibles, I include the log of sales 
(ܵܣܮܧ ௜ܵ௧) and the log of total assets (ܵܫܼܧ௜௧). As in regression (1), I include country 
characteristics ( ௝ܹ௧), subsidiary (ߠ௜) and year (߱௧) fixed effects and robust standard errors are 
clustered by country-years. 
Analyzing profit shifting activities related to intercompany debt I follow prior research 
(e.g., Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013; Huizinga, Laeven, and Nicodème, 2008) and use the 
leverage ratio (ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧) and the log of financial profit (ܨܫܲܮ௜௧)107 as dependent variables in 
regression (3). Assuming that intercompany financing will increase after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment the leverage ratio should decrease (negative sign of	ߛଵ, when using 
ܮܧ ௜ܸ௧ 	as dependent variable) and financial profits are expected to increase (positive sign of		ߛଵ, 
                                               
106  To avoid losing subsidiaries that do not hold any intangible assets, I follow previous studies (e.g., 
Weichenrieder, 2009; Hilary and Lennox, 2005; Plassmann and Tideman, 2001) and add a small constant (0.1) 
to the value of intangibles before computing the log of those subsidiaries. 
107  Due to an overlap of financial expenses or revenues, financial profit can be either positive or negative. As I am 
also interested in firms with financial losses and using logs would drop those observations, I add to each 
observation a constant C that reflects the smallest financial profit of the sample. Doing so, all observations 
have a positive financial profit while the relative distributions to other observations is not affected. Thus, even 
negative financial profits will be considered in the regressions. This procedure is in line with prior practice 
(e.g., Dharmapala and Riedel, 2013). 
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when using ܨܫܲܮ௜௧	as dependent variable) in controlled foreign companies after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment. 
4.3.2 Data Description  
This paper is based on panel data of European subsidiaries. The data is obtained from 
the Amadeus database provided by Bureau van Dijk. Amadeus offers unconsolidated financial 
statements of European subsidiaries and provides a link to the group structure.108 
In line with the control requirement of CFC rules I define a subsidiary as a foreign one, 
if at least 50 % of its shares are owned by a parent company located in another country. To 
implement my difference-in-differences setting, I focus on subsidiaries with a European parent 
company restricted by CFC rules in 2005 (as those compose the treatment group) or a US parent 
company (as those compose the corresponding control group).109 Spain and France anticipated 
the ECJ judgment and changed their CFC rules already in 2004 and 2005, respectively. As 
anticipation effects in these two countries would potentially blur the precise identification of 
the Cadbury Schweppes effect, I exclude subsidiaries with a Spanish or French parent company. 
Further, the sample is restricted to subsidiaries located in those countries, which met the tax 
threshold of common CFC rules in 2005, i.e., the year prior to the ECJ judgment. As the tax 
threshold of CFC rules differs and depends on the specific tax regime in the parent company’s 
country, I use a relatively strict definition to focus on low-tax countries that are commonly 
triggered by CFC rules. Thus, I select subsidiaries from countries with an applicable statutory 
                                               
108  The ownership data is only available for the most recent year, which is mainly 2012 in this sample. The use of 
a constant ownership data could lead to a bias as group structures usually vary over time. Following previous 
studies (e.g., Budd, Konings, and Slaughter, 2005) I am not too concerned about this issue, since a potential 
misclassification would bias the results towards zero. 
109  The appendix provides more details. Please refer to table A1 of the appendix to get a detailed data development. 
Table A2 of the appendix provides additional information regarding the origin of all subsidiaries and table A3 
of the appendix presents a list of countries with binding CFC rules in 2005. 
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tax rate below 20 % in 2005.110 The selection requirements ensure that the considered 
subsidiaries are usually defined as controlled foreign companies if they realize passive income. 
Analyzing profit shifting activities I use pre-tax earnings (EBT) in logs as dependent 
variable and exclude subsidiary-year observations with missing values. Additional financial 
statement information is required for the regression analyses and thus observations with missing 
firm characteristics were deleted. 
The dataset is completed with several country specific control variables. Statutory tax 
rates are taken from the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY. Proxies 
for the host country’s income and development level (GDP and GDPC) and for the 
unemployment level (UNEMPLOY) are retrieved from the World Development Indicator 
Database. The corruption index (CPI) is offered by the Worldwide Governance Indicators.111 
I reduce the sample to the years from 2003 to 2011. I exclude the years 2008 and 2009 
to mitigate that my results could be driven by a potential bias raised to deviating behavior of 
MNCs during the financial crisis. Thus, I analyze three years prior and three years after the 
Cadbury Schweppes judgment. The final sample consists of 18,866 subsidiary year 
observations, thereof 15,250 subsidiaries are European-owned and 3,616 are US-owned, 
respectively. 
The summary statistics presented in the appendix (table A5 of the appendix) show that 
European-owned subsidiaries report lower pre-tax earnings compared to US-owned 
subsidiaries. Further, subsidiaries with a European parent company have less employee costs 
                                               
110  Those countries are Ireland, Iceland, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. Note that my basic results are 
essentially unchanged if a less restricted tax rate threshold of 22.5 % is considered. My results might further 
be underestimated as the countries listed on country-specific black lists are not necessarily included under the 
selected tax threshold. However, untabulated tests confirm my findings when Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Belgium are additionally considered as low-tax countries. Those countries have implemented a preferential 
tax regime for different types of income and are thus typically considered on a black list, e.g., on the Swedish 
black list.  
111  The definitions and data sources of all variables are presented in the appendix, table A4. Please note that to 
guarantee comparability, I use annual average exchange rates to convert financial data to Euros, if necessary. 
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and capital invested, while the leverage ratio is slightly larger compared to subsidiaries with a 
US parent company. 
4.4 Consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes Judgment 
4.4.1 Regression Analyses 
As explained above one would expect an increase of pre-tax earnings of controlled 
foreign companies after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment in 2006. The following empirical 
analyses test this expectation by running different regressions based on equation (1). The main 
results are presented in table 1. 
Table 1. Basic Results   
Dependent  
Variable: EBT 1 2 3 
TREATMENT x POST 0.1390*** 0.1060** 0.0965** 
  (0.0415) (0.0406) (0.0394) 
STAF  0.5280*** 0.5210*** 
   (0.0368) (0.0355) 
CAPITAL  0.0672*** 0.0622*** 
   (0.0138) (0.0140) 
LEV  -0.6750*** -0.6720*** 
   (0.0620) (0.0632) 
GDP   0.1690 
    (2.0340) 
GDPC   -1.3130 
    (1.7180) 
UNEMPLOY   -0.4940** 
    (0.1830) 
CPI   -0.0097 
      (0.0782) 
Subsidiary FE   
Year FE   
N 18,866 18,866 18,866 
Adj. R² 0.782 0.798 0.798 
Notes: All regressions of table 1 are based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company located either in a 
European country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or in the US (TREATMENT = 0). All 
specifications include years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 are excluded. All columns consider EBT as 
dependent variable. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and 
*** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
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In all columns I use EBT as dependent variable. Specification (1) considers only 
subsidiary and year fixed effects. In specifications (2) and (3) I add subsidiary- and country-
specific control variables. The coefficient of interest (ߛଵ) which represents the difference-in-
differences estimation, is positive and significant over all specifications.  
The regression of column (3) includes all control variables. The coefficient of 
ߛଵ	indicates that European-owned subsidiaries in low-tax countries were able to increase their 
pre-tax earnings by around 10 % after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment.112 In line with prior 
research (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) pre-tax earnings are significantly and positively 
related to STAF and CAPITAL, but negatively related to LEV. All in all, the results of table 1 
support the expectation of an increase in pre-tax earnings after the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment in 2006. 
Related literature (e.g., Dischinger, 2010) usually controls further for the statutory tax 
rate (ܵܶ ௝ܴ௧) in the host country. My sample however is restricted to subsidiaries located in 
European low-tax countries, i.e., where the applicable statutory tax rate is below 20 % in 2005. 
Low variation in the statutory tax rates (e.g., the standard deviation of STR within the treatment 
group is 0.02, please refer to table A5 of the appendix) and negligible explanation power are 
the consequences of this restriction. Thus, for the purpose of my approach it is not necessary to 
include the statutory tax rate into the regression.113 
4.4.2 Sample and Treatment Year Variations 
Ensuring that the results are caused by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment I repeat 
previous regressions with variations in the considered time period and the composition of 
                                               
112  In line with Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980), I interpret the dummy variable coefficients (c) in this logarithmic 
specification with the formula exp(c) – 1. 
113  However, my results are also robust to controlling for the statutory tax rates in the subsidiaries’ country. 
Huizinga and Laeven (2008) include further the parent company’s country statutory tax rate to their regression 
and argue that this is necessary to mitigate an omitted variable bias. In untabulated tests I also include the 
statutory tax rate of the parent company’s country and get similar results as presented above. 
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treatment and control group. The results are presented in table 2. All specifications are based 
on the same regression model as column (3) of table 1 and differ only in the considered (sub-) 
samples. 
Table 2. Sample Variation 
Dependent  
Variable: EBT 
Shortened 
Time  
Period 
Europ. CFC 
vs. 
Europ. Non CFC 
German Parent 
vs. 
US Parent 
UK Parent 
vs. 
US Parent 
1 2 3 4 
TREATMENT x POST 0.1370*** 0.0907* 0.0948*** 0.1990*** 
  (0.0422) (0.0527) (0.0321) (0.0687) 
Subsidiary Controls    
Country Controls    
Subsidiary FE    
Year FE    
N 9,673 20,224 11,910 5,578 
Adj. R² 0.838 0.774 0.801 0.803 
Notes: Column (1) is based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company located either in a European country 
with binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or in the US (TREATMENT = 0) and considers the years 
from 2004 to 2007. Specifications of columns (2) – (4) include years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 are 
excluded. Column (2) is based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company in a European country, either with 
binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or without (TREATMENT = 0). Column (3) is based on low-tax 
subsidiaries with a German parent company (TREATMENT = 1) or a US parent company (TREATMENT = 0). 
Column (4) is based on low-tax subsidiaries with a UK parent company (TREATMENT = 1) or a US parent 
company (TREATMENT = 0). Subsidiary controls include STAF, CAPITAL, and LEV. Country controls include 
GDP, GDPC, UNEMPLOY, and CPI. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years and are shown in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Specification (1) is based on the same subsidiaries as table 1, but differs from the prior 
analysis as it focuses on the years around the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, i.e., two years 
prior and after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment (from 2004 to 2007). This specification 
supports the expectation that pre-tax earnings of European foreign controlled companies 
increase after the ECJ judgment. Column (1) focuses on the years prior to the financial crisis 
and thus denies a potential bias arising thereof. 
Furthermore I ensure that the effect is not driven by a common trend of European-owned 
subsidiaries114 or a contrary trend of US-owned subsidiaries. Therefore, in column (2) of table 2 
                                               
114  To further proof that the prior found effect is not caused by a general profitability increase of European-owned 
subsidiaries, I include parent country-year fixed effects into the basic regressions in untabulated tests. However, 
controlling for a general time trend of the parent company’s country does not change my basic results. 
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I replace the prior control group of US-owned subsidiaries by European-owned subsidiaries 
that should also not be affected by the ECJ judgment, i.e., subsidiaries with a parent company 
located in a European country without binding CFC rules in 2005. The treatment group is 
unchanged and still includes subsidiaries of European parent companies with binding CFC rules 
in 2005. The specification yields a significantly positive coefficient of	ߛଵ, and thus is in line 
with previous results. 
Columns (3) and (4) of table 2 repeat the basic regression based on subsamples. In 
column (3) I compare German-owned subsidiaries (treatment group) with US-owned 
subsidiaries (control group). The result indicates that German-owned subsidiaries increase their 
pre-tax earnings after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. In column (4) I compare UK-owned 
subsidiaries as treatment group, whereas US-owned subsidiaries again form the control group. 
While the effect is much larger than prior found effects, these subsample results are in line with 
my expectation and confirm H1. To mitigate that the latter effect is caused by the in 2008 
abolished territorial tax system in the UK, I repeat the same regression and exclude years 
after 2007. However, those untabulated results are similar in significance and magnitude as 
those shown in column (4). 
Table 3 presents several placebo-type tests. Again all specifications are based on the 
same regression and requirements as my basic estimation and differ only in the definition of 
treatment- and control group (columns (1) and (2)) or in the definition of the treatment year 
(columns (3) and (4)). 
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Table 3. Placebo Tests 
 Sample Variation Treatment Year Variation 
Dependent  
Variable: EBT 
European Non  
CFC vs. US 
EU High-tax vs.  
US High-tax TY 2005 TY 2007 
 1 2 3 4 
TREATMENT x POST -0.0128 0.0135 0.0816 0.0225 
  (0.0725) (0.0140) (0.0527) (0.0467) 
Subsidiary Controls    
Country Controls    
Subsidiary FE     
Year FE     
N 8,590 145,409 18,866 18,866 
Adj. R² 0.790 0.815 0.798 0.798 
Notes: Column (1) is based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company in a European country without binding 
CFC Rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) and low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company in the US (TREATMENT 
= 0). Regression of column (2) is based on high-tax subsidiaries with a parent company located either in a European 
country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or in the US (TREATMENT = 0). Columns (3) and 
(4) are based on the basic sample, i.e., on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company in a European country with 
binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) and low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company in the US 
(TREATMENT = 0). While the Treatment Year (TY) is 2006 in columns (1) and (2), it is changed to 2005 and 2007 
in column (3) and (4), respectively. Subsidiary controls include STAF, CAPITAL, and LEV. Country controls 
include GDP, GDPC, UNEMPLOY, and CPI. All specifications include years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 
are excluded. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** 
show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
The placebo test in column (1) considers low-tax subsidiaries of European parent 
companies with no binding CFC rules in 2005 as treatment group, while low-tax subsidiaries 
with US parent companies still constitute the control group. As the (placebo) treatment group 
in this sample should not be affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, the insignificant 
coefficient is in line with my expectation.  
The sample of specification (2) again compares European-owned subsidiaries with US-
owned subsidiaries. However, in this specification I do not concentrate on subsidiaries in low-
tax countries, instead I consider those subsidiaries located in high-tax countries where the 
applicable statutory tax rate were equal or above 20 % in 2005, e.g., Germany, France or Italy. 
This leads to a quite larger sample size. Due to the facts that the tax threshold of common CFC 
rules is no longer full filled for those subsidiaries and higher tax rates should not incentivize 
profit shifting activities, pre-tax earnings should not increase after the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment. Even more, I would expect a negative treatment effect in this composition, as profit 
 
149 
 
shifting activities usually result in an increase of pre-tax earnings in low-tax countries and a 
corresponding decrease in high-tax countries. However, the coefficient in column (2) is neither 
significant nor negative, and thus suggests that the Cadbury Schweppes judgment does not 
affect subsidiaries located in high-tax countries.115 
Finally, I run two placebo tests regarding the treatment year. Therefore I consider the 
same treatment and control group as in the basic regression and chose the years 2005 
(column (3)) and 2007 (column (4)) as treatment years. As the Cadbury Schweppes judgment 
was in 2006, I do not expect a treatment effect in these two modifications. The insignificant 
coefficients in columns (3) and (4) confirm the expectation. 
4.4.3 Matched Sample Analyses 
The perfect setting to analyze the effect of the Cadbury Schweppes judgment on profit 
shifting activities decision would require observing each subsidiary first with a European parent 
company (treated) and second with a US parent company (not treated) in each period. As a 
subsidiary is either European- or US-owned, it is not possible to observe how the (treated) 
subsidiary would have performed without being affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
The best alternative then is to create an adequate control group that is as similar as possible to 
the treatment group regarding several subsidiary characteristics. 
Propensity score matching is an appropriate technique to build such an adequate control 
group and further addresses a potential selection bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; 
Titus, 2007). Applying the propensity score matching involves a two-step procedure: First, the 
                                               
115  A possible explanation therefor might be the small (big) share of pre-tax earnings located in low-tax (high-tax) 
subsidiaries. Based on the overall pre-tax earnings of all European subsidiaries within a group, only 8 % are 
attributable to low-tax subsidiaries while the remaining 92 % are attributable to high-tax subsidiaries. My basic 
results suggest a 10 % increase in pre-tax earnings of low-tax subsidiaries after the ECJ judgment. Even 
assuming a completely corresponding (decreasing) effect in high-tax subsidiaries, the effect would be much 
smaller in magnitude due to the relatively high amount of pre-tax earnings in high-tax subsidiaries. Thus, I am 
not too concerned about not finding a significant negative effect in column (2). 
 
150 
 
probability ݌పෝ  that the subsidiary i has a European parent company has to be predicted. 
Assuming a probit model I estimate the following probability regression: 
ܴܶܧܣܶܯܧܰܶ௜, ଶ଴଴ହ = 	 ߚଵܺ௜, ଶ଴଴ହ + ߝ௜, ଶ଴଴ହ.  (4) 
Equation (4) indicates that the probability of being European-owned depends on firm-
specific characteristics, captured by	 ௜ܺ,ଶ଴଴ହ. The index 2005 indicates that all variables are 
measured in 2005, which is the year prior to the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. The vector 
௜ܺ,ଶ଴଴ହ includes subsidiary characteristics that are considered as determinants of pre-tax 
earnings (e.g., Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Augurzky and Schmidt, 2001). In line with the 
subsidiary-specific control variables defined in section 4.3.1, I consider STAF, CAPITAL, and 
LEV as relevant determinants.  
Second, I apply a one-to-five nearest neighbor matching. Based on the estimated 
propensity scores of the first step, each treated subsidiary (European-owned) is matched to one 
or maximum five non-treated subsidiaries (US-owned). I require that only subsidiaries within 
the same industry116 and year (2005) will be matched and that the difference in propensity 
scores is less than 0.01.117 The overall good matching quality is shown in table 4. Table 4 shows 
that the bias has been drastically reduced for all characteristics and remaining differences are 
not significant after the matching procedure.118 
                                               
116  According to the Fama and French classification of 17 different industry groups. 
117  Untabulated results based on the chosen one-to-five nearest neighbor matching are robust to applying a caliper 
of 0.02 and 0.03. 
118  Figure A1 of the appendix demonstrates graphically that the standardized bias is reduced for each firm 
characteristic after applying the propensity score matching. 
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Table 4. One-to-Five Nearest Neighbor Matching Quality 
Nearest  
Neighbor 1:5  Mean Bias 
Bias  
Reduction t-test 
 Treated Control (in %) (in %) t p>t 
STAF Unmatched 6.4429 7.0483 -38.2  -6.38 0.000 
 Matched 6.4551 6.4433 0.7 98.0 0.21 0.836 
CAPITAL Unmatched 6.5829 6.7883 -8.5  -1.42 0.155 
 Matched 6.3678 6.3322 1.5 82.6 0.38 0.704 
LEV Unmatched 0.0958 0.0631 23.7  3.78 0.000 
 Matched 0.0790 0.0777 1.0 96.0 0.25 0.806 
Notes: Table 4 compares the means of the relevant matching characteristics between European-owned and US-
owned subsidiaries before and after the matching. The control group is determined by the propensity score in the 
year prior to the Cadbury Schweppes judgment, i.e., 2005. The results are formed on one-to-five nearest neighbor 
matching requiring a difference in propensity score of less than 0.01. Variables are defined in table A4 of the 
appendix. 
Table 5 further shows that the observable characteristics do no longer explain the parent 
company’s origin of a subsidiary. The explanatory power in terms of pseudo-R2 is drastically 
reduced and the observables are not only separately insignificant as shown in table 4 but also 
jointly insignificant (p>χ² = 0.9810). As well the mean (median) bias between treatment and 
control group before and after the matching and across all characteristics is reduced from 23.5 % 
(23.7 %) to 1.1 % (1.0 %). Concluding, the results confirm an overall good matching quality. 
Table 5. Joint Insignificance of Observables after Matching 
   Bias 
Sample Pseudo - R² p>χ² Mean Median 
Unmatched 0.0400 0.0000 23.50 23.70 
Matched 0.0000 0.9810 1.10 1.00 
Notes: Based on the one-to-five nearest neighbor matching table 5 describes the jointly explanatory power of the 
selected subsidiary characteristics before and after the matching procedure. 
The matched sample consists of 340 treatment subsidiaries and 1,254 control 
subsidiaries. Based on the matched sample, I continue my analyses by running the basic 
difference-in-differences regressions as in section 4.4.1. Combining those two approaches, i.e., 
propensity score matching and the following difference-in-differences analyses, further 
mitigates a potential omitted variables bias (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008; Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith, and Todd, 1998). Table 6 presents the difference-in-differences results with subsidiary 
and year fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country-years. Column (1) 
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describes the estimation based on the matched sample. The positive and significant coefficient 
(0.1160) suggest an increase of pre-tax earnings for European-owned subsidiaries after the 
Cadbury Schweppes judgment of around 12 %. The result is consistent with my prior findings 
and thus confirms my expectations. 
Table 6. Difference-in-Differences Results after Matching 
Dependent  
Variable: EBT 
1:5 NN 1:1 NN Kernel 
1 2 3 
TREATMENT x POST 0.1160** 0.2790** 0.1220*** 
  (0.0480) (0.1270) (0.0434) 
Subsidiary FE   
Year FE   
N 8,730 620 10,517 
Adj. R² 0.755 0.757 0.762 
Notes: Table 6 presents the difference-in-differences results of equation (1) after one-to-five, one-to-one nearest 
neighbor and kernel matching. The treatment group includes 340, 56, and 340 observations and the control 
group 1,254, 56, and 1,592 observations respectively. All specifications include years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 
and 2009 are excluded. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years and are shown in parentheses. *, **, 
and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
I repeat the analysis using different matching procedures to ensure that the result is not 
driven by the choice of matching method. Columns (2) and (3) show the difference-in-
differences results based on a one-to-one nearest neighbor and a kernel matching, respectively. 
While one-to-one nearest neighbor matching reduces the sample to only 56 treatment and 
control subsidiaries each, the estimated coefficients of 0.2790 is quite above prior results. 
However, applying different matching procedures yields significant positive effects on pre-tax 
earnings for European-owned subsidiaries after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. Moreover, 
all presented results stay robust when using EBIT as dependent variable, as untabulated tests 
show similar, significant coefficients. All in all, the findings of the robustness tests further 
confirm H1 and suggest an increase of pre-tax earnings in European controlled foreign 
companies after the ECJ judgment in 2006. 
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4.5 Explanations of the Identified Consequences 
4.5.1 Profit Shifting Activities 
With further analyses I test H2 and examine whether the increase of pre-tax earnings 
after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment is related to profit shifting activities. Therefore, I make 
use of proxies that either incentivize or facilitate profit shifting activities, and interact those 
proxies with TREATMENT and POST as demonstrated in equation (2). Expecting that profit 
shifting activities are the drivers of the increase in pre-tax earnings found in section 4.4, I 
anticipate an additional treatment effect for those subsidiaries with enhanced profit shifting 
incentives or opportunities. The results are presented in table 7. 
Table 7. Additional Treatment Effects 
Dependent  
Variable: EBT 1 2 3 
TREATMENT x POST 0.0906** -0.1740 0.0882** 
  (0.0400) (0.1700) (0.0399) 
TREATMENT x POST x LOW STR SUBSIDIARY 0.4850**   
  (0.2160)   
TREATMENT x POST x HIGH STR PARENT  0.2790*  
   (0.1550)  
TREATMENT x POST x INCOME MOBILE   0.1090* 
      (0.0603) 
Subsidiary Controls    
Country Controls    
Subsidiary FE   
Year FE   
N 18,866 18,866 18,866 
Adj. R² 0.798 0.798 0.798 
Notes: All regressions are based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company located either in a European 
country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or in the US (TREATMENT = 0). Subsidiary controls 
include STAF, CAPITAL, and LEV. Country controls include GDP, GDPC, UNEMPLOY, and CPI. All 
specifications include years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 are excluded. Robust standard errors are clustered 
by country-years and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, 
respectively. 
First, the incentive of profit shifting should be higher the lower the statutory tax rate in 
the host country is. Column (1) presents the result when including the triple interaction of 
TREATMENT, POST and LOW STR SUBSIDIARY into the basic regression model (1). The 
positive coefficient of 0.4850 indicates that after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment pre-tax 
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earnings increase even stronger in those subsidiaries located in countries with extremely low 
statutory tax rates. 
Second, the incentive of profit shifting should also be stronger the higher the statutory 
tax rate in the parent company’s country is. Therefore, I interact the proxy HIGH STR PARENT, 
which equals one if the statutory tax rate in the parent company’s country is above 25 %, and 
zero otherwise. The result of the triple interaction of TREATMENT, POST and HIGH STR 
PARENT is shown in column (2) and demonstrates as well an additional treatment effect. 
Finally, the treatment effect should also be more pronounced for MNCs with enhanced 
profit shifting opportunities. Column (3) shows a positive coefficient and indicates an additional 
increase of pre-tax earnings for low-tax subsidiaries related to a group, which is operating in 
the income mobile sector and thus is expected of having facilitated profit shifting opportunities. 
Overall these findings support H2, stating that the increase of pre-tax earnings after the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment is related to profit shifting activities. 
4.5.2 Profit Shifting Channels 
As pre-tax earnings can be shifted in various ways from high to low-tax countries 
(Bartelsman and Beetsma, 2003), I continue analyzing the effect of the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment on those different profit shifting channels. First of all, I compare the treatment effects 
found in my prior analyses when using EBT as dependent variable with the treatment effect 
when using EBIT as dependent variable. The results are summarized in table 8. 
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Table 8. Profit Shifting Channels 
Dependent Variables 
 
EBT EBIT 
 Increase explained by 
 Debt Shifting Transfer Pricing 
1 2  3 4 
(1) Basic Regression 0.0965** 0.0901**  
4.49 % 95.51 %   (0.0394) (0.0391)  
(2) Shortend Time Period 0.1370*** 0.1130**  
15.63 % 84.37 %   (0.0422) (0.0407)  
(3) European CFC vs. 0.0907* 0.0778*  
12.25 % 87.75 % European Non CFC (0.0527) (0.0396)  
(4) German Parent vs. 0.0948*** 0.0792*  
14.54 % 85.46 % US Parent (0.0321) (0.0445)  
(5) UK Parent vs. 0.1990*** 0.1670***  
14.15 % 85.85 % US Parent (0.0687) (0.0474)  
(6) Matching 1:5 NN 0.1160** 0.1100***  
3.00 % 97.00 %  (0.0480) (0.0404)  
(7) Matching 1:1 NN 0.2790** 0.2700**  
1.00 % 99.00 %   (0.1270) (0.0987)  
(8) Matching Kernel 0.1220*** 0.1240***  
-3.97 % 103.97 %   (0.0434) (0.0381)  
Notes. The table summarizes the prior findings regarding EBT in column (1) and show the treatment effects on 
EBIT in column (2). All regressions are based on low-tax subsidiaries. The prior used control variables (STAF, 
CAPITAL, LEV, GDP, GDPC, UNEMPLOY, CPI) as well as subsidiary and year fixed effects are included. Robust 
standard errors are clustered by country-years and are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at 
the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
Column (1) of table 8 summarizes the coefficients for the treatment effect (ߛଵ) on EBT 
of the prior analyses. Column (2) shows the results when repeating same regressions with EBIT 
as dependent variable. Overall specifications the treatment effect is significant and positive. 
Except of modification (8), the treatment effect on EBT is always slightly larger than the effect 
on EBIT. At the first glance the finding is reasonable, as EBT captures all profit shifting 
activities and should therefore react more pronounced than EBIT, which in particular excludes 
debt shifting activities. However, I cannot compare the two effects immediately as both refer to 
different bases. Following Heckemeyer and Overesch (2017) I use the following equation to 
disentangle the effect of transfer pricing activities on the overall EBT effect: 
 ߛ்௉ = 	 ߛா஻ூ் ா஻ூ்തതതതതതതா஻்തതതതതത . (5) 
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The sample means ratio of EBIT over EBT is 1.023, indicating that on average EBIT 
is 2.3 % higher than EBT.119 Multiplying this ratio with my basic effect on EBIT in column (2) 
results in 0.0922 (= 1.023 * 0.0901), which represents the treatment effect related to transfer 
pricing activities. Interpreting the results shows that the overall treatment effect on EBT is 
mainly caused by transfer pricing activities (i.e., by 95.51 %)120, while the residual and thus 
little is driven by debt shifting activities (4.49 %). The shares of transfer pricing and debt 
shifting on the treatment effect for all modifications made in this paper are presented in 
columns (3) and (4), respectively. Overall specifications, on average more than 90 % of the 
increased profit shifting activities is related to transfer pricing and less than 10 % is related to 
debt shifting.121  
These findings are in line with my expectation that transfer pricing activities are more 
affected by the Cadbury Schweppes judgment than debt shifting activities and thus confirm H3. 
To further support those results, I continue analyzing the effect of the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment on both profit shifting channels. In particular, I analyze the effects of the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment on already prior used proxies for transfer pricing and debt shifting 
activities. The results based on equation (3) are shown in table 9. 
                                               
119  Due to the use of unconsolidated financial statements of the subsidiaries, this ratio itself might be affected by 
profit shifting activities. To mitigate a potential bias the computation of a ratio based on consolidated 
statements is recommended. In untabulated test, I compute the ratio of EBIT over EBT based on consolidated 
data offered by Compustat and Compustat Global. This procedure however leads to similar findings as the 
presented results. 
120  Derived by computing [(0.0922/0.0965)*100 = 95.51 %]. 
121  Specification (8) suggest that more than 100 % of the overall profit shifting activities are attributable to transfer 
pricing activities. As the result is difficult to interpret, I do not include this finding by calculating the average 
effects related to both profit shifting channels.  
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Table 9. Proxies for Profit Shifting Channels  
Dependent Variables 
 
INTAN FIPL LEV 
1 2 3 
TREATMENT x POST 0.1310** 0.0002 -0.0033 
  (0.0619) (0.0002) (0.0041) 
Subsidiary Controls    
Country Controls    
Subsidiary FE    
Year FE    
N 18,866 18,866 18,866 
Adj. R² 0.501 0.142 0.625 
Notes: All regressions are based on low-tax subsidiaries with a parent company located either in a European 
country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (TREATMENT = 1) or in the US (TREATMENT = 0). Subsidiary controls 
include SALES and SIZE. Country controls include GDP, GDPC, UNEMPLOY, and CPI. The sample includes 
years from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 are excluded. Robust standard errors are clustered by country-years and 
are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** show significance at the level of 10 %, 5 %, and 1 %, respectively. 
I find an increase of intangibles by around 14 % for low-tax subsidiaries affected by the 
ECJ judgment in column (1). Even the coefficient is positive for financial profits and negative 
for the leverage in columns (2) and (3), I do not find significant treatment effects on those 
proxies for controlled foreign companies. Taken those results together, it supports the prior 
findings and supports H3 that the increase of low-tax subsidiaries’ pre-tax earnings is mainly 
driven by enhanced transfer pricing activities while debt shifting is less important.  
Two findings should be mentioned to conclude these analyses. First my results are in 
line with prior findings demonstrating that the major fraction of international income shifting 
derives from the strategic distortion of transfer prices. Second, the results are reasonable 
regarding previous research results showing that thin capitalization rules are suitable to avoid 
debt shifting while transfer pricing rules are still not able to prevent several tax avoiding 
strategies. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the prior literature by providing convincing evidence that less 
effective CFC rules facilitate profit shifting activities of MNCs. While previous studies focus 
on the allocation of assets or the effect on overall tax expenses of MNCs, this paper provides 
evidence about the extent of increased pre-tax earnings in low-tax subsidiaries and the channels 
used for profit shifting activities after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. 
Using a difference-in-differences approach, my empirical results show a significant 
increase of pre-tax earnings in low-tax subsidiaries after the ECJ judgment. Several robustness 
tests confirm the expectation and indicate that pre-tax earnings of affected low-tax subsidiaries 
have increased by approximately 10 % after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment. Furthermore, 
additional tests ensure that the increase is related to profit shifting activities and is mainly driven 
by the strategic determination of transfer prices within MNCs, while debt shifting activities are 
less material.  
My results suggest that strengthening CFC rules could limit profit shifting activities. 
However, I acknowledge that my study is not free of limitations. Most notably, due to the lack 
of data, I am not able to analyze profit shifting activities in a direct manner. Future research 
with access to intercompany transactions could provide deeper insights. Nevertheless, my 
analyses provide convincing evidence as they rely on already proved proxies of prior research. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Sample Selection 
Description Firms Firm-Years 
Available in Database 953,439 6,201,377 
Foreign Subsidiaries 169,777 1,093,854 
Low-Tax Subsidiaries  31,372 185,218 
Headquarters in EU / US 14,619 89,459 
Non-Missing and Positive EBT 12,020 55,804 
Non-Missing Control Variables 5,605 25,479 
Excluding Years of Financial Crisis 5,449 18,866 
Notes: The sample is based on firms that were incorporated in European low-tax countries and includes the years 
from 2003 to 2011, 2008 and 2009 are excluded. 
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Table A2. Country Overview 
 
# of foreign subsidiaries with 
 
 
European 
Parent 
with  
CFC rules 
 
European 
Parent 
without CFC 
rules 
 
US 
Parent  
 
 
Low-tax Countries       
 Ireland 924 140 869 
 Iceland 18 9 8 
 Latvia 154 33 5 
 Poland 9,090 2,113 1,651 
 Slovakia 3,035 2,319 523 
 Hungary 2,029 360 560 
 Total 15,250 4,974 3,616 
 
 
    
High-tax Countries       
 Germany 4,841 2,465 5,089 
 France 19,320 10,607 9,098 
 Netherlands 1,737 511 1,179 
 Italy 7,482 3,407 4,462 
 UK 8,217 4,222 13,808 
 Denmark 1,500 196 571 
 Portugal 2,436 1,045 1,153 
 Spain 11,878 2,627 4,481 
 Belgium 5,639 2,539 3,641 
 Luxembourg 597 357 223 
 Norway 6,169 445 1,012 
 Sweden 6,104 659 1,652 
 Finland 3,707 412 948 
 Austria 2,705 353 656 
 Malta 34 0 2 
 Estonia 2,464 174 200 
 Czech Rep. 8,099 2,815 1,727 
 Slovenia 1,125 427 189 
 Croatia 1,047 233 217 
  Total 95,101 33,494 50,308 
Notes: The main sample of the analysis consists of foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries (# 18,866) with a 
parent company located in a European country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (# 15,250) and those with a US 
parent company (# 3,616). The remaining information of this table is relevant to understand the composition of 
created subsamples in robustness tests. 
  
 
161 
 
Table A3. European Countries with CFC Rules  
European Countries with binding CFC Rules 
in 2005 
Denmark 
Finland 
France * 
Germany 
Hungary 
Italy 
Lithuania 
Norway 
Portugal  
Spain * 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Notes: Based on a document provided by Deloitte (see further: 
https://www2.deloitte.com/global/en/pages/tax/articles/guide-to 
-controlled-foreign-company-regimes.html) this table includes 
European countries with binding CFC rules in 2005. My 
treatment group consists of foreign low-tax subsidiaries with a 
parent company located in one of the countries listed at this 
table. Please note that due to the anticipation of the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment and the early amendments in French and 
Spanish CFC rules, I exclude observations with a parent 
company location in France or Spain (labeled with *).  
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Table A4. Variable Definition 
EBT Pre-tax earnings in logs 
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes in logs 
TREATMENT Dummy, which is one for a subsidiary affected by the Cadbury 
Schweppes judgment, and zero otherwise 
POST Dummy, which is one for the year of the Cadbury Schweppes 
judgment (2006) and following years 
STAF Labor compensation in logs 
LEV  Ratio of long term debt to total assets 
SALES Sales in logs 
CAPITAL Fixed assets in logs 
SIZE Total assets in logs 
FIPL Financial profit in logs 
INTAN Ratio of intangibles over total assets in logs 
LOW STR SUBSIDIARY Dummy, which is one if the statutory tax rate in the host 
country is equal or below 15 %, and zero otherwise 
HIGH STR PARENT Dummy, which is one if the statutory tax rate of the parent 
company’s country is above 25 %, and zero otherwise 
INCOME MOBILE  Dummy, which is one if the parent company operates in the 
income mobile sector, and zero otherwise 
GDP Gross domestic product in logs of the host country 
GDPC Gross domestic product per capita of logs in the host country 
UNEMPLOY Unemployment rate in logs of the host country 
CPI Corruption index in logs of the host country 
STR  Statutory corporate tax rate of the host country 
Notes: Firm data are taken from Amadeus database. GDP, GDPC, and UNEMPLOY are taken from the World 
Bank Development Indicators database. CPI is retrieved Worldwide Governance Indicators database. STRs were 
collected from the worldwide corporate tax summaries of PwC, KPMG, and EY.  
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Table A5. Summary Statistics 
  
Subsidiaries with a 
European Parent  
Subsidiaries with a  
US Parent 
Variable  N Mean Std. Dev.  N Mean Std. Dev. 
EBT  15,250 5.94 1.95  3,616 6.81 2.01 
EBIT  15,210 6.09 1.81  3,615 6.85 1.91 
TREATMENT  15,250 1.00 0.00  3,616 0.00 0.00 
TREATMENT x POST  15,250 0.74 0.44  3,616 0.00 0.00 
STAF  15,250 6.54 1.66  3,616 7.32 1.62 
CAPITAL  15,250 6.56 2.51  3,616 6.82 2.66 
LEV  15,250 0.10 0.16  3,616 0.07 0.13 
GDP  15,250 25.86 0.75  3,616 25.85 0.65 
GDPC  15,250 9.14 0.46  3,616 9.41 0.70 
UNEMPLOY  15,250 2.45 0.34  3,616 2.37 0.42 
CPI  15,250 -1.10 0.62  3,616 -0.76 0.83 
STR   15,250 0.19 0.02   3,616 0.18 0.03 
Notes: The main sample of the analysis (# 18,866) consists of foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries with a 
parent company located in a European country with binding CFC rules in 2005 (# 15,250) and those with a US 
parent company (# 3,616). 
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Figure A1. Bias Reduction after Propensity Score Matching 
 
Notes: The figure demonstrates that the standardized bias is reduced for each subsidiary characteristic after 
applying the propensity score matching. The points and crosses in the figure compare the standardized bias before 
and after the employed one-to-five nearest neighbor matching.  
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This thesis analyzes tax differentials between US and European firms. The three essays 
provide a better understanding of tax differentials that exist between US and European firms 
and explore the potential determinants thereof. 
Chapter 2 reviews the definitions of effective tax rates (ETRs) as common proxies used 
for tax expenditures and thus contributes to literature that spends effort in interpreting the 
information content of different ETR measures. In addition, it illustrates the differences in ETRs 
between US and European firms. While previous research comes to confounding results when 
comparing tax expenditures between US and European firms, the results of chapter 2 suggest 
that conflicting findings of prior analyses can be attributed to the use of different ETR measures: 
higher tax expenditures in terms of GAAP ETR and lower tax expenditures in terms of 
CURRENT ETR, CASH ETR, and FOREIGN ETR are found for US firms compared to European 
firms. Additional analyses of chapter 2 demonstrate that higher GAAP ETRs of US firms are in 
particular attributable to higher deferred tax liabilities compared to European firms. 
Chapter 3 builds on the insights of chapter 2 as it uses the prior presented ETR measures 
to analyze tax differentials between US and European firms with a more detailed approach. In 
particular, pairs of similar US and European firms, given observable firm characteristics, were 
identified. Running regressions on the matched sample that condition on pair fixed effects 
allows to analyze effective tax rate differentials that arise between very similar US and 
European firms. These pairwise comparisons confirm the prior results of chapter 2: US firms 
face higher GAAP ETRs compared to their European peers, while CURRENT ETRs, CASH 
ETRs, and FOREIGN ETRs are lower for US firms. 
Additional analyses in chapter 3 are concerned with the determinants of tax differentials. 
The results suggest that most of the tax differential between US and European firms can be 
explained by observable firm characteristics and home country tax law. For example, US firms 
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face a competitive disadvantage due to the higher statutory tax rate applicable in the US until 
the tax reform in 2017. However, enhanced profit shifting opportunities of US firms associated 
with research and development expenditures let US firms compensate that disadvantage. 
Moreover, the applicable international tax system and the effectiveness of Controlled Foreign 
Company (CFC) rules in the home country of a firm affect its tax expenditures. The results 
suggest that ETRs decrease significantly after CFC rules became less effective. For example, 
ETRs of US firms fell by around 4.6 percentage points after the so-called “Check the Box” 
(CTB) introduction made it possible to avoid the application of US CFC rules. A similar 
decrease is found for ETRs of European firms after the Cadbury Schweppes judgment required 
amendments to CFC rules within Europe. While CFC rules affect GAAP ETRs and FOREIGN 
ETRs, the international tax system impacts GAAP ETRs only. 
Chapter 4 continues to evaluate the impact of CFC rules on tax expenditures and 
contributes to previous literature that analyzes the relevance of anti-tax avoidance measures. 
The empirical results in chapter 4 suggest that profit shifting activities increase after CFC rules 
became less effective within Europe. After the Cadbury Schweppes judgment in 2006, pre-tax 
earnings of European-owned subsidiaries located in low-tax countries increased by around 
10 percent compared to US-owned subsidiaries. Additional tests demonstrate that the increase 
in pre-tax earnings is in particular attributable to transfer pricing activities. The results suggest 
that strengthening CFC rules, as currently followed with the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
(BEPS) action plan by the OECD, is likely to limit profit shifting activities. 
Overall, this thesis addresses current developments in international tax legislations as for 
example the US tax reform and the BEPS action plan followed by the OECD. The analyses 
enhance the understanding of existing tax differentials between US and European firms prior 
to the US tax reform in 2017: conditional on the home country tax rates, US firms had already 
lower tax expenditures prior to the US tax reform. In particular, tax planning opportunities and 
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the home country tax legislation are significant determinants of those tax differentials between 
US and European firms. The findings let assume that the tax rate cut and the abolishment of the 
worldwide tax system in the US after the tax reform will increase the tax differential and will 
result in a competitive advantage for US firms compared to their European peers.
 
 
  
 
